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ABSTRACT
Municipal unauthorized immigration policy, as an area of study, is underexplored.
The literature is in the early stages of development, and little specific theory to guide
research exists. To advance this emerging field, my study addresses two questions. First,
what unauthorized immigration policies do local governments pursue, under what
circumstances, and for what reasons? Second, what explains city-to-city variation in
municipal responsiveness to the policy preferences and interests of residents without
legal status?
The dissertation also presents a typology of municipal responsiveness to
unauthorized immigrants, based on my exploratory research. To explain intercity
differences in the policy processes and choices of local government, I explore three
possible explanations--Hero’s (1998) social diversity thesis, urban regime theory, and
political culture and policy entrepreneurship. My study engages these theoretical ideas
with the findings of a comparative case study of three mid-size, reemerging gateway
cities: Sacramento, California; Denver, Colorado; and Portland, Oregon. I explore
whether associations between local factors and municipal unauthorized immigration
policy emerge in the recent history of the three case cities.
Analysis of data gleaned from document study suggests that political culture, as
expressed through entrepreneurial political leaders, has been important in shaping regime
development and subsequent policy action on unauthorized immigration, while
differences in the ethnoracial structure of cities accounts for variation in policy approach.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The Problem of Municipal Immigration Policy
Municipal immigration policy is happening all around us, but it is ad hoc from
city to city and not well understood. For example, in 2008 federal immigration agents
scooped up and incarcerated 20 percent of Postville, Iowa’s population of 2,300 in a raid
at local kosher meat processing plant. The near-demise of the town that followed after the
plant declared bankruptcy was documented on CBS News. Correspondent Seth Doane
issued this report on the raid’s impact:
With empty streets and shuttered shops, this small town is facing economic
calamity. Mayor Bob Penrod is taking steps this weekend to declare a state of
emergency here. But it's not a natural disaster. Rather, one that's manmade…
(Drennen, 2009, para. 3).
A story in the Washington Post detailed allegations made by townspeople against
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for targeting workers instead of CEOs
(Hsu, 2008). A month later, USA Today ran a story about three West Coast mayors who
got their colleagues in the U.S. Conference of Mayors to challenge the way government
raids businesses in search of illegal workers. Local leaders complained about sweeps
hurting regional economies by forcing companies to relocate (Bazar, 2008).

1

San Francisco’s position on immigration raids is captured in this April 27, 2007
New York Times national news brief:
Police officers and other city employees will not help federal immigration
authorities seeking to round up and deport illegal immigrant workers in San
Francisco, Mayor Gavin Newsom said Sunday. The mayor told a predominantly
Hispanic audience…that while city and state officials could not stop Immigration
and Customs Enforcement from conducting sweeps in the city, he would do
everything within his power to discourage them. ‘We are a sanctuary city, make
no mistake about it’ (“City Won’t Aid,” 2007, para. 1).
In 2008, Mayor Newson launched an $83,000 taxpayer-funded public awareness
campaign to promote the city’s “sanctuary” policy to undocumented residents. Ad
packages come in different languages, but the message was the same: San Francisco will
not report you to federal immigration authorities (McKinley, 2008). The public service
announcement--published in brochures, broadcast across the airwaves and on YouTube-was not breaking news.1 San Francisco’s sanctuary ordinance, which prohibits city
employees from helping federal authorities with civil immigration investigations or
arrests, was adopted nearly two decades ago. Still, it never hurts to advertise, Mayor
Newson told a New York Times bureau chief (McKinley, 2008).
According to city officials, unauthorized residents stopped using city services,
reporting crimes, and sending children to school after the raid in San Francisco
(McKinley, 2008). The outreach program was the intended remedy. Meanwhile a new
municipal ID card streamlines access to city programs and services for residents who do
not have a state-issued driver’s license (McKinley, 2008). San Francisco is not alone in
its sanctuary status; New York, Detroit, Chicago and hundreds of other cities have

1

The PSA is posted on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMzsUo2aM4U.
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policies that protect their residents from deportation; a decision encouraged by the
sanctuary movement.2
Other cities have done the exact opposite. Political commentator and Los Angeles
Times blogger Andrew Malcolm remarked on the “unwelcome sign” Costa Mesa,
California put out: “Mayor Allan Mansoor...not only doesn’t welcome illegal immigrants
but doesn’t want them and is, in fact, a ‘rule-of-law city’ that will enforce immigration
laws strictly” (Malcolm, 2010, para. 4). In 2010, Mr. Mansoor persuaded the city council
to pass a resolution stating that Costa Mesa is not sanctuary city.
Residents of Prince William County, a Virginia suburb of Washington DC, are
still arguing about the consequences their Rule of Law Resolution (Khan & Sridhar,
2008).3 The 2007 policy empowers police to ask about the legal status of suspected
“illegal aliens” alleged to have violated a municipal law or ordinance. It also expands the
county's participation in ICE’s 287(g) program, which deputizes local law enforcement
officers to act as immigration agents.4 NBC News 4’s Julie Carey says the ordinance
helped shape Arizona’s controversial immigration law (Carey, 2012).
According to the Washington Times, Supervisor John Stirrup introduced the
resolution in response to accusations that the county employed so-called “sanctuary”
policies protecting illegal aliens (“Prince William,” 2007). Prior to adopting the Rule of
Law Resolution, police were prohibited from questioning suspects about their
2

The sanctuary movement is a campaign by religious groups to designate U.S. cities as sanctuaries for
unauthorized immigrants.
3
Proponents claim the measure, which targeted day laborers, has reduced crime and improved the quality
of community life. Opponents say it caused immigrants to flee the county, leaving neighborhoods dotted
with vacant houses and sowing distrust of authorities without reducing crime
4
In 2008, the original resolution was modified so now all persons arrested are subject to a check of their
status, not just suspected undocumented immigrants; performing checks on suspects who are not arrested is
left to the discretion of the officer.
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immigration status unless they had committed a felony violation (“Prince William,”
2007). The Washington Post issued this report on the measure’s development:
The Federation for American Immigration Reform, and its legal affiliate the
Immigration Reform Law Institute, helped write both the Arizona and Prince
William County laws and are working on similar legislation for other jurisdictions
(Bahrampour, 2010, para. 11).
Film maker Eric Byler captured local government’s vulnerability to national antiimmigration networks in 9500 Liberty, a documentary about immigration politics in
Prince William County. Citizens used YouTube videos and virtual town hall meetings to
repeal the town’s notorious immigrant law.
NPR’s Jennifer Ludden issued this report on the efforts of anti-illegal immigrant
activists in another Northern Virginia town:
Herndon will close a controversial worker center for immigrant day laborers. The
center was hardly the first of its kind, but Herndon became a high-profile test case
when activists against illegal immigration sued the town for publicly funding the
site (Ludden, 2007, para. 1).
A Washington Times report provides details on the lawsuit filed by Judicial Watch, a
conservative public interest law firm:
The group…asks a judge to declare the [day labor hiring] site ‘unlawful and a
violation of federal and state law’ because the center will ‘predominantly’ serve
aliens...the lawsuit also questions whether the center is in violation of a new
Virginia law that denies illegal aliens state and local benefits (“Judicial Watch,”
2005, para. 3, 5).
Judicial Watch argued that employment services qualify as public assistance, and rentfree use of the town property equates to a taxpayer subsidy. In the meantime, Herndon
voters, encouraged by the Arizona-based Minutemen Project, ousted the mayor and city

4

council members who supported the day labor center and elected new leaders who shut it
down (Turque & Stewart, 2006).
Suffolk County executive Steve Levy, co-founder of a national coalition called
Mayors and County Executives for Immigration Reform, drafted legislation to rid
Brookhaven, New York of illegal day laborers (Lambert, 2006). USA Today covered
“Operation Firestorm,” a 2005 campaign that resulted in the eviction of more than 100
Latino men from overcrowded housing in the town (Willens, 2006). A religious leader,
quoted in the New York Times, accused Levy of “ethnic cleansing” (Lambert, 2005). This
quotation, in Merlene Davis’ Lexington Herald column, succinctly sums up the situation:
“My country, maybe, my neighborhood, no way” (Davis, 2006, p. D1).5
Battles over illegal immigration go beyond cities at the epicenter of debate, like
San Francisco and Hazelton, Pennsylvania.6 In 2009, deportation furor caught an
unwilling Texas mayor in the middle. Community conflict in suburban Irving was
documented in the New York Times. Journalist Randy Kennedy issued this report in April
on the city’s response to unauthorized immigration and the fallout:
As battles over illegal immigration rage around the country, Irving’s crackdown
is not unusual in itself. What makes it striking is that it happened with the
blessing of a mayor like Mr. Gears, an immigrant-friendly Democrat with deep
political ties to the city’s Hispanic leaders, a man who likes to preach that
adapting to immigration…is not a burden but an opportunity, or as he says, it’s
‘not a have-to, it’s a get-to’ (Kennedy, 2009, para. 5).

5

Merlene Davis was quoting a message written on a note attached to a burning cross on the lawn of an
immigrant household.
6
In 2006, Hazleton gained national attention when the Republican mayor and council members passed the
Illegal Immigration Relief Act, which was instituted to discourage hiring or renting to illegal immigrants.
Other cities replicated the ordinance.
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Mayor Gears won re-election against an opponent whose campaign promised tough
immigration measures. But as a wave of anti-illegal sentiment built around Dallas and the
nation, Mr. Gears realized his city would no longer be able to remain on the sidelines-and that his own political future depended on his response (Kennedy, 2009). Heeding
public pressure, two years ago Gears made an agonizing decision. He adopted the federal
cooperation program for residency checks inside the local jail (Kennedy, 2009. It was a
“public turning point in the political reorientation of Mr. Gears,” a New York Times
reporter observed (Kennedy, 2009, para. 30).
Four thousand locals were deported as a result. Only 850 were charged with
violent crimes or other felonies. Well over half of the deported had been arrested for
public intoxication or not having a driver’s license. The town became deeply divided over
the issue. Mayor Gear’s friend is leading the campaign against the jail policy (Kennedy,
2009).
The story of Mayor Herbert A. Gear is one of the many newspaper reports about
the growing number of U.S. cities where immigration control, a federal prerogative, is
reshaping politics at the local level (Kennedy, 2009).
Still, this phenomenon, while important on the ground, is not well studied, an odd
fact given that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that between 2000
and 2010 the unauthorized population in the United States grew by 27 percent, to 10.8
million (Hoefer, Rytina & Backer, 2011).7 The impact is felt first and foremost in cities.
In response, local governments have become increasingly autonomous in their responses
7

Of all unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in 2010, the DHS reports 39 percent entered in
2000 or later, and 62 percent were from Mexico.
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to the challenges and opportunities of unauthorized foreign in-migration, as media
accounts point out. More research is needed to help us understand this increasingly
important dimension of immigration policy.8
In a broad sense, these municipal actions are a category of municipal foreign
policy. International relations scholarship establishes that City Hall’s involvement in
unauthorized immigration politics is part of a larger trend that began in the 1980s
(Shuman, 1986-87; Hobbs, 1994). Then, hundreds of local governments got involved in
their own international policy pursuits. These municipalities added defense policy,
international trade, and immigration to the catalog of issues that urban and suburban
politicians contend with.9 Two examples of municipal unauthorized immigration policy
are highlighted in this literature: sanctuary resolutions for Central American refugees
(Hobbs, 1994), and anti-Patriot Act resolutions (Hobbs, 2004).10 Kresel & Fry (2005)
classify both as municipal foreign policy, which entails city officials directly formulating
and implementing their own version of foreign policy that is not approved by the national
government, and, in fact, advocates noncompliance with federal laws and noncooperation
with federal law enforcement authorities.11
8

This conclusion is supported by the marked, ongoing overlap between migration research and urban
studies research. The Urban Institute, the Mumford Center for Urban and Regional Research, and the
Brooking Institute’s Center on Urban Metropolitan Policy produce primary research on U.S. immigration
trends and policy. Both Canada and the United States participate in the International Metropolis Project,
which produces policy-relevant research on migration and immigration in urban settings (Abu-Laban &
Garver, 2005).
9
These policies emerged from progressive cities encouraged by national lobbying groups.
10
Components of both measures protect unauthorized community members from deportation, a right
denied them by the U.S. government.
11
Kresel & Fry (2005:49) identify two other forms of municipal international policy: (1) municipal foreign
affairs (e.g. trade investment missions, hosting profile-raising world conferences, twinning partnerships
with foreign cities, and inter-municipal cooperation on public projects); and (2) municipal maneuvers that
fall into the “gray area” between foreign affairs and foreign policy, which they characterize as attempts by
local government to effectuate change in a nation’s foreign policy by working through traditional
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A few scholars have explored the role of state and local government in making
and implementing immigration policy early in United States history (Skerry, 1995;
Neuman, 1996). Contemporary scholarship focuses on the explosion of state and
municipal responses to unauthorized immigration that begun in the 1980s. The most
vigorous debates and discussions on the topic have taken place in law reviews. Legal
scholars are divided over the issue of “immigration federalism.”12
Those arguing against state and local involvement in the immigration regime say
it violates the Supremacy Clause and is unconstitutional (O’Byrne, 2008). Other
opponents raise concerns about the potential for racial profiling and violation of longestablished constitutional safeguards like due process, free speech and equal protection
(Chishti, 2002; Pham, 2004; Sullivan, 2009; Rodríguez, Chishti, Nortman, 2010).
Those in favor of immigration federalism highlight the national securityenhancing dimensions of state and local immigration enforcement (Hethmon, 2004;
Kobach, 2005-2006). These scholars view the devolution of immigration authority as a
crucial “force multiplier” in the war on terror. Others make a case for the structural
necessity of a multilayered immigration regime (Huntington, 2008; Rodríguez, 2008).
Rick Su (2010) argues that state and local immigration measures allow for finer
regulatory controls than the one-size-fits-all policy that can be implemented at the
national level. These “second-order immigration regulations,” as he calls them, also
provide a means by which, in the absence of a national consensus, the competing interests

channels—the national court system or their representatives in Congress—rather than breaking the law in
order to do it.
12
Hioshi Motomura (1999) first coined the term “immigration federalism,” which refers to subnational
immigration policymaking.
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surrounding immigration can still be negotiated and regulated” locally (Su, 2010, p. 370).
From this perspective, the federal-municipal immigration dichotomy is false one: national
and local immigration controls are integrated, complementary parts in the same
regulatory system.
This legal scholarship sheds light on the legality and wisdom of emerging state
and local immigration policies. Still, most of the discussion on immigration and
federalism, as Anil Kalhan (2008) points out, has centered on immigration regulation and
enforcement. The potentially “liberty-enhancing” dimensions of federalism and localism
have not been adequately considered, he argues. The role that state and local
governments might play in protecting the rights and liberties of non-U.S. citizens, Kalhan
says, needs to be explored.
Definitions
There is no single accepted definition of this new policy trend and the
terminology is various. “Subnational immigration policy” and “local immigration policy
activism” is the language used most often in the field. My working definition of
municipal immigration policy is any program of actions adopted or proposed by local
authorities that affects the well-being and life opportunities of first generation foreign inmigrants13(lawfully or unlawfully) present within a city’s jurisdiction, or attempting to
settle in it. Municipal immigration policy (MIP) also refers to the process of making

13

I use the term ‘foreign in-migrant’ to refer to someone who leaves the country in which he or she was
raised and moves to a new country for an extended period of time. Based on this definition there are six
types of foreign in-migrant groups: nonimmigrant sojourners (e.g., international students, exchange
visitors, missionaries, treaty traders and investors); temporary workers (e.g., highly skilled specialty
workers who enter on H-1B visas, and agricultural and nonagricultural workers at the other end of the
economic ladder who are admitted on H-2 visas); refugees and asylees; permanent immigrants (i.e.,

9

important public decisions, including the identification of alternatives such as programs
or spending priorities, and choosing among them on the basis of the impact they might
have on a city’s new foreign-born residents.
Like all urban policy, municipal immigration policy has many facets, which are a
topic of discussion in recent concept papers and legal reviews. In this scholarship MIP is
generally characterized as local immigration control measures or urban citizenship
policy.14
I understand local immigration control policy as programs of actions adopted or
proposed by a municipal government to regulate or restrict the flow of unauthorized
immigrants into a city’s jurisdictional boundaries, or expel settled foreign community
members without documents. These deter and deflection policies, as they are sometimes
called, encourage unauthorized foreign nationals to self-deport, or otherwise move on to
other cities within the country (Light, 2006). This is an objective typically achieved by
denying people without legal status the rights and entitlements of citizenship, including
the right to live in the country without fear of deportation.
Urban citizenship policies are steps taken by city government to naturalize
unauthorized community members. The process involves guaranteeing “illegal aliens”
formal membership in a city’s polity, and with that, the civil rights and liberties

migrants granted admittance and permanent residence status by the federal government); and federally
designated “illegal” migrants (i.e., those individuals who overstay or violate their visas, and those that cross
the border without being inspected by an immigration officer at a port of entry).
14
MIP is occasionally conceptualized as internationalization policy, immigrant-driven community
development actions that involve recruiting specific foreign nationals to advance a city’s status, stabilize or
spur population growth, and/or meet its service demands (Su, 2010).
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associated with citizenship.15 Relief from deportation is one of those rights, a goal
accomplished by enacting sanctuary policies.16 Sanctuary policies are official and
unofficial measures initiated to inhibit the local enforcement of federal civil immigration
laws. Immigration law scholar Orde Kittrie characterizes modern sanctuary policies as
three types: (1) “don’t ask” policies that limit inquires related to nationality and
immigration status; (2) “don’t enforce” policies that limit immigration-related arrests and
detentions; and (3) “don’t tell” policies that limit what information local enforcement
officers may share with federal officials (Sullivan, 2009, p. 574 ).
This new form of policymaking differs significantly from customary Chicago
School conceptualizations of local immigration policy as municipal settlement measures,
strategies designed to incorporate legal immigrants and refugees into mainstream urban
life, or efforts to marginalize the same. Locally-generated immigration control and
naturalization policy, are “local membership” policies. They “define who is or is not
permitted to be members of ‘our’ communities, and furthermore, what legitimate
membership means” (Varsanyi, 2007) and who should get to decide this. Settlement
policy is domestic policy.17 Municipal solutions to unauthorized immigration issues are
foreign policies.18

15

The idea of local citizenship has been discussed in a number of concept papers (Bauböck, 2003;
Varsanyi, 2006, 2008; Anderson, 2011).
16
The government cannot refuse citizens entry into the country or deport them.
17
With the exception of legally recognized refugees, the U.S. government does not concern itself with
newcomer settlement; there is no federal immigrant policy to meet the social, physical, civic, and integation
needs of immigrants and receiving communities. Decisions about the well-being and safety of foreign
immigrants are left up to municipalities. The primary focus of the federal government is on controlling the
flow of immigrants and policing the country’s borders (Abu-Laban & Garber, 2005; Bloemraad, 2006).
18
In the United States immigration policy is considered foreign policy. Foreign policy refers to the ways a
government advances its interests in international politics.
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According to Kresl & Fry (2005), most large, medium, and even small cities
engage in some form of municipal foreign affairs—local government activities which
transcend national boundaries in an effort to protect or enhance the economic interests of
their constituents. Fewer city officials are involved in more controversial municipal
foreign policy—directly formulating and implementing their own versions of foreign
policy which advocates disobeying federal authority. More common are municipal
maneuvers that fall into the “gray area” between foreign affairs and foreign policy. This
type of municipal action decries a national government’s international pursuits, but does
not advocate breaking the law in order to protest these initiatives (Kresl & Fry, 2005, p.
49).
Local immigration controls and urban citizenship policy fall all along the
municipal foreign affairs—foreign policy continuum. Local government decisions on
Mexican CID cards, or sister city relationships formed to protest U.S. asylum policy, are
examples of foreign affairs activities.19 Both measures are municipal agreements with
foreign governments.
City “sanctuary” ordinances and homegrown versions of the Illegal Immigrant
Relief Act,20 fit Kresl & Fry’s (2005) definition of municipal foreign policy. These are
direct action initiatives that exceed, without federal permission, the traditional legal scope
of municipal immigration authority and are intended to do one of two things: (1) prevent
federal authorities from performing some practice to which activist cities object (e.g.,
enforcing IRCA with worksite deportation sweeps or denying noncitizens access to
19

Municipal internationalization policy fits into the municipal foreign affairs category.
The Illegal Immigrant Relief Act is a local version of the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA). Both laws punish employers for hiring immigrants without documents.
20
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government benefits); or (2) to solve a perceived immigration problem which the federal
government is not addressing to the satisfaction of direct action participants (e.g., fining
employers who hire illegal aliens).
Municipal regulations that encourage real or imaged “illegal” day laborers to selfdeport (e.g., anti-solicitation and anti-stacking ordinances, which prevent undocumented
migrants from seeking work or finding housing) fall into the “gray area” of Kresl & Fry’s
(2005) framework. These indirect, conventional forms of MIP are within the legal bounds
of traditional municipal authority. Even so, recent court rulings indicate some are
unconstitutional if they discriminate.
In practice, local authorities use a variety of conventional and unconventional
tactics to achieve their immigration-related policy objectives. Depending upon the city,
these measures either advance or hinder the rights and opportunities of urban residents
without legal status.
Research Strategy
The dissertation addresses two questions. First, what unauthorized immigration
policies do local governments pursue, under what circumstances, and for what reasons?
Second, what explains city-to-city variation in municipal responsiveness to the policy
preferences and interests of residents without legal status?
The study also presents a typology of municipal responsiveness to unauthorized
immigrants, based on my exploratory research. To explain intercity differences in the
policy processes and choices of local government, I explore three possible explanations-Hero’s (1998) social diversity thesis, urban regime theory, and political culture and
13

entrepreneurship. My study engages these theoretical ideas with the findings of a
comparative case study of three mid-size, reemerging gateway cities: Sacramento,
California; Denver, Colorado; and Portland, Oregon.21 I explore whether associations
between local factors and municipal unauthorized immigration policy emerge in the
recent history of the three case cities. Analysis of data gleaned from document study
suggests that neither social diversity nor urban regime development explains intercity
variations in municipal immigration policy. However, political culture as expressed
through entrepreneurial political leaders has been important in shaping these policies.
This research has implications for urbanists and immigration specialists, as well
as researchers and scholars of international studies, political science, sociology, law and
geography. Those involved in public policy, government administration, municipal
leadership, urban planning and grassroots organizing will also find it relevant. Research
findings could ensure a stronger role for local government in determining federal
immigration policy, or guide stalled national reform efforts.

21

In this work, I separate central city from its suburbs and focus only on the former as distinct political
units.
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Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I analyze what
has already been written in the field and identify the research that still needs to be done.
This critique is followed by my research rationale and the main premises of the study.
Chapter 3 lays out the research questions and expectations. It explains my twopronged research approach. The explorative study is detailed first. Then, I describe in
detail how I conducted my comparative case study, and explain the criteria used to select
and evaluate the three case cities.
Chapter 4 presents the results of my multi-city policy exploration. It begins with a
summary of the most hotly contested immigration issues arising in U.S. cities over the
past two decades, all of which pertain to “illegal” immigration. Next, I present my
typology of municipal response to unauthorized immigration issues and summarize key
findings.
Chapter 5 provides a detailed, contextualized description of local government
action on unauthorized immigration in three U.S. cities--Sacramento, California; Denver,
Colorado; and Portland, Oregon--between 1985 and 2010. I focus on municipal response
to the six locally important immigration debates described in Chapter Four.
In Chapter 6, I compare municipal response to unauthorized immigration in the
three case cities and do theory evaluation. The chapter starts with a description of the
similarities and differences between the immigration strategies of local governments in
Sacramento, Denver and Portland. It goes on to explore the theoretical expectations

15

presented in the study to see if correlations emerge in the data, and ends with a list of
lessons learned.
Chapter 7 summarizes the research questions and findings of the dissertation.
Theoretical and policy implications are discussed, as are current study limitations and
future research directions.

16

CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, I draw on existing scholarship to describe the dimensions of municipal
immigration policy and utilize earlier studies to identify three explanatory frameworks
for understanding the emergence and character of these policies. This analysis provides
the basis for my research rationale and the explanatory propositions that I explore
through in-depth case studies.
Dimensions of Municipal Immigration Policy
Scholars have worked to identify and categorize the de facto roles that local
government plays in the immigration regime, which is basically to adjust federal policy in
accordance with local interests. Miriam Wells (2004) documents the way cities involved
in the late-twentieth-century sanctuary movement shifted the outcome of federal
immigration policy on the ground through noncompliance, a process she calls the
“grassroots reconfiguration” of U.S. immigration policy. Local governments in these socalled “sanctuary cities” were the first adopters of municipal citizenship policies: city of
refuge resolutions, limited police-INS cooperation ordinances, raid-free zone MOU
agreements, and city social welfare guarantees for unauthorized residents.22

22

A sanctuary city is a locality that has taken steps to protect its “illegal” foreign in-migrant population
from discrimination and deportation by federal agents.
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Wells traces the emergence of local policy activism to an expectation gap23--a
contradiction between the federal government’s responsibility to exclude illegal aliens
(by rejecting asylum applications, cutting public benefits, and conducting deportation
raids), and municipal government’s moral and municipal obligation to provide for the
welfare of all of its urban residents.
An unfair application of restrictive immigration laws24 produced this conflict of
interest which, in turn, triggered direct action from leaders involved in the immigration
sanctuary movement. These leaders, advocating the principles of
immigrant/ethnic/labor/civil rights, secured enough coalition support to pressure local
officials and regional INS directors to exercise the discretionary power granted them by
the federalized U.S political structure25 to protect the rights of residents without legal
status. Local government initiated ordinances limiting local immigration enforcement.
Regional INS directors signed no-raid agreements. The protest sequence26 occurred in a
number of other cities where constituents hold inclusive perspectives on the membership

23

The expectation gap thesis, a mainstay of presidential literature, is the idea that there is a gap between
public expectations of Congress and the president and what Congress and the president actually do, or the
public perceives they can do (Jenkins-Smith, Silva & Waterman, 2005). If the public believe their
representatives are supposed to be responsive to the policy preferences of local citizens, when they are not
the public is disappointed with government’s performance.
24
Those laws were: the Refugee Act of 1980, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), and
Welfare Reform Act of 1996.
25
The multifaceted, ambiguous, and internally contradictory structure of the U.S. political structure allows
for “alternative interpretations and concretization of federal policy” (Wells, 2004, p. 1310).
26
According to Smelser’s (1963) structural strain theory, six conditions underlie the origins of social
movement action: 1) structural conduciveness (the U.S. political system leaves openings for the
mobilization of protest), 2) structural strain (contradictions that produce frustrating conflicts of interest), 3)
generalized beliefs (that crystallize collective grievances and suggest courses for remedy), 4) precipitating
factors (events that trigger direct action by those involved in the movement), 5) leadership (coordinated
groups mobilize for action), and 6) operation of social control (governing authorities respond by
intervening in the condition of conduciveness that gave rise to the movement).
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of unauthorized immigrants, and city officials are willing to assume a responsibility
abdicated by the federal government—to protect the individual rights of all people.
Ivan Light (2006) documents how Los Angeles and, by interference other firstreception cities in the First World, took on migration control responsibilities during the
late-twentieth-century. Local officials assume this policymaking role, he argues, when
they decide how much poverty to tolerate. When municipalities tolerate poverty, then the
network-driven influx of immigrants continues. When they enforce previously ignored
laws and ordinances (against slums, sweatshops, and other non-middle class lifestyle
standards) the local influx slows. Light calls this program of action “sequential
absorption and deflection policy” (p. 13).
Sequential absorption and deflection is a process whereby first-reception cities
receive immigrants, absorb as many as they can decently house and employ, and then
deflect unwanted others to second-settlement reception areas which repeat the process.
According to Light (2006), this strategy becomes default policy when:
The national government will not or cannot constrain influx to manageable levels,
support first-reception areas with targeted relief for their exceptional burdens, or
effect long-term immigration’s equal dispersion over the national terrain (p. xi).
Under these conditions fed up suburban NIMBYists, and well-meaning social justice
activists, push local government to act autonomously instead of waiting for a national
solution.
Monica Varsanyi (2006, 2007) has a slightly different take on the role of local
government in the international migration arena. She claims the formulation of municipal
membership policies (locally-generated immigration control and naturalization policy)
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helps the nation-state negotiate--what political theorist James Hollifield calls, the “liberal
paradox,” or the “growing tension between neoliberal openness and the continued
necessity of national political closure” (Varsanyi, 2007, p. 300). She offers the widely
accepted matrícular consulares as evidence. These Mexican identification cards, which
document undocumented migrant workers, offer the perfect solution: they enable an
exploitative situation in the interior, while the federal government focuses on tougher
border control.
The greater part of social science literature simply documents and describes the
policy pursued during a second explosive wave of municipal immigration policy activism
in the late 2000s. These measures can be categorized as: (1) policies enabled by the
devolutionary power of federal legislation, like 287(g) and Security Community
agreements (Thacher, 2005; Coleman, 2007; Waslin, 2007);27 and (2) policies proposed
and adopted by local government. Homegrown actions, which can be either proimmigrant or anti-immigrant, are intended to do one of two things: (1) prevent federal
authorities from performing some practice to which activist cities object (e.g., enforcing
IRCA with worksite deportation sweeps or denying noncitizens access to government
benefits); or (2) solve a perceived immigration problem which the federal government is
not addressing to the satisfaction of direct action participants, like discouraging entry of
“illegal” immigrants or regulating informal day laborer-contractor market exchanges.

27

The devolution of immigration policing authority from federal to state and local government stems from
these factors: (1) the 1996 passage of IIRCA and PRWORA that allowed police and sheriffs to partner with
ICE on the interior enforcement of civil immigration laws, which involves the detection and deportation of
settled immigrants; and (2) Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 2002 memorandum authorizing local police
to enforce civil immigration laws, and encouraging their participation in the “War in Terrorism.”
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Some of these unauthorized immigration initiatives are planned and executed
openly, like policy pertaining to noncitizen voting, limited INS-police cooperation
ordinances, employer sanctions, and Illegal Immigrant Relief Acts (Hayduk, 2006;
Varsanyi 2005, 2006, 2007; Ridgley, 2008). Others are disguised as general population
measures. Land use and zoning ordinances used to regulate day laborers (Esbenshade,
2007; Varsanyi, 2008), or minimum wage laws (Mitnik & Halpern-Finnerty, 2010), fit
into this category. While these undercover policies do not appear geared towards
residents without legal status, members of that group are disproportionately affected.
Mitnik & Halpern-Finnerty’s (2010) national policy survey indicates that local authorities
in the United States use a variety of “immigrant-specific” and “nonimmigrant-specific”
tactics to achieve their policy objectives. Noting that sometimes city officials propose or
adopt new legislation, while other times they simply enforce existing state, regional or
local regulations that were not originally intended to address immigration, but have that
effect. Laws prohibiting slums and sweatshops are illustrative of this approach.
Broad, multi-city policy overviews shed light on the range of tactics that city
governments use to address unauthorized immigration issues. Still, most data comes from
patchy secondary sources--other scholars or non-refereed reports issued by nonprofit
think tanks, civil rights organizations, and special interest groups.28 More research is
needed to verify and expand this data set. Missing examples are probable. For instance,
the existing database is narrowly focused on four areas of traditional municipal authority:
lawmaking, law enforcement, urban land use and planning, and the provision of public
28

Migration Policy Institute, National Immigration Law Center, Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund,
Federation for Immigration Reform, National Employment Law Project, Day Labor Research Institute, Bill
of Rights Defense Committee, the American Civil Liberties Union and others

21

benefits. Examples of local government exercising its contracting and litigation power,
lobbying privileges, finance appropriation and public works authority, property
management clout and legal opinion are absent in the literature. So are off-the-record
practices, like turning a blind eye to local violations of federal immigration law. These
are all likely ways to achieve immigration-related policy objectives.
Another shortcoming of the national overview approach is the propensity to focus
on either “immigrant-specific” or “nonimmigrant-specific” policy. Michael Alexander
(2004) warns against this, arguing that researchers need to pay attention to all policies
that are “initiated or largely determined by the local authority, and have significant
impacts on local immigrant populations, either through specific (migrant-targeted) or
general (population or area-based) measures” (p. 59). Lack of context is also a problem.
None of the studies reviewed provide a comprehensive account of immigration policy
activism in a particular city.
Determinants of Municipal Immigration Policy
Several scholars have offered explanatory frameworks to account for the
circumstances and context within which policy activism emerges. This dissertation
explores three such frameworks: (1) regime theory, (2) social diversity, (3) political
culture and political leadership.
Urban regime factors
Kristin Good (2005) suggests the importance of urban regime theory for
understanding local municipal responses to immigration. She identifies six internal
factors that facilitate the formation of a regime with multicultural immigration goals.
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These are: (1) community consensus that immigrants are a problem; (2) a trigger event or
overt crisis that puts immigration concerns on the municipal agenda; (3) the immigrant
community is well-organized; (4) the city has a long tradition of civil society groups in
general, and history of interethnic coalition building in particular; (5) little competition
exists between racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants; and (6) local government actively
facilitates regime development. The three factors that she suggests prevent municipalities
from exercising immigration-related policy action are: (1) immigrants are not perceived
to be a problem; (2) no trigger event or overt crisis exists; and (3) immigrant
communities are unable to overcome collective action problems. Intercity differences in
the way immigrants are viewed, and how ethnoracial power is exercised, underlie these
regime development factors.
The urban regime model has been the dominant paradigm in the field of urban
politics and policy for more than a decade. According to Mossberger & Stoker (2001),
the concept, which includes elitist and pluralist aspects, has been used to study the
incorporation of various interests into governing coalitions—women (Turner, 1995),
lesbians and gays (Bailey, 1999), and African Americans (Stone, 1989; Whelan, Young,
& Lauria, 1994). It has also been used to explain developments in more specific issue
areas, like municipal obscenity policy (Bauroth, 1998) and urban school reform (Stone,
1998; Henig et al., 1999).
The conceptual model is based on three main ideas. First, public officials cannot
rely on their formal authority alone to carry out their policy agenda. 29 A local
government’s capacity to govern (undertake major policies and projects) is dependent
29

The formal structure and rules of city government often makes it difficult for local officials to act.
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upon its ability to form an urban regime by rallying together key stakeholders through
coalition building and leadership strategies.
Second, cohesive governing regimes do not exist in all cities (DeLeon, 1992;
Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). This variation in regime development patterns—present or
not present—explains intercity differences in municipal policy outputs (some or none),
and the point in time when major policymaking begins.
Third, an urban regime is a stable coalition between local government and
private-sector groups (with access to institutional resources) that sets an identifiable
policy agenda and collaborates based on social production goals--the need to bring
together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks (Mossberger & Stoker,
2001).30 Since urban regimes exist within a political economy framework rather than a
pluralist one, governing coalitions that are specifically regimes will include participants
from business (Stone, 1989). Beyond the involvement of local government (elected
officials and public servants in local agencies) and business, participants in regimes may
vary from one city to the next due to differences in urban contexts (Mossberger & Stoker,
2001).
Finally, different regimes dominate at different times in different cities; a city’s
policy agenda will reflect the varied preferences of regime partners.31 A review of the
literature suggests the possibility of three relevant types emerging in governing cities: a
corporate regime (also called a development regime), a caretaker regime or maintenance
30

Urban regimes span a number of administrations; ad hoc coalitions pursuing short-term goals do not
constitute regime development.
31
A regime’s policy agenda is influenced by the composition of coalition participants and the resources
they bring. Since local contexts, which are not fixed, are not the same in cities across the country, regime
purpose will vary from one place to the next and may change overtime.
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regime, and a progressive regime. Where a development regime holds the most power to
carry out policy, local government promotes the growth goals of downtown corporations
without concession from other community interests. Caretaker regimes seek to maintain
the status quo, either by preserving the quality of life or keeping taxes low. They oppose
large-scale development initiatives that would increase taxes or disrupt established
patterns of social interaction, and also government allocation of economic development
benefits (Clark, 2001). Where maintenance regimes are dominant government focuses on
the provision of routine services. Progressive regimes form to secure economic
development benefits for various local interest groups or areas of the city.32 According to
Ross and Levine (2001), there may be two variants of the progressive regime—a middle
class and a lower-class progressive regime:
A middle class progressive regime represents the concerns of environmentalists
and homeowners in limiting new and costly growth projects. A regime devoted to
lower-class opportunity expansion, in contrast, focuses on aiding the poor and
racial minorities (p. 73).
Regime types are a useful concept for identifying governing coalitions with
immigration-related purposes. For instance, to spur economic growth, a development
regime might try to attract firms with a reputation for hiring unauthorized immigrants.
Alternatively, a progressive regime, with support from national lobbying groups and/or
social movement organizations, could emerge to secure economic development benefits
for disadvantaged migrant day laborers, or homeowners worried about “useful invaders”

32

Some scholars question the existence of progressive coalitions, since a regime must be institutionalized
to be long-lasting. However, “permanent, city-wide neighborhood organizations may provide a relatively
long-term basis for citizen control” of certain types of regimes (Clark, 2001, p. 36). A local social
movement organization, or support from a national lobbying group, could serve the same function
(Toussaint, 2013).
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threatening the quality of their middle-class life.33 Either way, if local leaders can build a
governing coalition to co-produce policy capacity, that city will have the social
production power to take on major initiatives, like local immigration policy. Without
such a governing arrangement, little policy will be produced locally.
To summarize, the urban regime concept helps us understand the way power
works in urban settings. It correctly predicts the associations between governing
coalitions and City Hall’s involvement in controversial politics and policymaking. In
particular, it explains how local governments gain the capacity to formulate and carry out
strategies to cope with economic and social challenges, like unauthorized immigration.
The urban regime model, however, downplays the significance of race and white
racism in urban politics. The assumptions of this approach, which are based on a political
economy perspective, “maintains that class, not race, is the driving force of urban
politics” (Kraus, 2004, p. 96). Adding Hero’s (1998) racialized interpretation of state and
local politics to the framework addresses this limitation.
Social diversity factors
Hero’s (1998) social diversity thesis posits a relationship between the racial/ethnic
composition and configuration of U.S. states (and counties) and the nature of their
politics and policy outputs, especially policies that affect minority groups.
The theoretical basis for his argument is rooted in pluralism and race/ethnic
relations theory. By integrating these two frameworks, Hero created a foundation for
analyzing how the interdependent structures of race and politics combine to shape state
33

Ambrosini (1999) first used the term “useful invaders” to describe immigrant workers who provide
“economic benefits and political capital to elites while simultaneously being seen as a threat to dominant
cultural values” (Fleury-Steiner & Longazel, 2010, p. 157).
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and county policy outcomes. The basic tenets of social diversity can be summarized in
five major propositions.
First, state and county government policy is determined by competition and
cooperation between and among various dominant and minority interests, not just by the
dominant group. These nongovernment factions use their resources to influence elected
officials.
Second, in the racially stratified United States, there are three main racial/ethnic
interest groups: “white” (defined as whites with western and northern European
ancestry); “white ethnic” (defined as whites with ancestry traced back to eastern and
southern Europe plus Ireland); and “minority” (defined a peoples with ethnic and racial
backgrounds among black, Asian, and Hispanic populations). These groups have distinct
historical experiences that influence politics and policy choice (Hero, 1998, p.147; 2001,
p. 855). From their distinctive historical experiences members gain a common
worldview, which dictates how reality is defined and how problems are perceived and
resolved.
Third, racial and ethnic populations are not equally distributed across the country,
and stratification configurations (dominant-minority) differ as well. The social diversity
patterns of states (and counties) can be broadly delineated into three types according to
degree and level of racial and ethnic diversity: homogeneous jurisdictions, populated
mainly by whites from Northern and Western Europe (with a very small minority
population and relatively few “white ethnics”); bifurcated states/counties, comprised of
two major groups—white and minority (and small proportions of white ethnics); and
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heterogeneous environments, characterized by the presence of multiple groups—a
relatively large proportion of minorities and white ethnics (and a moderately large white
population).
Fourth, differences in social diversity patterns—racial/ethnic compositions and
configurations--account for variations in the nature of pluralist politics34 and policy
outcomes—favorable or unfavorable for minorities. This is because a society’s social
(diversity) context determines how power is exercised and the way individuals and
groups (with different historical experiences) perceive policy issues, especially policies
related to minorities.
Finally, given that social diversity patterns are not fixed, changes in the
ethnoracial composition and configuration of a political jurisdiction will be reflected in
its politics, policy outputs and voting patterns.
To examine the usefulness of his model, Hero assesses the degree to which social
diversity, and various other factors commonly used in state politics research, are
associated with state policy choices. His conclusion, drawn from comparative data across
fifty U.S. states, is based on a quantitative analysis of policies central in state politics,
including education, health, and criminal justice. Overall, he finds social diversity more
significant than other alternatives considered, including socioeconomics, in explaining
state-level variations in social policy outcomes.35

34

Hero (1998) identifies three types of political pluralism associated with different social diversity patterns:
consensual pluralism in homogeneous settings, competitive pluralism in heterogeneous places, and limited
or hierarchical political pluralism in bifurcated states and counties.
35
The other explanatory factors examined were: political culture, ideology, party competition, legislator
professionalism and gubernatorial power.
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Hero extends his model to another level, examining social diversity and public
policy at the local level. His analysis of two “illegal” immigration policies adopted
through the initiative process--English Only (adopted by voters in California, Colorado
and Florida in 1986) and Proposition 187 (adopted by Californians in 1994)--suggests
within state variations in the vote for these policies was a product of different social
diversity patterns within and across counties. He finds counties with higher minority
populations were less supportive of the ballot measures than counties with smaller
minority populations. In particular, homogeneous counties showed the strongest support
for Official English and Proposition 187. Bifurcated counties also supported the
measures, largely due to white voters; most Latinos voted against it. The strongest
opposition to Official English and Proposition 187 was in heterogeneous counties.
These findings are consistent with and supportive of his research on state public
policy, where heterogeneous environments are associated with neutral, if not positive,
policy outcomes for minorities. While the evidence suggests homogeneous context (even
in progressive states), and the presence of a large minority populations (bifurcation), was
associated with the worse policy outcomes for minorities (Hero & Tolbert, 1996).
Hero (1998) suggests that the “racial threat” hypothesis (that white racism
increases with competition posed by a greater proportion of African Americans in a
community) explains the Anglo response to Latino immigrants, which consists of
instituting legal controls and other measures to stymie a perceived threat to their
dominant status. The concept, based on Hubert Blalock’s (1967) power-threat thesis, has
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not been widely applied to Hispanics, but recent scholarship indicates that demographics
altering existing majority-minority relations make it relevant (Rigby, Bruch & Soss,
2007; Markert, 2010).
Theories of cultural differentiation support Hero’s conclusions that negative
reactions to diversity can occur when a dissimilar group is relatively small, or perceived
to be too large. The tipping point thesis argues that when the number of minorities is few,
the dominant racial/ethnic group tends to be more receptive to less-alike strangers, or at
least begrudging tolerant. When numerical increases in racially/ethnically dissimilar
groups reaches the tipping point (as in a bifurcated setting), then hostile responses often
occur.36 But negative reactions to diversity also occur when the minority group is
relatively small, as in the case of homogeneous states and localities. The racial isolation
theory specifies that racial isolation encourages negative responses toward minorities
(Kinder & Mendelberg, 1995). From this view, lack of interaction with racially/ethnically
different people leads to negative stereotyping of dissimilar groups. Stereotypes contain
elements of threat in that they lead to the anticipation of negative events or interactions
with “alien” outgroups (Stephan & Stephan, 1985).
Looking at these prejudice-precipitation variables from a social constructionist
perspective leads to the conclusion that a positive or negative response to difference
depends on the definition or interpretation of those differences. The social diversity
model does not discount this view; rather Hero argues that cultural factors (like
worldview of minorities) are shaped by the “racial/ethnic context within which
36

As Luigi Laurenti’s classic study on property values and race revealed, the tipping point has no exact
number; it is a perceptual stage when the ingroup believes “too many” of “those people” are in its midst
and “something needs to be done” (Pardillo, 2005, p. 131).
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individuals and groups are situated” (Hero & Tolbert, 2001, p. 854). That is why he uses
categories of social diversity instead of political culture categories like liberal and
conservative in his studies.
Hero’s (1998) hypothesis leads to three expectations related to municipal action
on unauthorized immigration. In homogeneous locations, local government will, under
threatening conditions, adopt policies that protect Anglo interests over those of nonwhite
foreign in-migrants.37 Lack of competitive pluralism allows Anglos, which constitute a
numerical majority and enjoy a disproportion share of (wealth, power, and social status)
resources, to monopolize decision-making. They can make demands of government over
opposition of racial and ethnic groups, native-born and immigrant. Lacking critical mass
and resources, minorities will be unable to frustrate the policy objectives of cooperating
Anglo groups with undivided interests. If the dominant group does not feel threatened by
minority immigrants the probability of a nativist reaction in reduced.
A number of local case studies tend to confirm that negative responses are
common in communities experiencing rapid demographic change. High profile cities at
the epicenter of the movement against “illegal” immigration are most often studied:
Austin, Texas (Skop & Buentello, 2008); Charlotte, North Carolina (Furuseth & Smith,
2010); Hazelton, Pennsylvania (Fleury-Steiner, 2010); Santa Ana, California (Harwood
& Myers, 2002); Vista, California (Danielson, 2010). Local governments in these
localities passed some of the most punitive immigration control measures in U.S. history.
Other municipalities have emulated the controversial measures initiated in these cities.
37

Here the term “Anglo” means all non-Hispanic English-speaking whites, regardless of their religion or
ethnicity.
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Scholars stress the centrality of rapid demographic change in creating antiimmigrant policy activism in studied areas, while recognizing the economic and political
factors shaping shifting settlement patterns.38 From this perspective the surge of
unauthorized Latino migrants into places with little or no recent experience of large scale
settlement (or social diversity) fueled a nativist backlash. When the U.S. Congress failed
to pass comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and again in 2007, restrictionists,
making “law and order” claims, pushed the issue of unauthorized immigration to the top
of the local political agenda.39 Local regulations to deter or deflect undocumented
“invaders” were a response to this pressure, which occurred even where immigrants had
revitalized neighborhoods and bolstered the local economy (Fleury-Steiner, 2010), and
where local elites held immigrant-driven global city aspirations (Provine, 2010).40

Factors explaining the influx of unauthorized Mexican immigration to U.S. include: (1) industrial
restructuring and business and corporate demand for a low-wage, relatively unregulated flexible labor in
the U.S. (Cornelius, 1998; Massey, Durand & Malone, 2002); (2) capitalist penetration into peripheral and
premarket societies and bifurcated labor-market in global cities (world system theory); (3) neoliberal
structural readjustment policies (that transferred state power upward to global institutions, such as the
WTO, and responsibility downward to local communities), economic crisis, and free trade policy, like 1994
NAFTA, that destroyed farming in Latin American encouraging illegal migration (Sassen, 1998); (4) the
expansion and militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border, to repress NAFTA-caused migration, and
simultaneous decline in the interior enforcement of IRCA (Brownell, 2005); (5) the interests and
action/inaction of the U.S. nation-state (e.g., 1986 amnesty laws/failure to reform immigration law in 2006)
(Meyers, 2004); (6) chain migration/cumulative causation (Massey, 1990); (7) the cost-benefit decision of
individuals and households; (8) immigrant deflection policies initiated by local governments in traditional
gateway cities experiencing saturation of immigrant labor niches (Light, 2006); and (9) the economic
development decisions of local elites, who recruit businesses that hire unauthorized migrants (FleurySteiner, 2010).
39
A number of other factors have multiplied the impact of demographic change in new immigrant
destinations, including: (1) the devolution of immigration law enforcement authority; (2) the presence of
organized anti-illegal immigrant activists; (3) lack of a mature immigrant service and advocacy
infrastructure; and (4) an unprepared local government that lacks experience with large scale immigrant
settlement and sociocultural diversity.
40
Local business and corporate elites benefit from immigrant-driven economic development, while average
residents are more readily threaten by rapid demographic change (Varsanyi,2010, p. 16).
38
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Public officials in heterogeneous jurisdictions can be expected to protect the
rights and preferences of immigrants who become minorities upon entering the United
States.41 This is because no single group dominates the racial hierarchy and a sizable
segment of the population, who can identify with minority immigrants, is willing to use
their collective resources to exert influence. At the same time, competitive pluralism
prevents any one group from advancing its own interests at the expense of other groups. 42
Finally, in a bifurcated environment, where political bargaining occurs between
two major racial/ethnic interests—nonHispanic white and a single large minority group-policy decisions will be determined by the pressure group with the most influence. Since
hierarchical pluralism restricts minority access to decision-making, white interests tend to
be more powerful.43 Under these conditions, if the demands of Anglos and minority
interests clash, politicians will probably be more responsive to the policy preferences of
Anglos than to demands made by minorities representing nonwhite immigrants. A
minority group can, however, overcome this structural constraint through biracial
coalition building. With support from white liberals, a less influential, but cohesive
minority coalition can shift the policy direction in favor of minority immigrants.44 When

41

In competitive situations native-born racial/ethnic minorities do not always support immigrants. But
polling data over the past 50 years indicates that Americans of African, Hispanic, and Asian descent are
more accepting of immigration and immigrant-friendly policy than non-Hispanic whites (Smith &
Edmonston, 1997; Hero, 1998; Suro, 2005).
42
Competitive pluralism can also make cooperation between interests group difficult, especially if interminority competition or conflict exists. A state or locality with a tradition of intergroup coalition building,
or government support for that, can, however, overcome this diversity challenge.
43
See Rodney Hero’s (1992) Latinos and the U.S. political system: Two-tiered pluralism.
44
The presence of a single large minority group facilitates coalition building and collective action, since
minorities here possess tighter social networks and are more cohesion than racial/ethnic groups in other
types of cities. This, in turn, increases the group’s chances of inclusion in a limited pluralist system; a wellorganized group is easier for political leaders to recognize.
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immigration and/or race are not politically divisive issues, then the probability of a
nativist reaction is also reduced.45 In sum, local government can be expected to initiate
immigration strategies that reflect and reinforce a city’s ethnoracial structure.
Political culture and political leadership
With race at the core of the analysis, the social diversity thesis sheds light on an
oft overlooked dimension of U.S. state and county politics. By identifying the structural
factors that shape local political culture, and subsequent worldview about foreigners, the
concept overcomes the weaknesses of culture theories. Still, its pluralist interpretation of
state and local politics has limitations. Here it is important to highlight the political
dimension of voter preferences and political leadership. Social factors have to be
activated and expressed by political actors. Results happen because individuals and
groups are motivated to intervene in public policy decisions. For this reason, political
culture and political initiative need to be a third explanatory dimension.
Drawing on empirical analyses, Wells (2004) stressed the importance of local
political culture. She suggests that inclusive policy outcomes are most likely in localities
where immigrants are a valued part of the local economy, are well-connected to nativeborn residents and community institutions, and the political culture is liberal and globally
focused.46

45

There is an incentive for politicians to respond to minority demands, especially where undivided minority
interests. But when there are sharp divisions of opinion between dominant Anglos and minorities,
politicians will ignore minority voters’ interests because it costs them the white swing vote (Brown et al.,
2003).
46
Chernotsky & Hobbs (2001: 66) identify three categories of cities based their responses to the forces of
globalization and the strategies adopted in response to changing global conditions: world cities (metro areas
with populations near one million that have a wide array of international interests and contacts and have
actively sought to expand their role in the global economy; emerging glocalities (cities with populations of
approximately 200,000 to 500,000 that have rapidly moved into the international arena to take advantage of
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In the cities she studied—established immigrant gateways47 and left-leaning
college towns--those factors countered tendencies toward exclusion of undocumented
residents during economic downturns, and in places with little ethnic or class diversity.
To assess the relative efficacy of different explanations, political scientists S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan and Tom Wong (2010) simultaneously test six leading variables, alongside
their own hypothesis on political partisanship. Their conclusions, drawn from a universe
of twenty thousand U.S. municipalities, is based on quantitative analysis of pro- and antiunauthorized immigrant ordinances enriched with contextual data at the state and local
level. According to their analysis, political partisanship is the best predictor of local
government policy on unauthorized immigration, with Republican counties (and by
extension, cities) pursuing anti-illegal immigration policies at a much higher rate than
Democratic areas. Local party composition (a proxy for political ideology and issue
preference on immigration) was more statistically significant than the seven other factors
assessed: 1) growth of the Latino population; 2) Latino share of population; 3) recency of
migration; 4) wage competition; 5) immigration protests; 6) local economic interests; and
7) state-level policy climate toward immigrants.
More research is needed to explore how political purpose is shaped and exercised
in particular localities, since, as Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) point out, it is difficult
to ascertain from their research whether the relevancy of partisanship is related to

changes in the global economy); and reactive globalizers (communities with population of 50,000 or less
that have been penetrated by the forces of globalization with limited degrees of control over the process).
47
Established gateways include long-established, continuous immigrant destinations, such as New York
and Chicago, and post-World War II gateways, such as Houston and Los Angeles (Singer, 2008).
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“grassroots mobilization from below or to mobilization from above by elected officials
and policy entrepreneurs” (p. 90).
Scholars studying multi-jursidictional areas--metro Dallas-Fort Worth (Brettell,
2008), metro Atlanta (Odem, 2008), and metro Washington, DC (Price & Singer, 2008)-highlight political questions. They suggest that varied reactions to settlement are due to
differences in the local tax base and the legal status of immigrants. Anti-immigrant action
is rarely aimed at all immigrants; “the exclusive policies are almost exclusively against
undocumented Latino immigrants” (Odem, 2008, p. 122).
Political leadership is also highlighted in studies of Rogers, Arkansas
(Scheonholtz, 2005), and the Atlanta suburb of Chamblee (Hansen, 2005).48 Local
governments in these cities adopted measures limiting local involvement in immigration
enforcement and made public services more responsive to newcomers regardless of
immigration status. To mitigate the negative effects of culture shock, local officials hired
cross-cultural liaisons to bridge the gaps separating different groups. They set a positive
tone by emphasizing the citywide economic benefits of legal and unauthorized
immigrants, and by framing provisions for noncitizens as whole community assets.
Basically, political leaders accepted the challenge of nonAnglo immigration—legal and
unauthorized, rather than fighting it.
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Most integration and reception literature focuses primarily on immigrants—their characteristics,
settlement patterns, and impact--not on the characteristics of cities and their residents (e.g. see Singer,
Hardwick & Brettell’s Twenty-First Century Gateways, 2008). Studies that do account for best community
practices tend to concentrate on the role of mediating groups and nonprofit organizations, not local political
actors (e.g. see Elżbieta Goździak and Susan Martin’s Beyond the Gateway, 2005). Other research on
emerging geographies of settlement makes intergroup relations the focal point of inquiry (e.g. see Douglas
A. Massey’s New Faces in New Places, 2008). This is not public policy analysis.
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Study Purpose and Rationale
Local policy on unauthorized immigration, as an area of study, is underexplored.
With that in mind, I began with exploratory policy research. The resulting database
verifies and expands existing policy inventories.49 It also provided the raw material for
developing a typology of U.S. municipal unauthorized immigration policy.
My classification scheme builds on the work of other scholars. I adopt Good’s
(2005) municipal ‘responsiveness’ scheme, and Alexander’s (2004) ‘policy domain’
model, after making a few adjustments.50 Presenting this typology is the first aim of this
dissertation.
Offering a theoretical framework to guide comparative research on municipal
unauthorized immigration policy is the second goal. Towards this end, I start with Good’s
(2005) theoretical framework to assess its explanatory usefulness in the United States.
Following her lead, I explore aspects of two perspectives--urban regime theory and the
social diversity thesis. I then address gaps in these approaches by adding political culture
and entrepreneurship as an additional explicit factor. By utilizing in depth case studies, I
hope to overcome a weakness in the work of Ramakrishnam and Wong—namely their
reliance on political party affiliation as a measure of local political inclinations and
likelihood of action on MIP.

49

My sampling frame covers immigrant-specific and general population measures affecting immigrants
without legal status.
50
Good’s (2005) model works better for classifying data on unauthorized immigration than Alexander’s
(2004) policy alternative plan.
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Providing a richly detailed contextualized description of municipal response to
unauthorized immigration issues in three U.S. cities, and then comparing these, is my
final purpose.51 Three cases were purposely selected to facilitate cross-city comparison:
Sacramento, California; Denver, Colorado; and Portland, Oregon.52 Selection was guided
by the theoretical propositions of the study. Sacramento is a heterogeneous urban society,
Denver a bifurcated municipality, and Portland a mostly nonHispanic white city. The
study also employs a “comparable case strategy” (Lijphart, 1975, p. 159), which involves
selecting highly similar cases that vary in terms of the policy outputs under investigation.
“The logic of the design is that if cases are tightly matched then the variation on the
dependent variable can be explained in terms of the remaining differences between the
cases” (Good, 2005, p. 4). The cases under investigation are tightly “matched” on a
number of factors. Besides their comparable size and common geographic location—the
western region of the United States, the municipalities also share like immigration
histories. All three of the cases are classified as “reemerging” immigrant gateways. 53
They experienced high rates of immigration growth in between 1980 and 2000. The cities
also have similar socioeconomic profiles, and a tradition of progressive politics. Latinos
constitute the largest share of foreign in-migrants in each city, followed by newcomers of
Asian descent. Other commonalities: the residents of all three cities are predominantly
native-born, and each city has been labeled a “sanctuary city” by anti-immigrant interest
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We can think of this comparative case approach as intensity sampling, a technique that seeks rich
examples of the phenomenon (Patton 1990, p. 171).
52
In this dissertation, I separate central city from its suburbs and focus only on the former as distinct
political units.
53
Reemerging gateways are largely Western cities that “harbored high foreign-born shares in the early
1900s, saw them decline through the 1970s, and then grew again in the 1990s” (Singer, 2008, p. 9).
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groups and the media. However, recent case studies of immigration for metro Sacramento
(Datel & Dingemans, 2008), and metro Portland (Hardwich & Meacham, 2008), do not
mention municipal immigration policy.
My study covers the twenty-five year period between January 1, 1985 and
December 31, 2010. I started in 1985 because the bulk of U.S. cities entered the
immigration policy arena then.54 The end date coincides with the second wave of local
policy activism, which occurred in the aftermath of failed federal immigration reform in
2007. This longitudinal approach lets me track the trajectory of policy processes in case
study cities at many points in time. In doing so, it overcomes the temporal problem of
most literature on municipal action on unauthorized immigration, which tends to focus on
one point in time.

54

Policy phases common in international migration research do not work for organizing data at the local
level, because, unlike a national government, municipalities respond to issues at different times.
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Research Propositions
This study explores several propositions relating to the emergence and character of
municipal immigration policy, and evaluates their usefulness in understanding policy
directions in the three case study cities:
1. Municipal immigration politics and policy choice are shaped by a city’s
racial/ethnic composition and configuration, which can be broadly delineated into
three types according to degree and level of racial and ethnic diversity:
homogeneous, heterogeneous, and bifurcated.55 Since policymaking occurs within
the broader system of racial and ethnic stratification, local governments can be
expected to initiate immigration strategies that reflect and reinforce their city’s
ethnoracial structure. City governments in homogeneous locations will, under
threatening conditions, adopt policies that protect Anglo interests over those of
nonHispanic white immigrants. If the dominant group does not feel threatened by
these newcomers the probability of a nativist reaction is reduced. Public officials
in heterogeneous jurisdictions can be expected to take legislative steps to protect
the rights and interests of minority immigrants—legal and unauthorized, if the
situation warrants it. In a bifurcated environment, policy decisions will be
determined by the ethnic/racial group with the most influence. Since racial and
ethnic populations are not equally distributed across the United States, and
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I define homogeneous places as jurisdictions comprised of a dominate Anglo group—which includes all
non-Hispanic English-speaking whites, regardless of their religion or ethnicity-- and a very small (less than
40 percent) minority population. Heterogeneous municipalities are characterized by the presence of
multiple, more or less equally-sized racial/ethnic groups. Bifurcated cities have a relatively equal-sized
Anglo and minority population, but, unlike multiethnic localities, one minority group is significantly larger
than the others (Toussaint, 2013).

40

dominant-minority stratification arrangements vary as well, these different
diversity patterns account for city-to-city variation in policy outputs—favorable
or nonfavorable for unauthorized minority immigrants.56
2. Local government’s capacity to act on policy preferences is dependent upon its
ability to form an urban regime with immigration purposes.57 If local leaders can
build a governing coalition to co-produce immigration policy capacity, then that
city will have the social production power to take on major immigration
initiatives. Without such a regime little or no immigration policy will be produced
locally. Since regime development does not occur at the same time across the
country (due to variations in urban contexts), differences in regime development
patterns—present or not present—explain variation in municipal immigration
policy outputs (some or none), and the point in time when immigration
policymaking begins.
3. Municipal policy on unauthorized immigration is shaped by local political
ideology. There are two main political orientations in the United States—liberal
(typically associated with the Democratic Party) and conservative (characteristic
of the Republican Party). Liberals believe unauthorized immigrants should have
the same rights as U.S. citizens. They expect government to protect the civil
liberties and human rights of all people, regardless of nationality or citizenship.
Conservatives oppose “sanctuary policies” for unauthorized immigrants. They
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According to Hero (1998), this is because a society’s social (diversity) context determines how power is
exercised and the way individuals and groups (with different historical experiences) perceive policy issues,
especially policies related to minorities.
57
The formal structure and rules of city government often makes it difficult for local officials to act.
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believe those who break the law by entering the U.S. illegally do not have the
same rights as citizens, or immigrants who obey the law by entering legally
(“Conservative vs. Liberal,” 2010). Accordingly, local governments in cities with
a liberal political culture are more likely to pursue urban citizenship policies58
than city officials in places with a more politically conservative outlook, if
committed leadership from a “policy entrepreneur” exits.59 Without such a change
agent, liberal ideals are less likely to be translated into action. Since local political
culture and political leadership varies across cities within the same country, these
alternative political patterns explain intercity similarities and differences in
strategic policy direction.
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These measures guarantee unauthorized immigrants formal membership in a city’s polity, and with that,
the civil rights and liberties associated with citizenship (Varsanyi, 2006), including freedom from
deportation.
59
A policy entrepreneur is an individual—in or out of formal government—who exploits an opportunity in
order to introduce innovative policy and influence its adoption without regard for the absence of resources
required to take on such activity (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, pp. 652-54; Cohen, 2012, p. 53).
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CHAPTER 3
Research Methods
Municipal policy on unauthorized immigration, as an area of study, is
underexplored. To remedy that, this dissertation raises two questions. First, what
unauthorized immigration policies do local governments pursue, under what
circumstances, and for what reasons? Second, what explains intercity variation in
municipal responsiveness to the policy preferences and interests of residents without
legal status? This chapter describes the two approaches used to address those questions:
multicity exploratory research, and theory-driven, comparative case study. By combining
descriptive and causal methods, I have attempted to provide as complete an approach as
possible to the study of municipal responsiveness to unauthorized immigration. The first
part of this chapter presents the methodology for the policy exploration chapter. The
second section covers the methods used in the case study chapter.
Multicity Policy Exploration
This section describes typology construction and outlines the steps in the
exploratory research process. Primary research was needed because very few secondary
sources exist. The resulting inventory of municipal unauthorized immigration policy
supplied the raw material for developing a typology about the same. It also provided a
context within which to ground my comparative case study.
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Typology construction
The typology utilized in this study is developed and expanded from two existing
typologies—Michael Alexander’s (2003) policy domain ordering scheme, and Kristin
Good’s (2005) municipal responsiveness model.
In Alexander’s (2003) classification system, policy domains are components of
the political system—socio-economic, legal-political, cultural-religious, and spatial—
organized around substantive issues.60 His Socio-Economic domain deals with issues
related to the labor market and government spending on public housing, health care,
education, job and social services. The Legal-Political domain encompasses issues related
to civic status and political participation through voting, grassroots mobilization and/or
political appointments. In the Spatial domain, policies are associated with concerns about
public land use and urban development. Lastly, strategies that focus on the cultural
otherness of migrants can be separated into the Cultural-Religious domain.
According to Alexander, this framework is vital in a multi-city comparison.
“Since different cities may focus on different areas in their policy response to migrants
(or the same city does so in different periods)” (Alexander, 2003, p. 64).
The second ordering scheme—municipal responsiveness—is based on Good’s
(2005) analyses of multiculturalism policy in seven Canadian cities, and grounded in the
principles of democratic governance.61 Since the people are the ultimate source of public
authority in a democracy, political scientists use the word “responsive” to characterize
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Alexander’s (2003) second classification plan, which focuses on policy alternatives—non-policy, guest
worker policy, assimilation policy, and pluralist policy--is based on an analysis of migrant labor policy in
Europe and Tel Aviv. It does not work well for classifying policy on unauthorized immigration.
61
It replaces the policy alternative ordering scheme in Alexander’s (2003) model.
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various aspects of government performance, that is, the degree to which public officials
respond to the issue preferences of citizens. According to Good (2005), in a study of
municipal responsiveness to immigrants, questions concerning institutional accessibility
and inclusiveness are paramount. Her definition takes this into account. She uses the term
“responsiveness” to describe the extent to which public officials adopt policies that
respond directly to the needs and issue preferences of immigrants, including decisions
about whether (or not) to adjust their services and governance structure to facilitate
equitable, inclusive access.
In Good’s (2005) framework, policy is classified according to three degrees of
municipal responsiveness to immigrants and minorities: responsive, somewhat
responsive, and unresponsive. She uses three broad elements of policy to measure the
“responsiveness” of municipalities: (1) formal policy, which would include policy
proposed or adopted by locally elected or appointed politicians; (2) policy enforcement,
which would include policy enforced by local public servants (i.e., employees working
for local government departments and agencies such as police, building inspectors, social
workers); and (3) informal or de facto polices or practices in all municipal areas.62
Good then uses this information to define three degrees of municipal
responsiveness to immigrants and minorities: responsive, somewhat responsive, and
unresponsive. To evaluate the nature and scope of policy outputs, Good assesses the
breadth and depth of policies in place (comprehensive, limited, highly limited), and the
policy style of the municipality (proactive, reactive, and inactive/resistant). She
62

De facto policies are programs of action that “in fact” exist but not necessarily by written law or formal
operating rules; they are unofficial operating directives communicated off the record or developed by
custom and consensus within individual agencies (Toussaint, 2013).
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conceptualizes “responsive” municipalities as proactive and comprehensive in their
responses to immigrants and ethnic/racial minorities; “somewhat responsive” cities as
reactive and their responses limited rather than comprehensive; and “unresponsive”
localities as inactive or resistant to multiculturalism policy and their responses to the
target population highly limited (Good, 2005, pp. 268-69).
To facilitate the search for policy examples, Good (2005) also developed a list of
potential strategies local governments might pursue to achieve their policy objectives.
She groups these programs of action into eight general categories: immigrant-welcome
city imagery; inclusive political procedures; access and equity in service delivery plans;
employment equity initiatives; multiculturalism and anti-racism programs; provision of
grants, in-kind contributions and research; support of multicultural festivals; or
development of intergovernmental immigration and settlement measures.
Equipped with frameworks to guide me, I plunged into exploratory research. The
investigation yielded a list of hotly debated, locally important immigration issues and
later, a wide a range policy examples. I modified the starting typology categories based
on inductive analysis of this data.
Since none of the issues identified in my study fit into Alexander’s (2003)
“cultural-religious” domain category, I eliminated that group in my typology. I also
added some issues areas specific in unauthorized immigration, like police enforcement of
immigration laws, attorney legal opinions and lawsuits to the Legal-Political domain.
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Next, I customized Good’s (2005) policy checklist by making the following
adjustments. First, I deleted her multicultural festival category. The scope of my research
did not include cultural issues. I also removed her multiculturalism and anti-racism
program group, as it pertains to local policies designed to meet the equity goals
established in the Canadian Multicultural Act (1988) (Good, 2005, p. 284).63 This is
essentially civil rights legislation (equal opportunity law and affirmative action policy),
or corporate diversity management, in the United States. Good (2005) does not
distinguish between policies for native-born racial and ethnic groups and first generation
foreign in-migrants. In the United States, programs created for racial/ethnic minorities
generally are not constructed with the adjustment needs of new foreign-born residents in
mind. I make this distinction in my typology, while expanding her categories. I add
eighteen new policy examples, and a description of what each plan of action might look
in practice and pertain to the issue of unauthorized immigration; none of Good’s (2005)
policy types address the issue of illegal status. To facilitate organization, I also frame
these strategies as areas of municipal authority (see Appendix A).
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The goals of the Act include a federal government commitment to: remove barriers to equitable
participation in all aspects of Canadian society (3.1a); encourage (social, cultural, economic and political)
institutions to be inclusive of ethno-cultural diversity (3.1f); preserve and enhance the use of languages
other than English and French (3.1i); ensure that all Canadians have equal access to employment regardless
of their ethnic origins 93.2a); and, more generally, to be “responsive” to Canada’s ethno-cultural diversity
(3.2f). The scope of its mandate extends beyond public institutions to include the business community,
voluntary and other private sector organizations (5.1d). [1988, c. 31, assented to July 21, 1988].
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Finally, some of the criteria Good (2005) uses to evaluate policy outputs are
problematic. Her “inactive/resistant” policy style category is not mutually exclusive. And
she fails to operationalize indicators of policy “breadth and depth.” I use “policy impact”
in place of these measures.
The exploratory research process
This section describes how I searched various data bases, collated, and
categorized the data drawn from exploratory research. In the first phase of research, I
used Google to scan the Web for national-level organizations with a stake in local
immigration. My sources were derived from a word text search of U.S. municipal leader
associations (e.g., United States Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities);
research policy institutes (e.g., Brookings Institute, Immigration Policy Center, Center for
Immigration Studies, Migration Policy Institute); national immigrants’ rights
organizations (e.g., ACLU, Bill of Rights Defense Committee, National Council of La
Raza, National Employment Law Project); national anti-immigrant organizations (e.g.,
Federation for American Immigration Reform, NumbersUSA, Team America PAC); and
immigration law centers (e.g., American Immigration Law Foundation, National
Immigration Law Center). I found no municipal immigration policy tracking
organization, although a few organizations do track policy related to particular themes.
The Bill of Rights Defense Committee, for instance, produced a downloadable booklet of
anti-Patriot Act resolutions passed by state, county, and local governments. Most of the
sampled websites had an “Issue” option on their main menu. Otherwise, I found relevant
information on the dropdown menu when I clicked on “Publications” or “What We Do.”
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I inventoried the content of those web pages looking for and recording (on an
Excel spreadsheet) data about local immigration debates, and municipal responses to
those issues. I also examined documents (research reports, working papers, policy and
legal briefs, factsheets, newsletters and press releases) that were published by these
organizations and posted on their websites.
From this research, I developed a checklist of the issues most hotly debated in
U.S. cities over the past twenty five years. The issues selected were those most frequently
raised by people with a role in municipal agenda setting—local officials, news reporters,
and claimsmakers on both sides of the immigration debate. I also constructed a list of
local policy responses to the issues on the first checklist. I used these checklists to guide
the second phase of my research.
To facilitate analysis, I constructed a two-dimensional matrix comprised of
examples of immigration policy produced in selected U.S. cities. Data in my policy
inventory was sorted into mutually exclusive rows and columns based on study
headings—policies and cities respectively.64 The policy section was further broken down
by issue area. The resulting grid provided the raw material to develop a typology for
comparing cities’ responses to a common set of issues related to unauthorized
immigration. The organizing scheme helped squeeze some order out of a chaotic set of
information.
When the two ordering schemes described above are combined, the result is a
classification system of municipal responsiveness to unauthorized immigration by policy
domain and issue area (see Appendix B). In the typology, the columns represent the
64

I used my brain to construct the typologies, not a computer program.
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policy responses, and the rows represent municipal domains subdivided into policy areas
that address specific issues. The matrix cells can be filled with adopted or proposed
policies, each cell representing how a specific policy type (say, unresponsive) is
expressed in a particular policy area (say, day labor solicitation). The contents of the cells
were derived from a mix of inductive and deductive reasoning. Most are based on actual
policies gleaned from my exploratory policy research, or found in literature, then
classified according to the scheme. A few policies were inferred from gaps in typology as
“potential policies” that may or may not actually exist.
The content presented is not an accurate representative of policymaking in any
city, but rather an analytic framework that can be applied to particular cities and policies
to better understand them. As is the case with any classification system, this model has
limitations. The two policy types proposed here are ideal types. No city will likely
conform to one type across all policy domains all the time, a mix of unresponsive and
responsive policies are probable. Also, policy trajectory is not fixed. Policy development
does not always evolve from anti-immigrant to pro-immigrant. A city that produced
foreign-born friendly policy in one era may not craft that same kind of policy always.
Still, the framework may indicate which domains or policy areas tend to dominate local
policymaking in a given period.65 Identifying a prevailing policy pattern is possible in
most cases.
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If the date that a policy was adopted is included in the cell, then the model can also be used to track
activity overtime.
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Case Study Methods
The current lack of academic research into municipal policy on unauthorized
immigrants, and the consequent dearth of theory about it, led to my decision to adopt the
case study approach. Case studies play an important role in advancing a field’s
knowledge by providing more detailed information than what is available through other
methods. Case studies also allow one to present data collected from multiple methods to
provide a complete story. This is something which cannot appear in a policy matrix. It is
also an important mechanism for theoretical generalization. By combining descriptive
and casual methods, I have attempted to provide as complete an approach as possible to
the study of municipal responsiveness to unauthorized immigration. This section starts
with a description of the model that I used to evaluate policy, followed by details of the
methodology.
Typology construction
To evaluate the nature and scope of policy outputs, I developed a second
typology. It uses two criteria to assess local government responsiveness to unauthorized
immigrants: policy style and policy impact. The first indicator, policy style, is measured
in terms of three problem-solving approaches: proactive, reactive, and defensive. Each
type indicates the amount of effort city officials put into policymaking. A proactive
approach is well-planned and anticipatory; it requires institutional effort to identity and
address the needs of unauthorized immigrants before problems arise. Reactive
policymaking entails setting up a unit of city government (police liaison, task force, or
advisory committee) to respond ad hoc to community demands and complaints that
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cannot be ignored. This is a passive method. The third category, defensive, involves
denying, trivializing, or deliberately refusing to acknowledge the unique needs and
concerns of residents without legal status. These types are based on a model by Marcia
Wallace and Frances Frisken (2000).66 Who derived their categories from comparative
study of public service agency response to immigrant settlement in seven municipalities
in the Greater Toronto Area.
My second assessment standard is policy impact. This outcome-based
performance indicator, commonly used in public policy research, measures the effect of
policies in terms of these values: positive, moderately beneficial, and negative. A positive
policy result increases access to opportunities for unauthorized foreign-born residents in
most all aspects of mainstream urban life. If these programs of action were not initiated
the well-being of immigrants without legal status would be markedly diminished.
Moderately beneficial policies increase access to opportunities for undocumented
residents in some aspects of mainstream urban life. If these programs of action were not
initiated the well-being of this population would be diminished somewhat. A negative
policy does not increase access to opportunities for unauthorized immigrants or improve
their quality of life. These programs of action either make no real difference or cause
harm. Evidence of “benefit” is demonstrated by the breadth and depth of policies in and
across municipal policy domains. Table 1 summarizes my evaluation criterion and
scoring system.

66

I replaced Wallace & Frisken’s (2000) “inactive” category label with “defensive.”

52

Table 1 Policy evaluation criteria and score
Policy Evaluation Criteria
Policy style
Proactive
Reactive
Defensive
Policy impact
Positive
Moderately beneficial
Negative

Score
H
M
L

3
2
1

H
M
L

3
2
1

The dependent variable in this study--local government policy--is classified according to
three degrees of municipal responsiveness to unauthorized immigrants: responsive,
somewhat responsive, and unresponsive. “Responsive” policies are proactive and
produce a positive outcome for unauthorized immigrants. “Somewhat responsive”
policies are reactive and only moderately beneficial to city residents without legal status.
An “unresponsive” policy generates negative consequences for authorized foreign
nationals, and stems from a defensive approach to policymaking. The policy “scores” that
result are heuristic guides rather than scaled measures.
As Table 2 shows, my conceptualization of municipal responsiveness is a continuum
representing a range of policy alternatives. These are ideal types. A “real” city might
initiate some policies proactively while ignoring or responding reactively to other
unauthorized immigration issues.
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Table 2 A typology of municipal responsiveness to unauthorized immigrants
1--------------------------------2----------------------------------3

Policy style
Policy impact

Responsive

Somewhat responsive

Unresponsive

Proactive
Positive

Reactive
Moderately beneficial

Defensive
Negative

The case study research process
This section lays out my case selection criteria, time frame, strategies for collecting
and analyzing data.
Three cases were purposely selected to facilitate cross-city comparison:
Sacramento, California; Denver, Colorado; and Portland, Oregon. Selection was guided
by the theoretical propositions of the study. Sacramento is a heterogeneous urban society,
Denver a bifurcated municipality, and Portland a mostly nonHispanic white city. The
study also employs a “comparable case strategy” (Lijphart, 1975, p. 159), which involves
selecting highly similar cases that vary in terms of the policy outputs under investigation.
“The logic of the design is that if cases are tightly matched then the variation on the
dependent variable can be explained in terms of the remaining differences between the
cases” (Good, 2005, p. 4). As Table 3 and Table 4 illustrates, the cases under
investigation are tightly “matched” on a number of factors. Besides their comparable size
and common geographic location—the western region of the United States, the
municipalities also share like immigration histories. All three of the cases are classified as
“reemerging” immigrant gateways.67 The cities also have similar socioeconomic profiles,
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Reemerging gateways are largely Western cities that “harbored high foreign-born shares in the early
1900s, saw them decline through the 1970s, and then grew again in the 1990s” (Singer, 2004, p. 7).
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and a tradition of progressive politics. Latinos constitute the largest share of foreign inmigrants in each city, followed by newcomers of Asian descent. Other commonalities:
the residents of all three cities are predominantly native-born, and each has been labeled a
“sanctuary city” by anti-immigrant interest groups and the media.
Table 3 Comparison of case city general population characteristics, and changes 1990-2010
Place
Denver, CO
Portland, OR
Sacramento, CA

2010 Census
Numbers

2000 Census
Numbers

1990 Census
Numbers

600,158
583,776
466,488

554,636
529,121
407,018

467,610
437,319
369,365

1990-2000
(%) ± change

2000-2010
(%) ± change

18.6
21.0
10.2

8.2
10.3
14.6

Table 4 Comparison of case city foreign born population characteristics, and changes 1990-2010
Place

2010 Census
Numbers
%

2000 Census
Numbers %

1990 Census
Numbers %

1990-2000
(%) ± change

2000-2010
(%) ± change

Sacramento, CA
Portland, OR
Sacramento, CA

96,924
78,892
103,152

96, 601
68,976
82,616

43,715
33,601
50,569

120.9
105.3
63.4

0.3
14.3
24.8

16.4
13.7
22.3

17.4
13.0
20.3
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7.4
7.7
13.7

Table 5 Comparison of case city population characteristics by race and ethnicity, 1990-2010
Place

2010 Census
Numbers

%

2000 Census
Numbers

%

1990 Census
Numbers

%

Denver, CO
American Indian and Alaska Native
Asian and Pacific Islanders
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Non-Hispanic White

20,433
21,040
61,435
190,965
313,012

1.4
3.5
10.2
31.8
52.2

12,187
20,365
67,375
175,704
287,997

2.2
3.6
12.1
31.7
51.9

5,381
11,005
60,046
107,382
287,162

1.2
2.4
12.8
23.0
61.4

Portland, OR
American Indian and Alaska Native
Asian and Pacific Islanders
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Non-Hispanic White

5,991
44,801
36,695
54,840
421,773

1.0
7.6
6.3
9.4
72.2

12.125
43,143
41,589
36,058
399,351

2.3
6.7
7.9
6.8
75.5

5,399
23,185
33,530
13,874
362,503

1.2
5.3
7.7
3.2
82.9

Sacramento, CA
American Indian and Alaska Native
Asian and Pacific Islanders
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Non-Hispanic White

5,291
92,158
68,335
125,276
161,062

1.1
19.7
14.6
26.9
34.5

11,303
83,841
70,218
87,974
164,974

2.8
20.6
17.3
21.6
40.5

4,561
55,426
56,521
60,007
197,157

1.2
15.0
15.3
16.2
53.4

Table 6 Comparison of changes in case city race and ethnic populations, 1990-2010
Denver

Portland

Sacramento

126.5
67.7

124.5
50.6

147.8
- 53.2

Asian and Pacific Islanders
1990-2000, (%) ± change
2000-2010, (%) ± change

85.1
3.3

86.1
3.8

51.2
9.9

Black or African American
1990-2000, (%) ± change
2000-2010, (%) ± change

12.2
- 8.8

24.1
- 11.7

24.2
- 2.7

Hispanic or Latino
1990-2000, (%) ± change
2000-2010, (%) ± change

63.6
8.7

159.9
52.0

46.6
42.4

Non-Hispanic White
1990-2000, (%) ± change
2000-2010, (%) ± change

.3
8.7

10.2
5.6

1.6
2.4

American Indian and Alaska Native
1990-2000, (%) ± change
2000-2010, (%) ± change
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Table 7 Comparison of case city socioeconomic characteristics, 1990-2010

Per capita money income ($)
1990
2000
2010
Median household income ($)
1990
2000
2010
Persons below poverty line, individuals (%)
1990
2000
2010
Media value owner-occupied units ($)
1990
2000
2010
Bachelor’s degree or higher, persons age 25+ (%)
1990
2000
2010

Denver

Portland

Sacramento

15,590
24,101
32,051

14,454
22,643
30,631

14,087
18,721
25,744

25,106
39,500
47,499

25,587
40,146
50,177

28,183
37,049
50,781

17.1
14.3
18.8

14.5
13.1
16.8

17.2
20.0
18.6

79,168
165,800
243,400

154,900
292,800

128.800
275,800

29.0
34.5
41.3

27.1
32.7
42.0

23.5
23.9
29.2

Table 8 Comparison of case city geographic and political characteristics
U.S. region
Type of immigration
destination
Political culture and rank*
Political structure

Denver
western
re-emerging

Portland
Western
re-emerging

Sacramento
Western
re-emerging

Liberal 47th
Liberal 27th
Liberal 69th
Reform-style
Unreformed
Unreformed
(commission)
(mayor-council)
(strong mayor/ council)
* Liberal-Conservative rankings based on the voting returns of the 2004 presidential election (BACVR).

My study covers the twenty-five year period between January 1, 1985 and
December 31, 2010. I started in 1985 because the bulk of U.S. cities entered the
immigration policy arena then.68 The end date coincides with the second wave of local
policy activism, which occurred in the aftermath of failed federal immigration reform in
68

Policy phases common in international migration research do not work for organizing data at the local
level, because, unlike a national government, municipalities respond to issues at different times.
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2007. This longitudinal approach lets me track the trajectory of policy processes in case
study cities at many points in time. In doing so, it overcomes the temporal problem of
most literature on municipal action on unauthorized immigration, which tends to focus on
one point in time.
Studying policy activity in the three case cities involved generating three different
but overlapping data sets, each of which was associated with a different methodology. At
the city level of analysis, data were collected on municipal action on unauthorized
immigration in three cities, as well as the cities themselves, through structured content
analysis of relevant articles in seven local daily newspapers, and four national papers,
during a twenty-five year period. At the municipal level, data on locally generated
unauthorized immigration policy were gathered from government archives in the three
case cities during the same time period. At the nongovernment organizational level, data
were gleaned from secondary analysis of accounts written and published by agencies on
both sides of the “illegal” immigration debate about municipal responsiveness. Contacts
with local officials and community leaders were used to fill-in gaps in the data or clarify
a conflicting account.
My initial source of data came from a word text search of newspapers and news
blogs published between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2010 in my three case cities.
These news sources included: the Oregonian, Willamette Week, Portland Tribune, and
Portland Business Journal in Portland; the Denver Post, Rocky Mountain News, and
Denver Business Journal in Denver; and the Sacramento Bee, Sacramento Observer, and
Sacramento Business Journal in Sacramento. I also collected articles, about immigration
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politics in the three cities, from the archives of some of the largest metropolitan
newspapers (Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post) and a few
national sources (USA Today and Associated Press). I relied on two computer assisted
research services—NewsLibrary.com and (the newspaper database in) LexisNexis--to
help me locate city-specific information published in these sources. To narrow the search,
I relied on the same Index Terms strategy used during my policy survey research. I also
pulled data from the web pages of local immigrants’ rights organizations, and their
counterparts—anti-immigrant groups. I read relevant city-specific reports and press
releases available on their websites. To guide data collection, I used the issue-policy
checklist developed from my exploratory policy research. The document data described
above was used to make inferences about circumstances surrounding local immigration
policymaking. I also gained archival research leads.
Archival data was my primary data source, and included the examination of these
items: executive orders and administrative laws; council bills; resolutions and
proclamations issued by elected officials and various government departments and
agencies; municipal codes and ordinances; police department manuals; legal opinions;
memorandums; agenda packages, meeting materials and meeting minutes; permits;
budget documents; press releases and letters. I got most of these records from online
records libraries accessible via the web page of the City Auditor or City Clerk.
I occasionally used focused questions to corroborate evidence obtained from other
sources, or to fill-in gaps in my research. Respondents were interviewed for a short
period of time and asked to answer specific questions. The conversations took place over
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the telephone or by email. The people contacted were government officials, or persons
mentioned in a newspaper article or on a website.
The aim of the second phase of my research was to refine and build on the lists
constructed during the first phase. In phase one I identified general policy categories. In
phase two I was looking for articles about what was happening in the specific case cities.
I used of two computer assisted research services—NewsLibrary.com and (the newspaper
database in) LexisNexis--to find stories published in national and local newspapers about
municipal immigration policy. To focus the search, I used a list of key words derived
from my earlier research. For instance, to find articles pertaining to the day labor issue, I
typed the word “day laborer” into the news bank search engine. I applied the advance
search option to limit the scan to my study dates—January 1, 1985 to December 31,
2010. To exclude stories that focused on national instead of local immigration actions, I
typed a series of key Index Terms separated by the word ‘AND’ into the search engine.
For example: local ‘AND’ immigrant ‘AND’ sanctuary; or police ‘AND’ immigration
‘AND’ enforcement. I saved relevant articles in a file folder on my computer and later,
analyzed and cataloged their contents. Data gleaned from these articles was summarized
and entered into an Excel spreadsheet, which I stored in a folder on my computer.69 To
this database, I added information derived from the few empirical studies that exist.70

69

Data sources were recorded and stored on the same spreadsheet. These could be cross-referenced with
the corresponding bibliography document that I created.
70
Hobbs (1994); Wells (2002); Light (2006); and Varsanyi’s (2010) anthology on local immigration
policymaking in the United States.
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Still, it should be emphasized that this is a partial list, due to the patchiness of
secondary data and limited availability of finding primary sources. As a result, I adapted
my research to fit the most readily accessible data sources, rather than the totality of the
policy pool. As previously discussed, this imperfect policy subset consists of municipal
response to seven hotly debated, locally important immigration issues.
Comparative analysis
To reduce and systematically analyze descriptive data, I used my typology tool.
Pattern-matching was my analytic strategy. A description of the process follows.
First, I sorted evidence from my three case cities into appropriate policy domain
and issue area categories, according to the classification scheme. After filling the matrix
with available data, I then compared each city’s empirical policy pattern with the
responsiveness evaluation criterion presented earlier. These evaluation measures were
constructed to facilitate systematic assessment of a city’s level of responsiveness to
foreign in-migrants. I assigned each city a score based a match between its prevailing
policy pattern and the designated indicators of responsiveness. A city with a high score
would be judged “responsive.” Those with medium and low scores would be deemed
“somewhat responsive” and “unresponsive” respectively.
Theoretical evaluation
Finally, I evaluated the cases in relation to the three explanatory frameworks
presented below. A summary and discussion of these findings is reported in Chapter 6.
(1) According to regime theory, different sets of interests come together as a
regime around a particular set of goals. The interests that might be expected to
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come together to constitute a pro-immigrant regime might include:
immigrants’ rights advocates, ethnic minority groups, labor unions,
community-based nonprofits, local media, business associations, commercial
property owners, immigration lawyers, civil liberty and civil rights
organizations, faith-based networks and groups (e.g., the Sanctuary
Movement), elected and appointed officials from the City and County
(including police and sheriffs), police watch dog groups, foreign consulates,
immigrant and refugee resettlement organizations, state congressional
members, and the immigrants themselves. Anti-illegal immigrant regimes
might include: immigrant-restriction organizations and “think tanks,” local
media, business associations, neighborhood associations, elected and
appointed officials from the City and County (including police and sheriffs),
state congressional members, federal immigration personnel, citizen militia
members and white supremacists. I noted when and where these interests were
present in the three cities studied.
(2) In the second phase of pattern-matching, I compared the response patterns of
local government with the theoretical propositions of the social diversity
thesis. I noted where the data was consistent with the frameworks and where it
was not.
(3) Finally, I assess how political culture as expressed through entrepreneurial
political leaders has shaped local policy decisions on unauthorized
immigration.
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CHAPTER 4
The Range of Municipal Unauthorized Immigration Policy: A Multicity Exploration
This chapter draws on a larger universe of cities to illustrate U.S. trends in
municipal unauthorized immigration policy. It presents findings from my exploratory
research on locally important immigration debates, and municipal responses to those
issues. This data provided the raw material to develop a classification scheme for
comparing the policy reactions of different cities within one or several policy areas, or to
follow one city’s policy responses over time. I begin with a summary of the most hotly
contested immigration issues arising in U.S. cities over the past two decades. Then, I
present the typology and present some notable highlights.
Issue Briefs
Seven locally important immigration debates can be inferred from the sources
surveyed. All are related to the theme of unauthorized immigration. This section outlines
these controversies, which began showing up on local political agendas in the mid-1980s
and center on these hot-button issues: 1) asylum for unauthorized refugees; 2) amnesty
for “illegal” immigrants; 3) worksite deportation raids; 4) devolution of immigration law
enforcement; 5) government benefits for noncitizens; 6) day labor-contractor market
exchanges; and 7) “locally legal” identification cards. The issue briefs that follow provide
a snap shot of each problem, and lay out the debates surrounding the issues.
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Asylum for unauthorized refugees
There are no federal laws governing who can move into a city. During the 1980s
thousands of unauthorized Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans entered the
United States to escape persecution in their homelands. When they were denied asylum
due to Cold War politics, local government entered the debate over who should be
allowed into the United States and who should decide this. That was in 1980, the year the
U.S. Congress passed the Refugee Act. The law was intended to expand eligibility for
political asylum in the United States.71 That same year, Ronald Reagan was elected
president of the United States. The new administration’s handling of both the overseas
refugee admissions program, and the new asylum system, became the subject of intense
criticism from the growing human rights community. At the time, refugees from
communist countries in Southeast Asia and the Eastern Europe were given preferential
admittance to the United States, while Guatemalan and Salvadoran applications for
political asylum were being rejected.72 This uneven practice, which linked the fate of
asylum seekers to Cold War foreign concerns rather than the humanitarian standard of the
new Refugee Act, set the stage for a decade-long battle that eventually involved City
Hall.
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The Refugee Act of 1980 broadened the Cold War definition of a refugee, which was a person fleeing
communism or coming from the Middle East, to make it consistent with the non-ideological humanitarian
protocol established by the United Nations in 1967. To be granted asylum under the new act, a refugee or
asylee must demonstrate “well-founded fear of being persecuted.” It also created a new legal category of
refugee, an “asylee.” Unlike a refugee, who attempts to gain admission into the United States from outside
the country, an asylee applies for refugee status after arriving on U.S. soil.
72
Haitian applications for political asylum were also rejected, likely because of poverty and race
(Maharidge, 1985; Rother, 1986; Wilson 1986; Sanders, 1987a; Meyers, 2004).
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On one side of the controversy were sanctuary movement supporters--immigrants'
rights lawyers, religious activists, and the refugees themselves.73 On the other side were
President Reagan and his administration, the State Department, and the Department of
Justice (including the INS and FBI). The first group accused the federal government of
violating the human rights of Central American asylum seekers.74 The United States, they
argued, had ignored political oppression in El Salvador and Guatemala because it would
embarrass the administration to admit that U.S. allies were persecuting their citizens. The
Reagan administration, which considered Central Americans economic refugees, denied
this.75 Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylees in-country where often deported. In some high
profile cases, the religious activists who brought them in were indicted on alien
smuggling charges.
Frustrated with limited influence at the national level, the sanctuary movement
transferred its policy reform efforts to the municipal level. This coalition of religious
groups launched a “City of Refuge” campaign to persuade local governments to offer
their jurisdictions as a sanctuary for asylum-seekers discriminated against by federal
authorities. Most cities did nothing. Some took up the humanitarian cause. In doing so,
they ignited a still unresolved controversy about the role of local government in
immigration affairs. In the meantime, many of the Central Americans who sought asylum
in the United States during the 1980s remained here.
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For a historical account of the sanctuary movement, see Maharidge, 1985; Sander, 1987a; Lynd & Lynd,
2002; Walsh, 2005; Chuang & Haught, 2007).
74
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes asylum as a universal human right.
75
U.S. aid to El Salvador and Guatemala was the primary reason given for denying Central Americans
admittance into the United States.
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Amnesty for unauthorized immigrants
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
granting approximately 2.8 million undocumented immigrants legal status in the United
States. They received a Green Card, which could lead to U.S. citizenship. Immediate
relatives or dependents, which included about 143,000 individuals, could also qualify for
the resident identity card and work permit. Before the 1986 legislation, amnesty in the
United States was only granted on a limited, case by case basis (U.S. Immigration
Support, n.d.). Six additional mass amnesties have occurred since.76
The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 was an attempt to enact an
eighth amnesty for immigrants.77 The bill, which was also proposed in the previous
session of Congress, never became law. It would have provided legal status and a path to
citizenship for about 12 to 20 million unauthorized immigrants, while tightening border
enforcement. The proposed legislation was a counter measure to the Border Protection,
Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H. R. 4437). That piece of
legislation, also known as the “Sensenbrenner Bill,” for its sponsor in the House of
Representatives, Wisconsin Republican Jim Sensenbrenner, has been called the “toughest
anti-amnesty, enforcement-only immigration bill in history” (How Democracy Works,
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INS § 245(i) Amnesty, 1994 (a temporary rolling amnesty for 578,000 illegal aliens; INS § 245(i)
Amnesty, 1997 (an extension of the 1994 amnesty); Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief
Act Amnesty, 1997; Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act Amnesty, 1998; Late Amnesty, 2000 (an
amnesty for those who claim they should have been amnestied under IRCA); Life Act Amnesty, 2000 (a
reinstatement of the rolling Section 245(i) amnesty).
77
Its full name is Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348).
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2010).78 It called for making illegal immigration a felony offense punishable by at least a
year in jail.
The bill did not pass the Senate, but it was the catalyst for the 2006 U.S.
immigration reform protests involving millions of people across the United States. The
march was followed by one-day boycott on May 1st dubbed A Day without an Immigrant,
in reference to a popular political satire film.79 To raise awareness about the importance
of “illegal” immigrants to the U.S. economy, supporters abstained from buying, selling,
working, and attending school. They rallied in major cities across the country to demand
a general amnesty and fewer Immigration Services delays. Congress continues to debate
issue. In the meantime, local governments are left to deal with a population without legal
status, and constituents with mixed opinions on the topic.
Amnesty critics argue that the United States is already overpopulated and that
lawmakers need to crack down on illegal immigration, not promote it. Granting amnesty
increases the size of the U.S. population, they say, which negatively impacts the
environment. It also burdens taxpayers who must pay for extra social services, with their
immigrant-driven depressed wages. Besides pardoning illegal immigrants is wrong,
amnesty opponents argue. It penalizes legal aliens who have properly followed the rules,
and delays the immigration of those patiently waiting aboard. Granting amnesty also
rewards criminal behavior and encourages others, especially family members, to follow
the same path. Worst, it undermines the public trust, as past amnesties were promised to
be “the last.” Those against amnesty do not believe the government should make
78

The bill was featured in the documentary “The Senate Speaks,” story 11 in How Democracy Works Now:
Twelve Stories by Shari Robertson and Michael Camerini.
79
A Day Without a Mexican (2004).
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everyone legal just because it might be more convenient than deportation. The process of
granting legal immigration status, they argue, is even more troublesome. It creates a
costly bureaucratic nightmare.
Amnesty supporters believe a massive deportation is unrealistic. Locating and
sending people back to their home countries would be logistically difficult and expensive,
they claim. Besides, expelling people seeking to improve their lives simply because they
lack legal documents also violates basic human rights. Many unauthorized immigrants
have family members, including children, who are citizens or legal residents. Every effort
should be made to keep families intact. That is in the best interest of the children and
society-at-large, say those advocating for compassion. Besides these individuals have
resided, worked, and contributed to their new communities for years. They have earned
the right to remain in the country and to apply for citizenship. Forgiving the crime of
illegal entry will give them a chance at self-sufficiency and social mobility, argue those
who favor amnesty. Allowing such a substantial portion of Americans to live
“underground” harms the whole community.
Regardless of which side of the debate resonates with local leaders, failure to
reform national immigration laws has caused city officials to do the job of the federal
government—grant de facto urban citizenship to residents, or force foreign nationals to
leave the city limits. Having residents who work in an underground economy and cannot
access public health and safety services (due to ineligibility or fear of deportation) creates
difficult situations for municipal government.
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Worksite deportation raids
Other provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act were designed to
crackdown on foreign in-migrants who entered the country illegally to find work. The
first section of IRCA instituted civil and criminal sanctions against employers who
knowingly hire (or recruit, harbor, or refer for a fee) a non-U.S. citizen without
authorization to work in the United Sates. It requires employers to file an I-9 form for
each worker, stating that the employer has verified that the employee is legally allowed to
work in the United States. Employees can prove their legal status by allowing the
employer to examine their passport, birth certificate, Social Security card or alien
documentation. Employers who violate the law face fines and perhaps even jail time.
These “employer sanctions” were supposed to give employers an incentive to hire nativeborn or legal immigrant workers instead of unauthorized aliens. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) was charged with IRCA law enforcement.80 The agency
relies on worksite raids to accomplish this task. Migrants caught in the crack downs are
deported.
Local enforcement of IRCA provoked renewed criticism about the fairness of
United States immigration laws. Critics argue that raids hurt local economies. Rounding
up undocumented immigrants at urban worksites creates an unfriendly business climate.
It deprives targeted cities of their affordable workforce, and discourages some companies
from hiring people who appear foreign. Immigration raids also create the impression that
raid-marked cities are less hospitable than other cities to industries that rely heavily on
In 2003 the law enforcement functions previously performed by the INS were transferred to the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arm of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
80
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undocumented workers—like food processing, garment, and furniture companies.
Affected localities contend this puts their municipalities at risk. They argue that targeted
cities could lose jobs, and millions in tax revenues, if threatened businesses relocate.81
Plus, other manufacturing industries, they say, may think twice before moving into a city
where costly immigration sweeps take place. Since some cities are subject to more
immigration raids than others, local IRCA enforcement practices are perceived to be
inequitable by some, especially when the businesses raided are not those with the worst
employment violations (Bazar, 2008). Moreover, opponents argue that the problem is not
unauthorized immigration, but IRCA itself, a law they contend is out of sync with urban
labor needs. It authorizes too few immigrant-worker visas to meet labor demands of
expanding regional economies.
On the flip side are local officials who complain about having too many “illegal”
aliens. Like immigration raid critics, they also charge federal immigration agents with
unfair enforcement practices. But unlike IRCA opponents, worksite sweep supporters
criticize Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for ignoring industries that
outsource jobs to migrants in their towns. These businesses, they contend, hurt cities by
attracting unauthorized workers who undermine wages and drain scarce municipal
resources. They want ICE to step-up IRCA enforcement efforts in their jurisdictions.
Others have lost faith in federal immigration officials all together, and are tired of waiting

Unlike restaurants, hotels, yard maintenance and construction industries, these manufacturing operations
can actually move to places where more affordable labor is available and fewer sweeps occur.
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on congress to overhaul the nation’s immigration laws. These municipalities advocate ado-it-yourself approach to eliminating incentives for “illegal” immigration. Homegrown
IRCA measures, they believe, are the best way to do that.
Another issue that frequently arises focuses on the moral validity of IRCA law
enforcement. Those making an ethical case against immigration sweeps argue that ICE
practices are notoriously unfair. Workers, not employers, are disproportionately
punished.82 Few businesses have been fined under the law, whereas numerous workers
have been arrested and deported.
A related accusation has to do with the rights accorded a city’s unauthorized
workforce. It broadens the debate by focusing on the impact of raids on migrant workers.
Defenders of the “undocumented” say crackdowns deprive migrants of the right to work
and pursue a decent life. They also terrorize immigrant families. The forcible separation
of youngsters from their parents, which occurs as a result of worksite raids, tears apart
migrant families and traumatizes the children of “illegal” aliens arrested in the
crackdowns. This, opponents argue, is unfair to U.S.-born children who fear losing one or
more parent in sweeps, or in some cases, are abandoned or held in foster care while ICE
detains their parents. IRCA enforcement opponents want local government to protect the
city’s unauthorized workforce from intimidation by federal agents. Responsive
municipalities justify their actions in terms of public safety. Military-style immigration
raids, they argue, promote discrimination and push frightened immigrants deeper into the
urban shadows where they can be more brutally exploited.
While workplace arrests rose tenfold from 2002 to 2008, from 510 to 4,940, only 90 criminal arrests
involved company personnel officials (Hsu, 2008).
82
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The contrary view is that “illegal” immigrant parents, not ICE, are to blame for
adversely affecting their children. City officials that favor stricter control on immigration
think ICE should keep the pressure on undocumented workers, and should focus even
more attention on their employers. From this perspective, the “undocumented” have no
right to be in the United States and thus, should not expect to be protected by any of the
rights that U.S. citizens and legal residents have.
Beyond the economic and humanitarian issues, others say raids are not effective
deterrents to undocumented immigration. Allowing police to assist in raids on local
businesses is a waste of limited law enforcement resources, argue some city officials.
Similar complaints are made about employer sanctions.
Those opposed to employer sanctions contend that any process for screening
employees can be beaten. Besides, they point out, in certain industries unauthorized
immigrants are not likely to apply for work. Therefore, requiring every single U.S.
employer to screen documents burdens employers with unnecessary bureaucratic
paperwork, which, they contend, undermines the competiveness of U.S. business. Besides
that, it turns private citizens into INS informants, which civil libertarians fear represents a
step towards a police state. Opponents of employer penalties want federal agents to do a
better job of keeping illegal workers out of the country in the first place. From this view,
the costs of employer sanctions far outweigh their deterrent benefits. Supporters claim
employer sanctions are necessary in order to achieve a sense of fairness. Employers who
exploit “illegals,” they argue, should bear some of responsibility for creating incentives
for aliens who sneak into the United States.
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The devolution of immigration law enforcement
Since the mid-1990s, and to even a greater extent since 2001, the federal
government has acted to increase the role of police in the interior enforcement of U.S.
immigration law. First, Congress sought to restrict the ability of local government to limit
INS-police cooperation. Section 642 of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 outlawed city bans on sharing information about
citizenship or immigration status with the INS.83 The Welfare Reform Act, passed the
same year, also included a provision to the same effect.84 The legislation was a backlash
to local sanctuary policies adopted during the 1980s (NILC, 2004b; Kalhan 2008; Mitnik
&Halpern-Finnerty, 2010).
Next, congress authorized (but did not require) police participation in civil
immigration enforcement under certain conditions (Appleseed, n.d.; Kalhan, 2008).
Section 439 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996
allows police to arrest and detain an alien if that person is unlawfully present in the
United States, and has been previously convicted of a felony.85 Section 372 of the
IIRIRA created new rules for deputizing local officials in the event of a “mass influx” of
immigrants (Smith, 2003; Kretsedemas, 2008).86 This provision was expanded to apply in
nonemergency situations when Section 287(g) of the INA was amended.87
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IIRIRA codified at 1373(a).
PRWORA § 434 codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644.
85
AEDPA codified at 8 U.S. C. § 1252c.
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IIRIRA codified at 8 USC § 1103(a)(8).
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INA § 287(g) codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
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Section 287(g) allows the Secretary of Homeland Security (or Attorney General,
prior to 2003) to enter into voluntary agreements (called memorandums of understanding,
or MOUs) with local authorities to formally involve them in immigration law
enforcement. Cities that sign MOUs can have segments of their police forced trained and
certified to act as immigration agents. Deputized police officers are authorized to
investigate, apprehend, and detain anyone suspected of being in the United States
unlawfully (Edwards, 2003; NILC, 2004b; Waslin, 2010).88 Early attempts at MOUs
under the 287(g) program were not successful (Appleseed, n.d.).89
Efforts to enlist localities in immigration enforcement gained momentum after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. MOUs became more common
(Waslin, 2010), when Congress passed the USA Patriot Act.90 One of its most
controversial provisions is Section 215. It allows investigators broad access to the
personal records of non-U.S. citizens, and prevents the recipient of such an order—police
officers, librarians, health care personnel, school teachers, accountants and Internet
service providers--from disclosing the request. Another provision makes it easier for
federal agents to detain and deport suspicious aliens identified by federal agents, or
citizens doing the job of the INS.91
Plans and policies from the Department of Justice and Homeland Security also
created new avenues for local-federal cooperation. In 2002, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) reversed its opinion on police involvement in immigration. The DOJs new view-88

Local law enforcement officials without training or experience in immigration law are not allowed to
enforce these laws in the normal course of their duties (Waslin, 2010).
89
This provision was not implemented until after 9/11 (Kalhan, 2008).
90
PL 107-56 (October 26, 2001).
91
USA Patriot Act § 421.
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released in a memorandum kept secret until a 2005 court ruling made it public--is that
police have “inherent authority” to enforce noncriminal infractions of immigration law.
This was a stunning departure from its previous opinion, and overturned decades of legal
precedent. Traditionally, civil immigration violations—such as overstaying a visa or
being illegally present in the United States—were considered a federal responsibility.
State and local agencies were only permitted to enforce criminal violations, such as
people smuggling (Kalhan, 2008; Waslin, 2010).92 After making the internal
announcement, Attorney General John Ashcroft encouraged local jurisdictions to accept
their new enforcement responsibilities. Police were called upon to assist with the
investigation, interrogation, and arrest, of nonimmigrant Muslim visa over-stayers of
Middle Eastern and South Asian descent (Appleseed, n.d.; Kalhan 2008).
That same year, the INS was abolished and its immigration functions transitioned
into two offices of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE).93 As a result, civil immigration enforcement efforts were recast as
security-related, criminal priorities and repositioned within the longstanding federalstate-local partnerships designed to combat serious crime (Kalhan, 2008). Also, new
funding allowed ICE to more aggressively pursue MOUs with police departments across
the country, while other DHS programs and services encouraged ICE-police cooperation

For more on the history of legislation and court decisions leading to devolution of immigration law
enforcement authority, see the legal section of Appleseed, “Forcing Our Blues into Gary Areas,”
http://www.appleseeds.net/Portals/o/Documents/Publications/forcingourbluesintograysweb.pdf .
93
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296).
92
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in a more indirect fashion with no MOUs required. Two of the most controversial
initiatives are the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Database and the Secure
Communities program.
By entering hundreds of thousands of civil immigration records into the FBI’s
main criminal database--the NCIC, ICE has tried to induce police officers to arrest and
detain suspected immigration violators whose names appear in the database. Local police
query the NCIC database millions of times every day as part of their routine duties
(Appleseed, n.d.; Kalhan 2008). Under the Secure Communities program, which
launched in March 2008, police indirectly help ICE deport immigrants. Participating jails
submit arrestees’ fingerprints not only to criminal databases, but to immigration
databases as well. This allows ICE access to information on individuals held in jails. If
federal agents identify an immigration law violator, ICE can ask a municipality for a
“detainer” to hold that person for up to 48 hours. The program, originally designed to
target the “worst of the worst” offenders, has led to the deportation of people whose only
offense was violating civil immigration law. The technological presence of ICE in local
jails has also generated concern about police being seen as immigration agents.
While these activities have blurred the traditional distinction between federal and
local law enforcement agencies, none are mandatory. A few pieces of federal and state
legislation attempted to change that. A congressional proposal introduced in 2003--the
CLEAR Act--would have required local police to enforce civil immigration laws or risk
losing federal funding.94 Widespread opposition killed the bill. In April 2010, Arizona
governor Jan Brewer signed into law SB 1070, also known as the Support Our Law
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Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal, H.R. 2671, 108 th Cong. (2003) (“CLEAR Act”).
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Enforcement and Safe Neighborhood Act. One provision requires police to demand proof
of legal status if an officer has “reasonable suspicion” that someone might be an
unauthorized immigrant. Officers can detain a person who does not produce such
evidence. Citizens and naturalized residents are not required to carry proof of citizenship.
This devolution of immigration law enforcement authority has fueled a fierce
debate. Those who favor an increased role for state and local police argue that mass
immigration has overwhelmed the proper administration of the law. They believe the
federal government needs the increased capacity—or force multipliers—that state and
local agencies provide in the fight against terrorism and unauthorized immigration. With
an estimated eleven million “illegal” aliens residing in the U.S., and fewer than 2,000
trained federal immigration agents, police assistance is solely needed (Numbers USA,
n.d.). Since local law enforcement officers already come into contact with illegal aliens in
the course of their daily duties, it makes sense to enlist their support. The vast majority of
these officers believe in the rule of law, supporters claim, and want to help protect the
security of their country (“Cities/Counties Boycotting,” 2010).
Critics, meanwhile, argue that most unauthorized immigrants are not national
security threats, and most police officers are not interested in becoming immigration
agents. Police are supposed to protect people, not enforce immigration law. Actual or
perceived police participation in civil immigration enforcement, they contend,
jeopardizes community policing and erodes—rather than promotes—trust between
immigrant communities and the police. When police are turned into immigration agents,
immigrants who are victims or witnesses of crime avoid cooperating with police. Their
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fear of apprehension and deportation puts entire communities at risk. Besides, enforcing
immigration law is costly. The federal government does not cover the costs incurred by
localities that enforce immigration law. This means limited resources are diverted away
from the investigation of serious crimes. This money could be better spent on public
safety. Police involvement in immigration enforcement also increases response times to
emergency 911 calls, and makes racial profiling more likely (which can result in
expensive litigation).
Government benefits for noncitizens
“The public does not approve of natives using welfare benefits, much less newly
arrived immigrants” (Gimpel & Edwards, 1999, p. 284). In 1994, California voters
approved Proposition 187. Intense anti-immigrant sentiment sparked by a severe
economic recession, and increasing numbers of immigrants of color, prompted the action.
The measure sought to limit taxpayer-funded government services provided to “illegal”
aliens, including education and nonemergency health care. That same year, six states
(Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Texas) filed separate lawsuits
seeking federal reimbursement for the cost of providing mandated services to
unauthorized immigrants. Politically, President Clinton could not ignore the challenges
confronting states with lots of electoral votes and immigrants. In 1996, he signed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) into
law.95
For foreign in-migrants, PRWORA went well beyond conditioning access to cash
benefits on work. The immigrant provisions of the welfare reform law (Title IV of
95

PL 104-193 (August 22, 1996).
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PRWORA) established a comprehensive scheme for governing refugee and immigrant
access to a whole range of social benefits provided by federal, state and local
governments (Fix & Passel, 2002).
Introducing more restrictive eligibility standards for noncitizens was the first part
of the plan to crack down on unwanted immigrants. Before welfare reform, legal
immigrants living in the United States had the same access to public programs as nativeborn citizens. Now, legal immigrant and refugee eligibility for social services more
closely resembles that of unauthorized immigrants.96
The law also introduced and institutionalized the practice of distinguishing
between different groups of foreign in-migrants. PRWORA’s redefinition of immigrant
eligibility involved the creation of a series of “bright lines” drawn to separate groups who
were eligible for different levels of benefits. One bright line divided “qualified” and
“unqualified” (unauthorized) immigrants; another bright line distinguished between
“qualified” immigrants and naturalized citizens; and one more line was drawn between
legal immigrants entering the United States before August 22, 1996 and those who
arrived after (Fix & Passel, 2002). Espenshade & Huber (1999) explain the basic pattern
of programmatic reductions in eligibility:
Legal immigrants (regardless of when arrived and so long as they have not
become naturalized U.S. citizens) are no longer eligible for food stamps, and
refugees are eligible for SSI and food stamps only for their first five years in the
United States. Legal immigrants present in the United States prior to August 22,
1996, retain their eligibility, whereas, all future legal immigrants are not qualified
for SSI until they become citizens and are ineligible for other federal benefits for
their first five years in the United States (p. 367).
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With few exceptions, only citizens are eligible for means-tested federal benefits such as TANF, SSI, food
stamps and Medicaid (USCIS 2004).
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PRWORA’s Title VI also shifted financial support responsibility to immigrants’
sponsors. For the first time, sponsors were required to have an income of 125% of the
federal poverty line. Sponsors’ new income requirements and open-ended support
obligations have made it harder for the poor, and presumably most welfare-prone,
immigrants to enter the United States.
Lastly, PRWORA delegated the administration of the Title IV provisions to
states.97 Following reform, states were granted extensive discretion to limit the eligibility
of legal and unauthorized immigrants for federal and state benefit programs; a power
previously denied them by the courts.98 The law also authorized, but did not require,
states to use their own resources to supplement lost federal food, cash, and health-related
benefit programs. At the same time, states were restricted from extending benefits to
unauthorized immigrants, effectively limiting benefits access for this group. Publically
funded agencies are required to verify the legal status of all applicants, and to notify INS
officials of persons determined or suspected of being in the United States unlawfully.99
With eligibility for federal means-tested public benefits depending more on
citizenship than in the past, naturalization rates surged dramatically between 1994 and
1999. Fear engendered by California’s Proposition 187, and new limits on noncitizens’
procedural rights, also contributed. At the same time, 2.7 million immigrants acquired
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PRWORA § 404 (codified at 8 USC 1621).
“Previously, court ruling that applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution prevented states from distinguishing between legal immigrants, refugees, and citizens;
although illegal immigrants could be denied eligibility for most state programs or federal programs targeted
towards citizens” (Espenshade & Huber (1999, p. 368).
99
PRWORA § 411A (codified at 42 USC 611a).
98
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legal immigrant status around 1990 under the 1986 Immigration and Control Reform Act
and thus, became eligible to naturalize in the mid 1990s (Takahashi, n.d.). The result was
a huge backlog.
At the same time, Title VI led to steep declines in public benefit use among all
immigrants, even refugees and mixed legal status families who qualified under the law.
Confusion among immigrants about who was eligible for benefits, and fear of
deportation, discouraged some immigrants from using benefits regardless of eligibility
(Takahashi, n.d.). For cities with many foreign in-migrants, the immigrant provisions of
PRWORA meant more indigent people on the streets, the risk of communicable diseases
spreading, and extra hunger children.
Nevertheless, opinions on welfare and Medicaid benefits for immigrants remain
split. Supporters of a liberal interpretation of civic inclusion base their case on
constitutional principles. They argue that the 1996 welfare act, which made citizenship a
prerequisite for receiving benefits, runs contrary to core U.S. political principles. The
Constitution speaks of “We the People of the United States,” not “We the Citizens…, and
the Bill of Rights is designed to protect the interests of the people, not citizens (Pear,
1994). PRWORA’s Title IV is at odds with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution, opponents argue, because the provisions violate the antidiscrimination
principle and produce stratification. These defenders of individual rights and liberties
believe that all individuals who are members of a community should qualify for public
benefits on a par with U.S. citizens.
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This position is disputed by those who believe noncitizens do not have the same
rights as citizens. They understand the phrase “People of the United States” to mean
“citizens.” From this view, only natural-born, or naturalized, legal citizens should receive
publicly funded benefits. The government has no obligation to noncitizens, PRWORA
argue.
Another issue that frequently arises focuses on human rights. Those making a
humanitarian case against eliminating benefits for immigrants focus on moral obligations.
They claim that PRWORA--by denying noncitizens and their U.S. children access social
security and an adequate standard of living--breaches international law.100 All humans,
PRWOR opponents argue, are entitled to these inalienable rights, regardless of their
political membership. No human is illegal from this standpoint. Human rights advocates
worry about people who have little or no voice in the electorate being left outside the
welfare safety net.
Others are more concerned with meeting the needs of native-born residents. They
blame the federal government for not doing more to exclude “illegal” immigrants and
also, for admitting more poor legal immigrants than can comfortably be supported.
Rather than providing medical care, housing, and cash for foreigners, they argue, we
should concentrate on providing for those who were born here. The word “benefit,” Title
IV proponents argue, implies that the recipient has earned the help. Unauthorized and
recent legal immigrants have not contributed enough to deserve collecting government
benefits. They are feeding off the system that is set up to help citizens, argue those
opposed to government support for non-U.S. citizens. This group favors tighter
100

UDHR, Articles 22 & 25; ICESCR, Articles 9 &11; and CRC, Articles 26 & 27.
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restrictions on welfare eligibility for foreign nationals. They claim it is necessary to
maintain the system for “real” Americans, and to reduce the strain on taxpayers.
Taxpayers are the ones that need protection, restrictionists argue. Hardworking citizens
should not have to foot the bill for needy immigrants.
From this view, foreigners who cannot support themselves should not be in the
United States. Removing the welfare incentive to immigrate, goes the argument, deters
those most likely to need public assistance from entering or staying in the United States.
It also prevents immigrants’ sponsors from shirking their responsibilities to provide
financial support. Besides, restrictionists argue, free access to public benefits is a
“magnet” for the least desirable immigrants—people with less education, skills and
income. It gives “illegal” immigrants no incentive to work, follow the laws of the land, or
adapt to the nation’s culture. From this perspective, giving away free services to
unauthorized immigrants is stealing from U.S. citizens. It is unfair to people who obey
the law.
Those in favor of government support for foreign in-migrants claim most
noncitizens--legal and unauthorized, pay federal and state income taxes, Social Security
taxes, and Medicare taxes. And all foreign nationals pay sales and property taxes (even if
they rent housing), PRWORA opponents argue. They question the power of the so-called
“welfare magnet,” and notion that noncitizens use more benefits than U.S. citizens. Those
opposed to immigrant exclusion from benefits cite research showing immigrants to be
less dependent on welfare than native families. They point out that immigrants pay more
in taxes than they receive in government assistance. Besides, say those in favor of
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benefits for noncitizens, many immigrants have lived in this country for decades, married
U.S. citizens, and raised their U.S.-citizen children. Laws that punish them violate their
fundamental right to fair and equal treatment.
Another position calls Title IV impractical. Critics argue that restricting
noncitizen access to publicly financed services is detrimental not only to foreign inmigrants, but also for cities and their native-born constituents. Under PRWORA, almost
one million non-citizens lost welfare, housing, and Medicaid subsidies. The burden of
replacing these federal “savings” fell on state and local governments, where most of those
thrown off the welfare rolls live. As a result, child poverty became more common. The
risk of communicable diseases spreading grew, and more medically indigent foreign inmigrants ended up on the streets. If someone is living in the United States it is in
everyone’s best interests to do what we can to ensure that they lead healthy and produce
lives, PRWORA opponents argue, irrespective of immigration status. On the flip side are
local officials who argue that Title IV has helped cities. It diverted unwanted immigrants
to other locations and freed up funds to spend on voting constituents.
Since it was left to the state and city governments to decide whether to assume,
and to what extent, they would pick up the cost of un-restored programs, a patchwork of
benefits sprang up across the country in the wake of PRWORA’s Title VI. Some local
governments provided a safety net for those no longer eligible for assistance. Other
municipalities proposed or adopted local proposals that denied or reduced benefits, as
way to deflect unwanted immigrants elsewhere.
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“Locally legal” identification cards
For decades, consulates have issued matrícula consulars (consular registration
cards) to Mexicans living aboard who requested them.101 The cards are issued without
regard to immigration status and give no information about that.102 Mexicans in the U.S.
legally can and do use the card to simplify reentry in lieu of a passport, although it is
most useful to unauthorized immigrants who are less likely to have U.S.-issued
identification. Lack of ID prevents “illegal” aliens from accessing the few public and
private services that are available to them. It increases their fear of contact with police.
The events of September 11, and greater subsequent scrutiny of identity, deepened this
anxiety. Mexicans applied for the cards in droves.
Responding to the explosive popularity of the matrícula, the Mexican government
began issuing the cards through its network of consulate offices in the United States.
“Mobile consulates” were also set up to issue the card in communities without a
consulate. To convince U.S. authorities that the card was a secure form of identification,
the Mexican government upgraded the matrícula to add protection against counterfeiting.
It also launched a well-organized campaign to win acceptance of the card at the state and
local level. Consulate personnel met with police departments, bank officials, and
governments to encourage them to accept the matrícula as a valid form of ID (Dinerstein,
2003; Hudson, 2003; O’Neil, 2003).
101

“The ID card is a way for the Mexican government to keep track of its citizens for consular and tax
purposes, collect data on them, and provide them with what the government considers to be a basic human
right: the ability to identify oneself” (O’Neil, 2003).
102
To obtain a matrícula consular card, an applicant must appear in person and present the following
documents: (1) a birth certificate or other document demonstrating Mexican citizenships; (2) a document
with a picture demonstrating identity, such as a voter identification or driver’s license; and (3) proof of a
local address in the United States, such as a utility bill (Bruno & Storrs, 2005).
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The new version of “high security consular registration card” includes the
telephone number of the local Mexican consulate office (for card verification purposes)
and the U.S. address of the bearer, which is information banks and police want. Each
wallet-size card also has the photograph, name, date and place of birth, and signature of
the holder, as well as a serial number and date of expiration. It is valid for five years and
costs about $29. The laminated card was first introduced in major metropolitan areas in
2002, and gradually made available in consulate areas throughout the United States
(Bruno & Storrs, 2005). By 2005, matrícula consulars were formally accepted by 1,204
police agencies, 393 cities, and 168 counties (Varsanyi, 2007). Many telephone and
utility companies, hospitals, and video stores also accepted it. Where recognized, the card
makes city services more accessible to immigrants who have one.
The Mexican ID card has drawn heated debate. Those who support acceptance of
the matrícula point out that the card is issued solely for identification purposes. It does
not confer any type of legal immigration status. They maintain that recognition of the
card is necessary in a post-9/11 world in which photo identification is required to conduct
daily business. This acceptance benefits not only the holder, but banks and other
institutions as well. It also cuts down on the burgeoning fraudulent document trade, and
allows otherwise marginal individuals to participate more openly in mainstream life.
Opponents of matrícula consular acceptance argue that the card is only needed by
aliens without access to other legitimate identification documents. They maintain that the
ID card helps unauthorized Mexicans live and conduct business in the United States. In
so aiding them, opponents charge, the card confers quasi-legal status on “illegal” aliens
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and subverts U.S. immigration law. They view efforts to gain widespread acceptance of
the card as part of a larger plan to circumvent Congress, which, after September 11, has
been reluctant to grant amnesty to millions of immigrants living in the United States.
More broadly, critics argue that municipal acceptance of the matrícula interferes with the
federal government’s ability to set immigration policy, and subjects cities to lawsuits.
The Constitution reserves foreign policymaking for the federal government, they point
out.
Aside from aiding and abetting “illegal” immigration, opponents argue that
accepting consular ID cards comprises our homeland security. It places critical national
security matters in the hands of the foreign governments that issue these cards. They
maintain that changes since 9/11 have been put in place to make it harder for people who
are not supposed to be here to remain. By accepting the Mexican ID cards, businesses
and local governments are working at odds with the federal government’s homeland
security efforts. They further content that accepting the matrícula sets a dangerous
precedent, since other less friendly countries may decide to issue similar cards to their
nationals in the United States.
Supporters of the matrícula consular argue that the card improves homeland
security by enabling authorities to easily identify Mexican nationals living in the United
States. Individuals who are isolated and marginalized, they maintain, pose a greater
potential security threat than those who are known. They emphasize that Mexico is not a
terrorist-supporting country and that Mexicans come to the U.S. to work, not commit
terrorist acts.
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Another issue that frequently arises focuses on public safety and law enforcement.
Supporters argue that the consular ID card is secure and fraud-resistance. Mexican
officials maintain that the documents presented to obtain the card are properly
authenticated, and their database prevents the issuance of duplicate and fraudulent cards.
The Mexican identification cards, they say, are as secure as many U.S.-issued documents,
including driver's licenses.
Matrícula supporters take the position that when law enforcement agencies accept
the ID card, public safety improves. Clearly there is a benefit to police departments and
others knowing who they are dealing with. Aliens with identification are also more likely
to work with authorities to resolve crimes and other social ills, proponents add.
Acceptance of the matrícula consular by financial institutions also has public safety
benefits. Individuals who can open bank accounts do not have carry around or stockpile
large amounts of cash, which makes them easy targets for home invasion and robbery.
Advocates say the card provides Mexican immigrants a way to better function in a
society, where they contribute with their labor but are often excluded from obtaining even
basic services.
Critics question whether undocumented immigrants should have access to such
services. They call consular ID programs magnets for “illegal” aliens. Opponents of
matrícula acceptance also challenge the assertion that the card is a secure document.
They argue that despite its fraud-resistance features, the card is not secure, because
Mexican birth certificates, which are used to obtain the card, are easily forged. They
further maintain that acceptance of the consular ID by law enforcement agencies
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threatens public safety. In cases of minor law violation, police departments that recognize
the card do not conduct background checks or take fingerprints of card holders. Given
this practice, opponents argue, the card helps conceal past criminal activity.
Unregulated day labor-contractor market exchanges
In the 1990s, many mid-size cities and suburban areas experienced an increase in
the number of day laborers103 congregating on street corners and in parking lots.104 These
sites were transformed into areas of unregulated market exchange between casual
workers and the drive-by contractors or homeowners who hire them.105 Unlike migrant
farm workers, urban day laborers are highly visible. They are concentrated in places were
native-born residents drive and shop. Most are recently arrived Latino immigrants, many
are undocumented (Valenzuela, 2000). Consequently, day labor sites have become
flashpoints in the local immigration debate. To many, day laborers symbolize the federal
government’s failure to enforce or reform immigration laws. As a result, despite the
relatively small size of the day labor market, the presence of day laborers in many
communities has generated a lot of complaints.
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A day laborer is a laborer who offers himself/herself for hire for a day, or some other are temporary
basis, and who gets paid at the end of the day. These laborers typically work in construction, light
manufacturing, landscaping, and other similar jobs. Day laborers find work either through a temporary day
labor center or by waiting in a parking lot or on a street for an employer to arrive and hire workers as
needed (Workplace Fairness, 2013).
104
Three factors are responsible for the approximately 117,600 workers gathering at nearly 500 sites across
the country everyday: a recent surge in illegal immigration, the growth of part-time contingent labor, and
the explosion in the home-improvement business and do-it-yourselfers in need of helpers (Valenzuela,
Theodore, Meléndez, & González, A. 2006, p. 4).
105
Day labor markets are generally part of the informal economy, meaning workers and employers enter
into agreements that are not usually reported to the government and do not conform to various labor
regulations (Valenzuela, 2000; Gonzalez, 2007).
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Business owners fear that crowds of mostly male, usually Latino, day laborers
will scare off Anglo customers. They want the workers ban from the area, or at least
dispersed. Neighborhood critics call day labor sites eye sores. They blame day laborers
for ruining the quality of community life. Trades people complain that day laborers
undercut wages and push native-born workers out of their jobs. Individuals and groups
opposed to unauthorized immigration believe day laborers are in this country illegally,
and thus by definition, they are criminals. They bitterly oppose any measure that might
help unauthorized immigrants, who they want locked up and deported.
Local governments that support day laborers face the threat of lawsuits generated
by activist groups, or ousting by voting taxpayers. The former claim facilitating the hiring
of unauthorized immigrants violates federal law.106 The latter do not favor supporting a
non-taxpaying population. They want public funds directed toward activities and services
for local citizens.
On the other side of the debate are day labor advocates pressing local authorities
to protect day laborer rights. Their main argument is that laborers, even if some are
“illegal,” have a constitutional right to stand on public sidewalks and solicit work.
Policies that chase off day laborers, or their bosses, rob workers of their constitutional
right to seek economic opportunities. Supporters say the workers are simply trying to
make an honest living and are crucial to local economies. Little would get built in the
United States without foreign-born labor, contractors say; unauthorized immigrants often
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8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (1) (A) (2005) states: “It is unlawful for a person or entity…to hire, or recruit or
refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.”
There is no legal standard for regulating a largely illegal day labor market (Feere, 2007).
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fill jobs that Americans no longer want.107 They also keep industries dependent upon
sweatshop labor afloat, and provide do-it-yourselfers with a cheap source of weekend
help. Since there is a high demand for their work, advocates demand officials protect
vulnerable day laborers from exploitation and abuse.108 Workers hired from the street
often get ripped off by unscrupulous employers. Other times they get stuck with
dangerous, toxic jobs with no safety protections. Day laborers are also harassed by
federal agents and local police, neighbors, merchants, and anti-illegal immigration
activists (Workplace Fairness, 2013). Workers want local government to protect them
from crooked employers and bullies who prey on them.
The way local governments respond to these issues varies city-to-city across the
United States. A snap shot of this patchwork of locally generated immigration policy is
presented next.
A Typology of Municipal Unauthorized Immigration Policies in U.S. Cities
Comparing a wide range of municipal actions on unauthorized immigration
requires a system for squeezing some order out of what looks like a mass of unrelated and
chaotic information. With that in mind, I offer two ordering schemes—one related to
different policy domains and issue areas, the other to the policy alternatives. Combining
these classification schemes creates an analytic framework that can be used to compare
policy across a large number of cities and policy domains, or track policy development
trends in one city over time. The construction of this model is discussed in chapter 2.
107

With recent generations of American kids steered toward college and computer skills, manual labor and
time-honored trades have suffered; there's a stigma that if you get your hands dirty, you're a second-class
citizen (Simpson, 2001).
108
Day laborers are frequently transient, or noncitizen immigrants unfamiliar with the English language or
the legal system or both, which makes them susceptible to mistreatment.
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Information derived from my exploratory research provided the raw material for
developing the typology. This data is presented in Appendix B. It is not a full description
of policy behavior in any city. The purpose is to provide a national context within which
to situate case studies, and to offer a framework for future research. Here are some
notable highlights.
There are far more positive or pro-immigrant responses to unauthorized
immigration issues than negative examples. Cities crafting policy to protect the rights of
residents without legal status have been at it longer than localities with deter and deflect
settlement agendas.
All the local immigration control, or anti-illegal immigrant measures, identified in
this study were adopted in the last decade. The bulk of these policies originated from new
immigrant destinations (in rural areas, small towns and suburbs) that were primarily
nonHispanic white a generation ago. People in these places had little prior exposure to
native-born minorities let alone aliens with very differ languages, religions, and cultural
conventions. A new trend in immigrant settlement, away from traditional gateway cities
into inexperienced localities with cheap housing and sweatshop jobs,109 accounts for the
newcomer influx. Latino-ization threatened to destroy the Eurocentric identity of these
communities.
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According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, a sweatshop is an employer that violates more
than one federal or state labor law governing minimum wage and overtime, child labor, industrial
homework, occupational safety and health, worker’s compensations or industry regulations. Today,
sweatshops flourish beyond the traditional garment and meatpacking industries to include: high-tech
manufacturing, construction, and service industries (e.g. work in restaurants, landscaping, car washes, auto
repair, and domestic work).
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Local governments in some highly diverse, established gateways (like liberal Los
Angeles and Vista City, California) also passed immigration control measures during this
period. Middle class citizens in these status conscious cities became intolerant of large
scale settlement of poor, ‘backward’ immigrants, most from Mexico and Central
America, who violated middle class job and housing standards.
In both cases, federal inaction on immigration reform, coupled with pressure from
locally-stationed national anti-immigration lobby groups, prompted municipal action on
unwanted immigration.
Other cities responded differently. The first urban citizenship policies were
adopted in the 1980s. For the most part, the pursuit of these sanctuary protections were a
response to federal policies and practices that discriminated against city residents without
legal status, or ignored human rights violations against this vulnerable group. Big cities
(e.g. Detroit, Michigan; San Francisco, California; New Haven, Connecticut; Seattle,
Washington; St. Paul, Minnesota), midsize towns (e.g. Santa Cruz, California; Ithaca,
New York; Boulder, Colorado); and small places with liberal colleges (e.g. Takoma Park,
Maryland; Swarthmore, Pennsylvania) adopted these measures. Some of these places
have lots of diversity and foreign-born residents, others have little of either. What unites
these municipalities is a large population base with an equalitarian outlook and belief in
human rights principles. In these “human rights cities,” citizens, and their elected leaders,
hold inclusive perspectives on the membership of unauthorized immigrants. They make
no distinctions between citizens and foreign in-migrants—legal or “illegal.” Local
governments in these localities actively intervened on behalf of unauthorized immigrants
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because it was morally right to do. The first laws adopted coincided with the larger
progression of City Hall into foreign policy affairs, which included municipal activism on
international issues like South African divestiture and nuclear freeze agreements.
Religious leaders in the sanctuary movement, and leftie college and university students,
were key municipal partners.
The aim of both pro- and anti-illegal immigrant measures is threefold: to address
controversial local issues associated with unauthorized immigration; effectuate change in
public opinion on the topic; and urge local governments in other cities, or at the state and
federal level, to shift their policies in accordance with local ideas about the rights of
residents without legal status.
In terms of quantity, the most policy options on both the pro and anti-illegal
immigrant side are those related to the day labor issue. Day laborers have come to
symbolize the nation’s faulty immigration system. Their high visibility makes these
workers an easy target for citizen complaints and homegrown measures to address those
grievances. There are also a lot of different policy options on police involvement in civil
immigration enforcement, but very few for foreign-issued identification cards. The
proliferation of police policy on foreign nationals can be traced to the devolution of
immigration enforcement authority which began in the 1990s and escalated after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States. Municipal ID policy is related to
9/11 as well. Asylum for unauthorized refugees and federal deportation raids also sparked
a lot of local policy action, most of it on the pro-sanctuary side. Policy on public benefits
for noncitizens ranked fourth in importance, the bulk of it against unauthorized
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immigrant access to key services. Welfare is despised generally, and administered at the
county-level, accounting for a smaller number of policies. The fewest policies are those
pertaining amnesty for unauthorized immigrants. In all issue areas, intercity copycatting
is common. Local governments track and follow the measures adopted by similarly
oriented trendsetters, passing similarly worded initiatives in their cities.
To achieve their policy objectives, city officials employ a wide range of tactics.
These strategies go well beyond lawmaking, law enforcement or the provision of public
benefits. They also rely on other domains of municipal authority including: urban land
use and planning, contracting and litigation, finance appropriation and public works
authority, property management, legal opinion, lobbying, and off-the-record practices,
like turning a blind eye to local violations of federal immigration law.

95

CHAPTER 5
Case Study Results
This chapter provides a detailed, contextualized description of immigration
policymaking in three U.S. cities--Sacramento, California; Denver, Colorado; and
Portland, Oregon--between 1985 and 2010. I focus on municipal response to the six
locally important immigration debates described in chapter 4. These cities are not
necessarily representative of all cities in the United States. They were chosen because
they illustrate the social diversity variables hypothesized to shape municipal immigration
policy. The discrete decisions made by local government in these cities culminate in
immigration strategies.
Population of 466,488110

Sacramento, California
City Profile

Sacramento is the capital of California and the county seat of Sacramento County.
It is located about 100 miles from the Silicon Valley and near the site of the historic
UFW Salad Bowl Strike.111 Sacramento was gateway for immigrants early in the
twentieth century. Today it has re-emerged as one of the nation’s hot spots for
immigration growth.112 Foreign-born residents account for nearly one-quarter (22.3
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U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010.
The Salad Bowl strike, between the UFW and Teamsters for the right to represent Salinas-area farm
workers, began in August 1970 and consisted of a series of work stoppages, mass pickets and boycotts
which led to the largest farm worker strike in U.S. history and the passage of the California Agricultural
Labor Relations Act in 1975.
112
A 236.5 percent increase in the capital’s foreign-born population over the past two decades (Singer,
2004).
111
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percent) of the city’s total population, which is lower than the rest of the state (26.8
percent), but higher than the United States (12.4 percent).113
In 2002, Time magazine named Sacramento America’s most diverse city
(Stodghill & Bower, 2002).114 What is striking about Sacramento is the diversity of its
immigration stream. The city’s demographic hodgepodge defies the stereotypical view of
California immigrants as heavily Hispanic. Mexico is represented, but not so much as in
other parts of the state.115 Sacramento is a true “melting pot metro” (Frye, 2006; Weaver,
1999). While other cities tend to have large concentrations from one or more countries,
Sacramento attracts people from all over the world.116 The capital is a hub for refugees
from the former USSR and Laos, and of late a port of entry for Latino immigrants (Suro
& Singer, 2002; Passel, 2006; Singer & Wilson, 2007; Twohy, 2011). Many of the
newcomers are refugees fleeing persecution in their native countries, which is what
distinguishes it from other “re-emerging” gateway cities in California (Bazar, 2004a).
Thanks to a diverse mix of foreign in-migrants, and the arrival of African
Americans from the San Francisco Bay Area, Sacramento has become one of the fastest
growing,117 and most racially/ethnically balanced places in the United States (Bizjak &
Wong, 1991). In Sacramento everyone is a minority—including nonHispanic whites. The
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U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010.
Sacramento’s diversity rating was based on research conducted for Time by the Civil Rights Project of
Harvard. The U.S. Census Bureau also groups Sacramento with other U.S. cities having a “high diversity”
rating.
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The Sacramento region is home to only 2 percent of the state’s immigrants from Latin America.
116
According to 2000 census figures, the top 10 countries of origin for Sacramento’s immigrants are
Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Ukraine, China, India, Canada, Russia and Thailand.
117
The city’s population shot up by 14.7 percent in the 1990s, building on its massive (34.7 percent)
growth in the 1980s. Sacramento ranked 52nd in the United States in 1980 and by 2000 it had moved to
40th place, after gaining 131,334 new residents during the 20-year period. Most of the migration is from
other places in California.
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Anglo-white population dipped below 50 percent in the 1990s, even though the city got
about 5,000 new residents from Eastern Europe. Now, African Americans (blacks),
Latinos, Asians, and non-Hispanic whites all represent significant shares of the city’s
population—14.6 percent, 26.9 percent, 18.3 percent, and 34.5 percent respectively.118
Sacramento’s diversity is also experienced at the neighborhood level. The city has the
most integrated neighborhoods of any large city in the state, according to the Public
Policy Institute of California.119 A second-generation Chinese American, who lives in
one of those neighborhoods, explained integration in Sacramento this way: “Diversity
tends to attract diversity” (Magagnini, 2002, p. A1).
There are far fewer undocumented immigrants in the Sacramento area than in
other parts of California. According to Public Policy Institute of California estimates,
Sacramento County has an unauthorized population of 10 percent to 15 percent, which is
just 4.6 percent of the county’s total population (Hill & Johnson, 2011). A recent poll
indicates that an overwhelming majority think Sacramento is hospitable to undocumented
immigrants and a good location for ethnic minorities to live (Lui et al., 2007).120
One of Sacramento’s strengths in attracting people to the city has been its diverse
stock of housing, especially affordable housing, which stayed affordable even during the
dot com boom. The median value of housing in Sacramento ($128,000) was slightly
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U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010.
The Institute used a complex formula based on census and other demographic data to compile the
diversity index used for the rankings. In 2000, Sacramento had a “diversity score” of 81 out of a possible
100, with 40 percent of the city’s census tracts having very high diversity scores. Only 20 percent of the
tracts in Sacramento were segregated (Sandoval et al., 2002).
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The 2007 Sacramento State Annual Survey of the Region.
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above the $119,600 national average, but considerably below California’s $211,500
median value.121 An abundance of cheap land has kept housing prices low.
The city's economy is broadly based. Government and transportation are the
largest sectors of employment in the area, and agriculture and mining—while still
important in the region—have been surpassed by information, technology service, leisure
and hospitality, education and health services, and construction. Technology-related
companies such as Intel and Hewlett-Packard are among the Sacramento area's largest
employers. Demand for both high-tech workers, and low-skilled agricultural and
construction laborers, has made Sacramento a magnet for foreign in-migrants.
According to the Sacramento Business Journal, the Sacramento business
community depends heavily on the labor of immigrants—both legal and illegal
(“International Imports,” 2007). The large infusion of Vietnamese and Chinese during the
1990s helped sustain the high-tech industry in the Silicon Valley (“Sacramento’s
Changing,” 1991). Many of the technology businesses in the Sacramento region are
headed or formed by well-educated immigrants (“Starting Over,” 2007). They also help
maintain the government’s outdated computer system, and sustain the State’s
infrastructure and public services (Wadhwa, 2010). Immigrant entrepreneurs from
Eastern Europe and Fiji have also started janitorial, nursing and elder-care businesses
(“Home Away,” 2006). Latino immigrants are concentrated in the construction industry
and landscape trade (Twohy, 2011). Construction jobs in Sacramento held steady through
the housing slump, according to the State Employment Development Department. When
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residential construction fizzled, non-residential building continued. The city’s relatively
small unauthorized immigrant population is concentrated in service, construction and
production occupations (“Sacramento’s Diverse Workforce,” 2006).
Sacramento is a liberal-leaning city. In a nationwide study of the most
conservative and liberal cities in the United States, Sacramento ranked 71 (out of 237
cities) on the liberal list (BACVR, n.d.). The city has long been controlled by Democrats,
whose members hold the majority of the seats on the City Council and represent the
capital in Congress, the Assembly and the state Senate (Sanders, 2004). Sacramento has a
city council manager form of government and tradition of progressive politics, which
often drives public policy.
The Sacramento City Council has taken positions on a number of non-municipal
issues, namely: apartheid, the Gulf War and Proposition 187 (Moy, 1996). In the late
1980s, the city’s political leadership declared Sacramento a comprehensive test ban city,
and in the early 1990s, a nuclear free-zone and divestment city (Hobbs, 1994). A message
from Mayor Kevin Johnson, published in Sacramento’s Sister City brochure, spells out
the city’s view on the role of government:
Cities play a unique role in international diplomacy. Regardless of form of
government, history or the philosophical direction of another nation, Mayors the
world over share a unique bond and focus centering on the needs of our citizens.
Sometimes those needs transcend national politics or other agendas and allow
cities to build relationships that foster peace and cooperation when national
governments struggle to find ways to work together (Johnson, n.d., p.2).
Sacramento’s official motto is “a city that works for everyone.” The city is proud of its
reputation as the most integrated city in the United States, and residents consider their
city a model of tolerance for the nation and state.
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Unauthorized Immigration Policy
Permanent residency for the city’s authorized population has been the most
prominent immigration issue in Sacramento. All other locally important immigration
issues are related to this overarching concern. Police involvement in civil immigration
law enforcement is a mainstay on the local political agenda. The matter of taxpayersupported public benefits for foreign in-migrants is third in local significance, mostly
because debate over the issue set-off a local hate crime spree. The least pressing
immigration issues in Sacramento were deportation raids and the day labor dilemma,
followed by the Mexican ID card.
Asylum for unauthorized refugees
In December 1985, the Sacramento City Council passed a resolution expressing
opposition to U.S. foreign policy in Central American, and declaring Sacramento a
“sanctuary city” for unauthorized refugees from that region.122 The nonbinding policy
also includes a “don’t ask, don’t tell” provision to protect its unauthorized population
from unfair deportation. That clause directs police and other city employees not to
“request information about, or otherwise investigate or assist in the investigation of
citizenship or residency status of, any person unless such inquiry or investigation is
authorized” by state, federal or city law. It also promises that no municipal employee or
department will disseminate information about citizenship or residency status, or consider
a person’s immigration status in the provision of “City of Sacramento benefits,

122

Sacramento became the 12th U.S. city to declare its jurisdiction a “sanctuary” for Salvadorans and
Guatemalans (Lindelof, 1985; Lindsey, 1985).
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opportunities or services.”123 The decree calls on the U.S. Congress to recognize fleeing
Salvadorans and Guatemalans as “political refugees” and grant them asylum or extended
voluntary departure status.
Councilmember Joe Serna Jr.—a Latino rights activist, former Peace Corps
worker in Guatemala, son of migrant farm workers and loyal friend of Cesar Chavez-introduced the resolution (Tachibana, 1986; “Sacramento Mayor,” 1999). Data showing
selective enforcement of refugee sanctuary, and public testimony about the execution of
deported Central American asylum seekers, prompted the 5-2 city council vote in favor of
the resolution (Lindelof, 1985; Wright & Herron, 1985; Perkins, 1986; Sanders,
1986a&c; Tachibana, 1986).124 Mayor Anne Rudin voted for the proclamation pitched as
a humanitarian measure, saying she was satisfied that her vote would not be interpreted
as civil disobedience (Lindelof, 1985). This sudden revolt against federal immigration
policy was orchestrated by a powerful coalition of Protestant, Roman Catholic and
Jewish sanctuary movement leaders. Initial opposition was small (Lindelof, 1985).
The following month (January 1986), Mayor Rude defended Sacramento’s
sanctuary status on national television. She squared off in debate with Immigration and
Naturalization Service commissioner Alan Nelson in an interview with Today show host
Jane Pauley (Chance, 1986). During the six-minute segment, Nelson argued resolutions
like Sacramento’s undercut national laws, give illegal aliens a false sense of security, and
create confusion among police and health officials, who, he said, are unsure which laws
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Resolution No. 85-973 (adopted December 17, 1985).
Serna’s resolution was approved with the votes of Mayor Anne Rudin, then-councilmen Grantland
Johnson, Terry Kastanis, and David Shore. It was opposed by Doug Pope and Lynn Robie. Tom Chinn and
Bill Smallman did not vote (Sanders, 1987b).
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to enforce. Sacramento police will inquire about citizenship status if federal law requires
it, Rudin countered, but they will not initiate the questioning themselves. “The police are
directed not to make inquiries as to a person’s status,” she said (Chance, 1986, p. B3).
“The reason we passed this policy…is because we feel that the federal government is not
enforcing the immigration laws fairly and evenly and humanely” (Chance, 1986, p. B3).
Nelson defended the nation’s immigration laws as the “fairest in the world” (Chance,
1986, p. B3). In an interview afterwards, Rudin said Nelson “tried to make us look like
real lawbreakers” on national television. She complained about Jane Pauley’s repeated
questioning about the number of illegal aliens in Sacramento. “How do I know?” she told
the local reporter Chance, 1986, p. B3).
Three months later organized sanctuary foes surfaced. In April of 1986, several
Sacramento groups, supported by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
formed a coalition and announced their plan to initiate an anti-sanctuary referendum
(Tachibana, 1986; Sanders 2006b).125 At a post-press conference luncheon, Helen
Graham, a leader in the alliance, said the group objected to the resolution because it
encourages illegal immigration (Tachibana, 1986). Illegal immigrants are an economic
burden and take jobs away from legal residents, added William Carroll, officer in charge
for the INS in Sacramento. “I would like to see some evidence of that,” Mayor Anne
Rudin responded (Tachibana, 1986, p. B3). Councilman Joe Serna, who introduced the
resolution, accused the coalition of preying on the fears of local citizens. In a press
interview, Rudin and Serna urged the group to refocus its efforts. If the INS didn’t play
125

Coalition members included officials from the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars,
Californians for Population Stabilization, County Taxpayers League of Sacramento, Citizens for Law and
Order, conservative tax crusader Paul Gann and others (McQueen, 1988; Tachibana, 1986).
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favorites, they conjectured, the Sacramento City Council would not have passed its
resolution. “Immigration laws are very, very unevenly applied,” the Mayor added
(Tachibana, 1986, p. B3).
A member of the legal community contested Sacramento’s sanctuary resolution
next. Don Chairez, a private attorney with an immigration practice, delivered an
ultimatum to the Sacramento City Council during an emotion-packed July 1986 public
meeting: rescind the sanctuary resolution or be sued. ''This is a nation of laws, not of
people who are anarchists,'' Chairez argued, adding that the sanctuary resolution turns its
back on federal immigration law and sets a dangerous precedent (Sanders, 1986c, p. B3).
Chairez’s request died when no council member moved to amend or rescind the
resolution, and Rudin dismissed the issue without further discussion (Sanders, 1986b&c).
The decision to stick to sanctuary brought an angry reaction from some in the
standing-room-only crowd of about 150 people gathered in council chambers (Sanders,
1986b&d). Spectators were sharply divided on the issue. According to news report, some
felt the council had no business considering a foreign policy issue. Others complained
that the sanctuary resolution was too narrow. Still more saw it as a heroic, symbolic stand
against the federal government (Sanders, 1986c). Several near fights broke out between
supporters and opponents. They pointed figures and shouted at each other and council
members. Mayor Anne Rudin asked spectators to leave the council chambers when their
noisy reaction delayed the meeting (Sanders, 1986c). In a press interview afterwards
Rudin said she had no intention of complying with Chairez’s demand. “I’m not a lawyer
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and I don’t know if it’s ever been tested,” she said of the resolution, “The only way we’ll
ever know is if he brings it to court. Let him file a suit” (Sanders, 1986a, p. B3).
Helen Graham, state coordinator of Californians for Population Stabilization and
leader of a local coalition opposing the sanctuary resolution, told reporters that her group
was considering a recall drive against sanctuary backers on the council. “This is politics
at its worst,'' she said in reference to Councilman David Shore’s alleged broken promise.
“We were railroaded'' (Sanders, 1986c, p. B3). Graham contends that Shore had agreed to
introduce a resolution rescinding the sanctuary resolution, but backed out at the last
minute. Shore said he decided against proposing a compromise resolution, because it did
not have the support of a majority of the council. The decree he considered introducing
would have rescinded sanctuary and replaced it with a resolution asking for reform of
U.S. immigration policy (Sanders, 1986a&b). Speaking about the city's existing
resolution, Shore said, “[It] is a symbolic resolution and I hate to see us get in a major
fight over it”'(Sanders, 1986c, p. B3) Later, Shore told reporters that he supports political
asylum not only for Guatemalans and Salvadorans, but other refugees as well (Sanders,
1986c).
In mid-September 1986, frustrated sanctuary foes held a press conference outside
the state Capital where the coalition launched its petition drive to overturn Sacramento’s
“open-arms” resolution. In the news interview, Helen Graham called the council’s
legislative actions irresponsible. “I think it hinges on anarchy,” she said (Sanders, 1986b,
p. B1). The group’s initiative would propose that Sacramento not be a sanctuary for
people living there illegally. But Mayor Rudin was not worried. “My sense is there’s a
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great deal of support for Sacramento to be a sanctuary city,” she said. “No one has been
able to show that the policy has done harm to the city” (Sanders, 1986b, p. B1).
A few days later, U.S. Attorney Peter Nowinski, chief prosecutor for the U.S.
Department of Justice, asked the Council to repeal its sanctuary resolution. Concerns
about the declaration misleading immigrants, and subverting asylum procedures
established by Congress, compelled him to act. The chief prosecutor made his request in
a four-page letter sent to council members. “I would like to remind you that your oath of
office requires you to uphold the laws of the United States,” he wrote (Sanders, 1986a, p.
B3). City Attorney James P. Jackson said the resolution did not violate any state, federal
or local law. Nowinski closed his letter by saying, “[sanctuary] is irreconcilable with
continued federal assistance to Sacramento law enforcement and other programs”
(Sanders 1986a, p. B3). However, Nowinski’s closing statement was invalidated in a later
interview when he revealed he had no power to withhold funds, and was not aware of a
legal precedent to support his position (Sanders, 1986a).
Councilman Joe Serna reacted angrily to the letter. He accused Nowinski of trying
to blackmail the city of Sacramento for disagreeing with the unfair application of federal
refugee policy (Sanders, 1986a). Mayor Rudin called Nowinski’s letter an attempt to
intimidate the city. “I’m not intimidated,” she told the Sacramento Bee (Sanders, 1986c,
p. B3). Council members notified reporters there was little chance the sanctuary
resolution would be rescinded unless the federal government withheld funds, or the issue
qualified for a city ballot, which it did not (Sanders, 1986c).
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The next month (October 1986), anti-illegal immigrant activists launched a
petition drive to revoke the city’s sanctuary resolution. Roger Canfield, president of the
local chapter of the Conservative Citizens for America, spoke during the brief ceremony
in front of City Hall. He said Sacramento, which he referred to as the Democratic
People's Republic of “Rudingrad” and “Ciudad de Serna,” had adopted a “sinister” policy
which limited sanctuary to refugees who attacked U.S. Central American policies
(Perkins, 1986, p. B1).126 When a journalist asked Canfield whether his terms,
“Rudingrad” and “Ciudad de Serna,” could be considered bigoted or racist, Canfield
replied: “It was a colorful way of dramatizing how a few can make their mark on the city
in a negative way'' (Perkins, 1986, p. B1). He was referring to the support given the
resolution by Mayor Anne Rudin and Councilman Joe Serna Jr. Canfield’s group was
part of a coalition attempting to collect signatures to put the sanctuary issue on the
September 1987 ballot. The County Taxpayers League Inc., Veterans of Foreign Wars,
American Legion, American Prisoners of War, Paul Gann's People's Advocates, and
Californians for Population Stability, also participated in the petition drive (Perkins,
1986; Berstein, 1987).
Ten months after adopting its “sanctuary city” resolution, the City Council asked
the city-county Human Rights and Fair Housing Commission (HRFHC) to assess its
impact on Sacramento. In February 1987, the task force sent a report to the city council.
“There is no indication of an increase of undocumented El Salvadorans or Guatemalans
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Canfield said he used the term ‘Rudingrad,’ because Mayor Rudin has traveled to the East bloc, and
“Ciudad de Serna” (‘Cerna's City’ in Spanish), because it described the long heritage of Spanish in
California (Perkins, 1986).
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in the Sacramento area since the passage of the council’s resolution,” the report said
(Lindelof, 1987, p. B1). Researchers also found little or no evidence that undocumented
Salvadorans or Guatemalans were using federally funded programs such as Medi-Cal or
job training programs. This data contradicted assertions made by members of
Californians for Immigration Reform and David N. Ilchert, the San Francisco district
director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Both claimed
undocumented immigrants had been found with translated news clippings of
Sacramento’s sanctuary status (Lindsey, 1985; Perkins, 1986). Harold Ezell, the Western
district director of the INS, endorsed the idea that sanctuary resolutions had stimulated
new flows of immigrants from Central America. Smugglers of aliens are using cities’
sanctuary resolutions to recruit prospects south of the border, he explained to a local
journalist (Wilson, 1986). On this point, the HRFHC report quoted Anne Kanter, an
attorney who handles immigration cases. She said undocumented workers most likely
“follow relatives and friends to a geographic area and not City Council resolutions”
(Lindelof, 1987, p. B1).
A month later (March 1987) critics of the Sacramento’s sanctuary policy claimed
the review issued by the city-county Human Rights and Fair Housing Commission was
flawed. Speaking at a press conference attended by one reporter, members of the
Coalition for Immigration Reform called the report “incomplete” and its conclusion
“predetermined” (Bernstein, 1987, p. B3). Helen Graham, a lobbyist for Californians for
Population Stabilization, criticized the report for only looking at a 60-day period to
compare the number of Salvadorans and Guatemalans apprehended by the Border Patrol's
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Sacramento district (Bernstein, 1987). Using statistics from San Diego (that the Border
Patrol apprehended twice as many Salvadorans and Guatemalans crossing the Mexican
border last year as the year before) Graham claimed it was safe to assume that
undocumented immigrants who got past authorities were attracted to Sacramento because
of the city's sanctuary policy (Bernstein, 1987). The City Council got what they wanted
to hear, she argued, because they paid for the report. Randy Shiroi, who wrote the report
for the city-county commission, denied that the conclusions were preordained. "There
have been many instances where we have opposed the city,'' he told a writer for the
Sacramento Bee (Bernstein, 1987, p. B3). According to the Bee, annual statistics
provided by the Border Patrol supported the report's conclusion (Bernstein, 1987).127
In April 1987, Californians for Immigration Reform fell short in their drive to
place the sanctuary issue before city voters. They failed to obtain the necessary 18,327
signatures—10 percent of registered voters—to qualify for the ballot. Councilman Joe
Serna said he was not surprised that opponents failed in their petition drive (Sander,
1987b). “I think the people of the city—and Americans, generally—support political
asylum because we all come from immigrant backgrounds,” he said in a press interview.
“It’s symbolism. But it’s important that we stand up on these issues” (Sanders, 1987b, p.
B1).
After a six-year legal battle, a U. S. District Judge approved a settlement
agreement between the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and more than 70
churches and human rights groups. The 1990 agreement granted temporary protected
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Glen Smith, acting chief patrol agent, said the number of apprehensions of illegal Guatemalans and
Salvadorans declined from 40 in fiscal year 1985 (Oct. 1, 1984 to Sept. 30, 1985) to 28 in fiscal year 1986
(Bernstein, 1987).
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status to some 230,000 Salvadorans and Guatemalans, and directed the INS to reconsider
their petitions for asylum (Bee, 1991; Meyers, 2004).
Amnesty for unauthorized immigrants
Councilman David Shore delivered a scroll to INS officials in Sacramento
proclaiming March 19, 1988 “Amnesty Day” in the city (Sanchez, 1988). The
Sacramento City Council approved the resolution to publicize the amnesty features of the
new Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Sanchez ,1988).128 To recruit
applicants, the agency most feared by unauthorized immigrants launched its own
publicity campaign. The INS’ public relations blitz emphasized the benefits of citizenship
and tried to dispel myths about the amnesty program being a sting operation. Despite
fears, between 1987 and 1988, 8,449 people applied for amnesty at the INS “legalization
office” in Sacramento (Sanchez, 1989).129 The publicity encouraged noncitizen legal
residents to come forward too. Federal judges granted citizenship to 5,147 legal
immigrants in 1988, nearly double the number in 1987 (2,640) (Sanchez, 1989).
The exploding client load and a shortage of clerks caused staff at the INS office in
Sacramento to fall behind, according to the agent in charge, Lionel M. Nurse. In the early
1990s, they had 10,000 unprocessed citizenship applications stacked up (Sanchez, 1992).
By 1998, they were buried under a backlog of 40,000 citizenship applications and
applicants were waiting three years for naturalization interviews (Breton, 1998; Sanchez,
2002). A combination of factors led to the mid-1990 surge in INS applications, which
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Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, illegal immigrants who had lived in the United
States continuously since January 1, 1982 were granted legal resident status, along with a quota of
unauthorized agricultural laborers.
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The agency set up a local “legalization office” to process legal-resident claims.
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eventually forced a wrenching overhaul of the citizenship system, further exacerbating
delays.130
First, a new amnesty law passed that gave certain Nicaraguan, Cuban, Salvadoran,
and Guatemalan asylees (and their dependents) a chance to become legal permanent U.S.
residents.131 At the same time, immigrants who gained their green cards through the 1985
amnesty program were becoming eligible for citizenship. Finally, the anti-illegal
immigrant sentiment behind Proposition 187 prompted legal immigrants to seek
citizenship (Sanchez, 1995). A desire to vote against future anti-immigrant measures
motivated many in the latter group to apply. “When you don't participate, politics
happens to you," Mayor Serna reminded them (“Prop. 187,” 1995, p. B8)
Sacramentans caught in waiting lines for green cards and citizenship complained
to city leaders, because in 1986 officials passed a resolution vowing “to support efforts to
encourage and facilitate naturalization in the Hispanic immigrant community.”132 At the
time, Hispanics had the lowest naturalization rates among Sacramento’s immigrant
groups. Councilman Joe Serna Jr. spoke on behalf of the resolution, which was
recommended by city staff. The Sacramento City Council voted unanimously in favor of
the citizenship measure, and Mayor Anne Rudin signed it.
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In 1997, the INS came under fire for naturalizing 180,000 immigrants without completing criminal
background checks. A Justice Department audit found 16,400 had felony records. Congressional
Republicans forced a slowdown of citizenship procedures.
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Pub L.105-100, Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997.
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Resolution No. 86-512: Resolution for Promoting American Citizenship in Sacramento’s Latino
Community (July 1, 1986).
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Citizens-in-waiting reminded local officials about this promise. They said the
hostile immigrant environment in Sacramento made them feel unsafe. Between July and
October 1993, a self-proclaimed white separatist firebombed the local National
Association of Colored People’s (NAACP) office, the Japanese American Citizens
League, a synagogue, the home of City Councilman Jimmie Yee and the state Office of
the Fair Housing and Employment in Sacramento. Swastikas were also painted on an
African American bookstore (Bancroft, 1993; Magagnini, 1993). Mayor Serna linked the
hate crimes to Governor Pete Wilson and other public officials who blamed
undocumented immigrants for California’s problems. “At a time when we need to bring
people together, political leaders seem to be insistent on dividing us for purposes of
campaign tactics,” he said in a press interview (Bancroft, 1993, p. B2).
Serna promised an anxious crowd of 400 at a local NAACP membership banquet
that he was committed to the prompt arrest and appropriate punishment of the
perpetrators.133 His speech began with an overview of the historic link between racism
and tough economic times in California, and concluded with a confirmation of the current
situation:
As people of color, you and I have to work twice as hard to get half as far to get
where we are, and we accept that…[the term] ‘reverse discrimination’ [is] an
oxymoron, because we have never made the rules (Magagnini, 1993, p. B1).
When Americans pledge liberty and justice for all, he preached, “it means liberty and
justice for all not someday—now!” (Magagnini, 1993, p. B1). The mayor pledged to
counteract negative publicity from the bombings, and closed by saying “We are a
community that is unified. What you have now is an outlaw” (Bancroft, 1993, p. B2).
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African American, Asian American, Jewish and Latino community leaders attended the event.
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In October 1993, the Sacramento City Council adopted a resolution condemning
the hate crimes and reaffirming its commitment to eliminate them.134 The following year,
the city established a multiagency hate crime task force (Bureau of Justice Assistance,
1993).135
In August 1996, Sacramento radio talk-show host, Jeff Katz, made incendiary
remarks about “illegals” that ignited a firestorm of protest. He said motorists should be
awarded a sombrero-shaped bumper sticker for every illegal immigrant hit while
attempting to cross the border from Mexico. The bumper stickers would earn motorists a
free meal or drink at Taco Bell (Bizjak, 1996; Bizjak & Vierra, 1996). When he heard
about the incident, Serna angrily exclaimed:
This is an advocacy for violence. This is a hate crime. You have a talk show host
advocating murder. What I want is Jeff Katz’s resignation. I don’t want his
apology. I want him off the air (Bizjak, 1996, p. B1).
The next night more than 200 angry people jammed into City Hall for the council’s
regular meeting. Mayor Serna asked members of the community to come forward to
speak about the remarks made by Mr. Katz. Councilman Steinberg called Katz’s remarks
“sick and reprehensible” (Burrowes, 1996, p. 4). Those who hold the public airwaves
need to act responsibly, he added. Councilwoman Heather Fargo stated that she would
like Mr. Katz to apologize for his statements. His “remarks posed a clear and present
danger,” Council member Debra Ortiz exclaimed (Burrowes, 1996, p. 4). Other speakers
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Resolution No. 93-566 (October 12, 1992).
The Greater Sacramento Area Task Force on Hate Crime, sponsored and administered by the United
States Attorney’s Office, consists of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and community
organizations dedicated to preventing and combating hate crimes including the FBI, the ATF, the
Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office, Sacramento Office of the City Mayor, the Sacramento
Sheriff’s Department and Police Department, Sacramento Human Rights Fair Housing Commission, the
NAACP, the Anti-Defamation League, and more (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.).
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at the council meeting emphasized the potential for violence as well. “All it takes is one
individual to…terrorize this community,” said Deputy Police Chief Al Nájera, recalling
the hate crime wave carried out by a 17-year-old in Sacramento several years earlier
(Bizjak, 1996, p. B1).
Among those who spoke against the alleged comments made by Jeff Katz were
representatives from these organizations: the Mexican Consulate, Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce, Jewish Community Relations Council, Japanese American Citizens League,
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Raza Lawyers Association,
NAACP, Sacramento Black Chamber of Commerce, Human Rights Commission,
Sacramento Police Department, and others (Burrowes, 1996). Rick Eytheson,
representing the radio station KSTE, said he had not heard the broadcast but if press
reports were accurate, then Mr. Katz’s remarks were “reprehensible” (Burrowes, 1996, p.
4). He promised to take appropriate action after he heard the broadcast tape.
Mayor Serna and the eight-member City Council responded to public outrage by
uniformly denouncing Katz and the radio station. Joe Serena called for his resignation.
Nine days later Mr. Katz was relieved of his job at Talk 650 (Bizjak & Vierrria, 1996;
Otani, 1996). Still the anti-illegal immigrant rhetoric scared Sacramentans without U.S.
citizenship. They pressured city leaders to do something to speed up INS processing
times.
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During a 1998 Race Initiative Outreach Meeting at the White House, Mayor
Serna asked President Clinton to use his executive authority to remedy the backlog
problem.136 Here is Serna’s appeal:
I think a lot of folks that come from Mexico or that come from other parts of
Latin America are waiting to be told, we appreciate you being here and we’ll do
everything to assist you in becoming Americans. So I would encourage you, Mr.
President, to do what you can to encourage the INS to process folks thoroughly,
quickly, and then sponsor a citizenship program (The White House, 1998, p. 6).
In California, the backlog problem has resulted in the “scapegoating of immigrants,
which is incredibly divisive in the state,” Mayor Serna added (The White House, 1998, p.
5). The President acknowledged the INS processing problem, saying:
You know, when I came here, it was taking an unconscionable long time for
people to get through the system, and we tried to accelerate it. And the Congress
had such a negative reaction to it, the Republican majority did, they tried to
investigate the whole INS because we took the position that you shouldn’t have to
wait years and years after you had already been here five years, to have the
government decide whether you could become a citizen or not. I still think that’s
the right thing to do. I think it’s entirely too bureaucratic, and I think we should
do better (The White House, 1998, p. 6).
In 1999, the INS launched an initiative to reduce citizenship processing time. That was
not soon enough for immigrants terrorized by hate crime. In June, three local synagogues
were targeted in pre-dawn arson attacks (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.).
The next day, some 4,000 people stood under a giant “Sacramento United Against
Hate” banner in response to the coordinated firebombing (Tugend, 1999). Committed to
fight bigotry, more than 2,500 people jammed into a community center, while 1,500
listened in an overflow auditorium, for a two hour rally (Tugend, 1999). Mayor Joe Serna
said, “When I hear of synagogues burning, then I am a Jew” (Tugend, 1999, p. 5).
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Abraham Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, declared that
Sacramento would be held up as a model of how a community must respond to bigotry
(Tugend, 1999). During a smaller noon rally across from a damaged synagogue, Vice
Mayor Jimmie Yee, whose home was firebombed in 1993, urged the crowd to display
“Sacramento Together, United We Stand” signs in their homes, businesses and cars
(Tugend, 1999). Joe Serna Jr. died later that year. The mayoral torch was passed from a
former Chicano farm worker to a former Chinese American day laborer—Jimmie Yee
(Weaver, 1999).137
In 2000, the INS declared victory over its citizenship backlog crisis. With several
amnesty measures pending in Congress (a sign anti-immigrant sentiment had waned), a
local drive for a general pardon put the issue back on the municipal agenda. In
September, about 4,000 marched through the streets of Sacramento calling for amnesty
for the city’s unauthorized residents. Sacramento mayoral candidates Heather Fargo and
Rob Kerth, and Councilman David Jones, spoke in support of amnesty at the rally to
kick-off the march. The Sacramento Valley Organizing Community, a local coalition of
about 35 African American and Latino churches, organized the rally and march with
support from local labor and legal communities.138 As marchers passed the INS offices on
the Capital Mall, they deposited photos of people who had applied for residency or
citizenship. Afterwards, a petition in favor of amnesty was sent to President Clinton and
Congress (Chávez, 2000; Martineau, 2000).
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Shortly after winning his third term, Vice Mayor Yee was appointed mayor by the City Council to fill
the unexpired term of Joe Serna Jr., one week after Serna's death on December 14, 1999 until November
27, 2000 when new mayor Heather Fargo was sworn in.
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Earlier the AFL-CIO, in a stunning change of heart, voted to seek amnesty for all working unauthorized
immigrants and to push for the elimination of employer sanctions it helped enact (Chávez, 2000).
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In March 2006, more demonstrations on behalf of non-U.S. citizens took place in
Sacramento. Latino activists held a small protest against the federal bill (H.R. 4437) that
would make illegal immigration, or offering aid to the undocumented, a felony.139 The
Chicano Consortium organized the event (Ferriss, 2006a). The legislation was the
catalyst for a second round of protests in May (Robertson & Camerini, 2010). According
to news accounts, it was one of largest demonstrations in Sacramento in recent memory.
Police estimated that between 15,000 and 18,000 demonstrators massed at the state
Capital then marched downtown as part of the nationwide work stoppage called “A Day
Without Immigrants.” Organizers claimed 36,000 to 40,000 protested. Only a handful of
counter-demonstrators showed up (Ferriss, 2006b; Korber, 2006). Sacramento’s new
mayor, Heather Fargo, did not take a public stand on the issue; neither did the city
council.140
In October 2009, as Congress prepared to take up immigration reform again,
Sacramento Police Chief Rick Braziel said it was time to legalize millions of
undocumented immigrants. Braziel, made the appeal for immigration reform as part of
the Law Enforcement Engagement Initiative (LEEI) (Ferriss & Magagnini, 2009).141 In a
telephonic press conference organized by LEEI, which included several other big-city
police chiefs, Braziel made this statement:
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Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H. R. 4437).
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Our city is one of the most diverse and integrated in America. We celebrate our
cultural heritage and differences and strive to be inclusive. We can’t afford to
have a group of residents be afraid of reporting crime because they believe we
may report them for deportation. To allow fear to exist in the minds of victims or
witnesses endangers them and the rest of the community and lets criminals off the
hook. Without comprehensive immigration reform, we place our communities and
our nation at risk. It is time for Congress to take action on immigration reform to
increase public safety and encourage full civic participation from all members of
our community (“Police Leaders,” 2009, para. 3)
In a later press interview, Braziel said a common-sense apolitical approach was
needed to fix what he called an unworkable immigration system. He favors a twopronged solution: tighter borders and a way to allow undocumented immigrants who are
productive stay in the U.S. legally. Now, fear of being deported is putting the public at
risk, Braziel added (Magagnini & Ferriss, 2009). “We need to remember that there are at
least 12 million people out there who are unauthorized to be in this country, and they’re
our neighbors,” Braziel told reporters (Magagnini & Ferriss, 2009, p. B1). It is not
feasible to deport millions of undocumented immigrants, Braziel and other police chiefs
from cities with large immigrant populations, pointed out (Cave, 2009). To which one
anonymous Sacramento Bee blogger wrote “Fire him!” (Brenton, 2009).
The devolution of immigration law enforcement
On October 5, 1993, California Governor Pete Wilson signed four bills aimed at
denying benefits to undocumented immigrants. One of those measures attempted to
overturn local immigration sanctuary.142 The law prohibits cities and counties from
passing “sanctuary” laws that prevent local law enforcement agencies from cooperating
with immigration authorities (“California Laws,” 1993; Chávez, 1993). Still local
officials did not rescind Sacramento’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, a practice initiated
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after adoption of the “sanctuary city” resolution. The unbinding directive, while it does
not offer the accountability of a law or administrative regulation, is commonly adhered
to. The city’s governing body and local public servants, including police, uphold the
principles outlined in the 1985 decree. Besides, formal laws are not needed when those in
charge understand and can relate to immigrants.
By the time Wilson’s law passed Sacramento had, for the first time in the city’s
history, a truly diverse city council (Kollars, 1992). It was also the largest—perhaps
only—city in the country with a Latino mayor and police chief (Furillo, 1993a). Former
city councilman Joe Serna Jr. was elected mayor in 1992 on a cultural unity platform, and
re-elected in 1996. 143 He was the first minority in Sacramento to hold that position. The
bilingual college professor was raised in labor camps near Lodi, California, where he
picked grapes and tomatoes as a youngster to support his poor Mexican immigrant family
(“Immigrant Mayors,” 1999; Sanchez, 1999). As mayor, Serna put up a UFW flag in his
office and renamed the park downtown Cesar Chavez Plaza (Bizjak & Kollars, 1999). It
was Serna who introduced the “sanctuary city” resolution to the Sacramento City
Council; subsequent elected officials have upheld it.
Sacramento hired its first minority police chief, Arturo Venegas Jr., in January
1993. Venegas was born in a house with a dirt floor in San Nicolas de Ibarra, Jalisco,
Mexico. Community reaction to Venegas’ selection was overwhelmingly positive. He
pledged to improve minority hiring in the police department,144 and make developing a

Joe Serna J. was elected to the city council in 1981, where he served 11 years (Bizjak & Kollars, 1999).
Only one member of the department’s command group was a non-white when Chief Venegas arrived.
Before he retired 17 were people of color. Venegas’ efforts to diversify the SPD resulted in the loss of a
1999 reverse discrimination lawsuit (Bizjak, 2002).
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“police-public partnership” a top priority (Furillo, 1993b). Chief Venegas, whose tenyear tenure was double the national average for chiefs of police (Bizjak, 2002), founded
the Law Enforcement Engagement Initiative (LEEI) after he retired. LEEI provides a
platform for law enforcement professionals to add their expertise to the dialogue about
common-sense immigration reform (Solís, 2009).
Chief Venegas is adamantly opposed to police enforcement of civil immigration
law, or helping federal agents to do the same. When bans on sharing information with the
federal government were outlawed in 1996 by the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Chief Venegas did not alter local police
conventions. Officers, then and now, do not quiz people about their immigration status
during traffic stops, while investigating minor infractions, or when someone is a witness
or victim of a crime. Venegas also rejected federal efforts to encourage department
involvement in the 287(g) program, which gives officers a role in deporting unauthorized
immigrants.145
Sacramento police do, however, work with Immigration and Custom Enforcement
(ICE) in multijurisdictional crimes forces. In 1998, the Sacramento Police Department
joined the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).
The partnership generated little controversy or fanfare (Davila, 2003).146 Sacramento
police also coordinate with ICE to apprehend and detain undocumented immigrants
suspected of serious crimes. Deputies at the county-run jail, which police use, have been
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Police departments that sign 287(g) agreements designate officers to be trained and authorized to detect
and detain immigration offenders that they encounter during their regular, daily law enforcement activity.
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Amended Resolution No. 2003-046 (adopted February 6, 2003); Amended Resolution No. 2003-047
(adopted February 6, 2003).
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reporting arrested unauthorized aliens to the INS since 1993. The reporting requirement
is a condition of receiving federal law enforcement grants (Coronado, 1993).
Venegas’ predecessors—Chief Albert Nájera (2003-2008) and Chief Rick Braziel
(2008-present)--shared Venegas’ outlook on police involvement in immigration
enforcement. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon, Chief Nájera resisted mounting pressure to involve police in the enforcement
of civil immigration laws. He explained the philosophy behind his dissent this way: “We
can’t afford to have victims out there who won’t call us because they’re afraid they’re
going to be deported,” Nájera revealed during a press interview. “People need to be able
to call the police and have trust in us, without regard to their immigration status” (Bazar,
2004b, p. A1). The Chief opted out of the ICE 287(g) program because he believes
turning local officers into de facto immigration agents is not good for crime fighting
(“Immigration Law,” 2004).
Sacramento’s current police chief, Rick Braziel, like those before him, rejected
federal efforts to involve police in the enforcement of noncriminal infractions of
immigration law. In an interview with the Sacramento Bee, Braziel revealed that he has
met personally with Latino leaders and said, “Here’s the deal, we’re not going to check
immigration status—tell your communities not to be afraid to work with us” (Magagnini
& Ferriss, 2009, p. B2). The Chef has openly criticized the federal 287(g) program and
lobbied Congress to separate local police from immigration enforcement (Taylor, 2007;
Cave, 2009). He joined other chiefs across the United States in calling for immigration
reforms that would legalize millions of undocumented immigrants. “The public's safety
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depends on it," Braziel explained (Magagnini & Ferriss, 2009, p. B2).147 Generally,
immigrant communities are more likely to report crime to police, testify at trial, and
cooperate with local law enforcement if local law enforcement is not seen as part
of immigration enforcement.
Sacramento police are not the only ones opposed to singling out foreigners for
civil immigration violations. In November 2003, the Sacramento City Council voted 8-1
to adopt a resolution opposing the infringement of civil liberties by the federal
government; Mayor Heather Fargo signed it (Bazar, 2003c&d; Stanton & Bazar,
2003).148
The decree "calls on agencies and employees of the City not to engage in any
activities that would violate any city ordinance or the laws and constitution of the State of
California or of the United States.” It “reaffirms the Sacramento Police Department’s
commitment to unbiased policing and endorses the principle that no law enforcement or
other city agency may profile or discriminate.”149 The resolution further urges federal
officials to repeal provisions of the Patriot Act that infringe upon the rights and liberties
of the Sacramento residents, particularly people of Arab descent, Muslims, immigrants
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Braziel made his call for immigration reform as part of the Law Enforcement Engagement Initiative, an
organization founded by former Sacramento Police Chief Arturo Venegas Jr. to give police a voice in the
immigration debate.
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Resolution No. 2003-795 (November 13, 2003). The State of California passed a similar resolution in
2006 (BORDC, 2006).
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The resolution also directs Sacramento public school officials to notify individuals whose education
records have been obtained by law enforcement agents under the Patriot Act, and directs Sacramento public
libraries to post signs warning patrons that their reading habits and Internet browsing may be scrutinized by
federal agents.
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and dissidents. In signing the resolution city leaders reiterated their commitment “to
protect the rights of immigrants and opposes measures that single out individuals for
legal scrutiny based on their country of origin, religion, or immigration status.”
The document's purpose and underlying philosophy are explained in its preamble,
which highlights the city’s pride in its “reputation as the most integrated city in the
United States and a model of tolerance for the state and the nation.” It also acknowledges
the contributions of the city’s diverse population of immigrants, students, farm workers,
and others who are vital to its “economy, culture, and civic character,” and whose civil
liberties should be preserved for the political and social health of the community. Even
though the resolution does not carry the weight of law, it will guide the behavior of city
employees by serving as a statement of policy, said lawyer Keith Wagner, a member of
the Sacramento Coalition to Stop the Patriot Act (Bazar, 2003d).150
Here’s how the resolution came to be. In January 2003, about 100 demonstrators
gathered at a rally and press conference outside Sacramento's Immigration and
Naturalization Service office on the Capital Mall (Bazar, 2003a&b). The protestors called
for the elimination of a special INS registration program that they said unfairly targets
Middle Eastern and Muslim men, and contend is a form a racial profiling (Bazar, 2003c).
The protest attracted peace activists, immigration attorneys and representatives from local
cultural groups, (Bazar, 2003a&b). In addition to the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee (ADC), representatives from Japanese, Chinese, Latino, Middle Eastern and
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"Where requirements are made for cooperation or turning over of information under the Patriot Act, it
gives those city workers the ability to hold off and seek a second opinion on whether what they're being
asked to do is consistent with state and federal constitutional principles," he said (Bazar, 2003d).
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Muslim cultural organizations attended the protest (Bazar, 2003a). Many immigrant
groups organized out of fear that the registration program would be expanded to include
their own communities. After the rally they coalesced into the Sacramento Coalition
Against the Patriot Act (Stanton & Bazar, 2003a).
In July the group organized a meeting to drum up support for a city council
resolution condemning the controversial anti-terror law. More than 250 people jammed
into the downtown meeting room to hear speakers denounce the Bush administration’s
secret surveillance, arrest, and detention of “disfavored classes of immigrants” (Stanton
& Bazar, 2003a). Recounting how U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft sought police
help in keeping tabs on visa overstayers (a civil immigration violation), former
Sacramento Police Chief Arturo Venegas Jr. said, “I thought that was the most stupid
thing anybody could ever ask us to do” (Stanton & Bazar, 2003a, p. B1). He also warned
that the Patriot Act “allows law enforcement now to be able to pry into your lives, to seek
information on you and even to hold you incommunicado” (Stanton & Bazar 2003a, B1).
Venegas urged the crowd to press for a resolution condemning the law. No words of
support for the Patriot Act were delivered during the two-hour session (Stanton & Bazar
2003a).
The next week, U.S. Attorney John Ashcroft swept through Sacramento to talk up
the Patriot Act and encourage federal workers, including police involved in Sacramento’s
anti-terrorism task force, to help federal agents (Stanton & Bazar, 2003b). There were no
demonstrators outside the federal building where Ashcroft spoke. Details of his visit were
not publicized in advance (Stanton & Bazar, 2003b). “Even if it wasn’t open to the
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public, the public should have been aware that he was here speaking to law enforcement
about issues that relate to people’s lives, particularly in the immigrant community,” said
Carl Pinkston, who arranged last week’s anti-Patriot Act meeting in Sacramento (Stanton
& Bazar, 2003b, p. B1).
Frustrated coalition members showed up in force at the November 13, 2003 city
council meeting, to hear debate on the proposed civil liberties measure. More than 100
people crowded into council chambers, and another 100 lined up outside hoping to get in
(Bacher, 2003b). Arguing in favor of the resolution was a coalition that included the
League of Women’s Voters of Sacramento (LWVS), NAACP, ACLU, Physicians for
Social Responsibility, American Library Association, various Asian, Hispanic, Jewish,
Islamic organizations and other religious and human rights groups (ACLU, 2003; Bettis,
2003).
The second-ranking official in the U.S. attorney’s office in Sacramento, Larry
Brown, spoke ten minutes against the resolution (ACLU, 2003; Stanton & Bazar, 2003c).
Activist Dave Jenest, who founded a group called the Patriot Defenders Network, argued
the city has no business making statements about federal security issues. “I think it's
stupid,” he said. “I think it’s, ‘Me too.’ Let’s go join 130 other places that oppose the
Patriot Act” (Bazar, 2003d, p. A1). City staff drafted the resolution (Stanton & Bazar,
2003c).
About 60 community members were scheduled to speak at the city council
hearing. After 30 activists had spoken the debate was cut short when Councilman Jimmie
Yee announced he was ready to vote (Bacher, 2003b). “I don’t need another 30 people to
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tell me what they think about this,” he said. “I’m ready to support it. I don’t know how
much more it takes” (ACLU, 2003, para. 3). Yee’s comments brought loud applause from
the audience (Bacher, 2003b). Then, Mayor Heather Fargo addressed the crowd:
I was moved by your testimony, not only by the words but by the breadth of
community groups represented here tonight. People here tonight have shown that
they are not just concerned about the civil rights of themselves, but the rights of
others (Bacher, 2003b, para. 2).
The vast outpouring of support for the resolution prior to and during the meeting moved
council members to vote in favor of the resolution.
Afterward the meeting, both Councilwomen Lauren Hammond (who introduced
the measure) and Councilman Dave Jones (an early supporter) said that opposing the
unconstitutional provisions of the Patriot Act was the patriotic thing to do (Bacher,
2003b). They were taking a stand on a civil rights issue. “We have as much at stake in
this as anybody. Maybe more, given the size of our various ethnic and minority
communities, the diversity of this community and the importance we place on diversity in
Sacramento,” Councilman Jones told the Sacramento Bee (Stanton & Bazar, 2003c, p.
B1).
Given Sacramento’s propensity for broad civil rights protections, the city’s
response to Arizona’s controversial new immigration law was not too surprising;
although its convoluted approach was a bit unusual. Five days after Arizona’s Governor
Jan Brewer triggered a national firestorm by signing the nation’s toughest illegal
immigration bill, Sacramento’s new mayor, Kevin Johnson, responded. He wrote on his
website’s blog that the city should follow the lead of others and sever economic ties with
Arizona (Breton, 2010a; Lillis, 2010a). But later that day, Johnson changed his mind and
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wrote: “Damaging the good work of Mayor Gordon and the many honorable people in his
city in retribution for the immigration law can become the equivalent of trying to make
two wrongs equal one right” (Smith, 2010, para. 9).
Critics claim he caved to pressure from Phoenix--where Mayor Johnson starred as
a point guard with the Suns basketball team for 12 seasons and got campaign
contributions (Reese, 2010). “Would Johnson have caved if Arizona targeted African
Americans?” a columnist for the Bee speculated (Breton, 2010a, p. B1). Kevin Johnson is
the first African American to hold the position of mayor in Sacramento.
When asked why he switched positions, Johnson said that Phoenix Mayor Phil
Gordan convinced him that sanctions would hurt the battered economy of that city. Still
the new law would encourage “discretionary bigotry,” and Arizona needs to be sent a
message, Johnson added (Lillis, 2010a, B1). “This is a personal issue for me, a
fundamental issue of justice for a place where I used to live for 12 years,” the Mayor
recalled (Lillis, 2010a, p. B1). The Arizona law is an example of going backwards,
Johnson told the Bee. “This took me back to my time in Phoenix and I remembered how
divisive [the King Holiday debate] was,” he recounted.151 “I want to do what I can do,
find a balance and send a strong message” (Lillis, 2010a, p.B1). So instead of conferring
with his own city council, Johnson flew to Phoenix to discuss what he called an “unAmerican” and “morally wrong” law with elected officials in that city (Lillis, 2010a, p.
B1). That was in April.
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On May 11, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in front of the State Capital
building in Sacramento to denounce Arizona’s new law, and convey urgency for action
on comprehensive immigration reform (Caprio, 2010). Protestors demanded that the
Sacramento City Council pass a resolution calling for a boycott of Arizona. Members of
the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement, Council on American Islamic
Relations, Japanese American League and Union Civica Primero de Mayo spoke at a
news conference outside City Hall later that day (Lillis, 2010b).
On May 25, council members debated the law and how the city should respond.
Mayor Kevin Johnson introduced the discussion with his personal insights and opinions:
“[some people] do not think the city of Sacramento, should be talking about this issue. I
respectfully disagree with that” (Lillis, 2010d, p. B1). An unjust law anywhere threatens
our justice here locally, Johnson added (Lillis, 2010b).
Councilman Rob Fong agreed. It was he who asked that the issue be placed on the
council agenda. Fong argued that it was the city’s responsibility to be heard on what he
called a “misguided and ill-conceived law” (Lillis, 2010e, para. 3). He asked his council
colleagues to join him in directing city staff to draft a resolution condemning the law and
instituting a boycott like other cities. “We have an obligation for our voices to be heard,”
he said. “If enough voices are heard, I believe we can get the law in Arizona repealed”
(Lillis, 2010e, para. 5). Fong advocated taking “the most definitive position possible of
opposition” (Lillis, 2010a, p. 4). Mayor Johnson replied, “Personally, for me, I think a
boycott would be the thing to do” (Lillis, 2010c, para. 4). But he said the council should
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talk about it before the city takes a stand. He wanted to hear from the community too
(Lillis, 2010c).
More than 230 people turned out for the public hearing. A rare overflow crowd
began lining up an hour before the meeting (Haley, 2010). The City Council took
comment from 70-80 people. Most of the speakers were in favor of the boycott, including
former Sacramento Police Chief Arturo Venegas Jr., who called the law “the civil rights
issue of today” (Lillis, 2010e, para. 8). “Will a boycott hurt Arizona?” Venegas asked the
council. “Absolutely—that is the intent. However, the true intent is to repeal the racist
law of Arizona” (Lillis, 2010e, para. 9). Venegas urged council members to sanction
Arizona. Twenty-two speakers opposed the boycott, according to Mayor Johnson’s count,
(Haley, 2010a). They criticized the council for spending time on a law that had nothing to
do with the residents of Sacramento (Haley, 2010a). The city should focus on its own
issues, critics said, notably its $3 million deficit. “You do this [boycott] to Arizona, we’ll
do it to Sacramento,” said speaker Jim Ricketts (Lillis, 2010e, para. 11).
Elected officials brushed off the threat of a Sacramento boycott. Council member
Sandy Sheedy called the law racist (Haley, 2010a). So did Councilwoman Lauren
Hammond, who added, “I’m the great grandchild of slaves, so you know what I’m going
to say” (Haley, 2010a, para. 8). It’s a “human rights issue,” Johnson opinioned (Haley,
2010a, para. 7) Councilman Steve Cohn said the law was unconstitutional (Haley,
2010a). “This law makes an open season for racial profiling and harassment of people
who look like maybe they don’t belong here” (Haley, 2010a, para. 10), Sheedy
concluded. All eight of the council members present agreed to oppose the law, although
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Cohen and Councilman Ray Tretheway did not want to call for an economic boycott
(Haley, 2010a).152
Councilors decided the city of Sacramento should oppose the law, and possibly
boycott businesses in Arizona. City staff was charged with preparing a resolution
defining the city’s official position on the immigration law (Bisharat & Teichert, 2010).
The council planned to decide on the resolution the following week after hearing
information about the city’s existing ties with Arizona businesses (Haley, 2010a; Lillis,
2010d).
In the meantime, older Latino community leaders with familiar names and
reputations quickly came together to push for a boycott. There was former Sacramento
police chief Arturo Venegas, Arturo Aleman of the SEIU, Ralph Carmona, a former
University of California regent and SMUD lobbyist, plus several Latino lawyers and the
owner of the Spanish-language radio (Breton, 2010b).153 These activists did not picket or
march, observed newspaper columnist Marcos Breton. They worked inside the system by
lobbying council members and building diverse coalitions (Breton, 2010b). Even though
there were no Latinos on the city council, the group was successful. Community
members were at work even before Councilman Rob Fong put the Arizona boycott on the
council agenda. To them, Arizona was violating the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by empowering local cops to enforce federal immigration laws (Breton,
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2010b). Why seek a boycott? Breton asked. “For us not to speak would be immoral…We
have to speak for those who can’t speak for themselves,” Luis Cespedes (an attorney)
told the Bee journalist (Breton, 2010b, p. B1).
Hours before the Sacramento City Council was set to discuss how it should
respond to the law, the ACLU of Sacramento County sent a letter to the council. The
letter, sent on behalf of the organization’s 2,600 local members, urged city leaders to
adopt a resolution opposing Arizona SB 1070 (“ACLU of Sacramento,” 2010). The
ACLU is proceeding with a lawsuit in Arizona that, among other points, states that the
Arizona law is illegal, wrote Jim Updegraff, chair of the board of directors of the ACLU
in Sacramento (“ACLU of Sacramento,” 2010).
In June 2010, the Sacramento City Council approved a resolution in protest of
Arizona’s tough new immigration regulations (S.B. 1070 and H.B. 1262).154 Those laws
allow Arizona police to arrest people suspected of being unlawfully present in the United
States, and to charge immigrants with a state crime for not carrying immigration
documents. The vote passed 6-1, with Councilman Robbie Waters as the lone dissenter
(Haley, 2010b). City staff drafted the resolution, which includes economic sanctions on
Arizona and Arizona-headquartered businesses “until the disputed laws are repealed or
nullified by a court.” Opposition is expressed by prohibiting city workers from traveling
to Arizona at city expense, boycotting future contracts to purchase goods or services with
Arizona-based vendors, and terminating (if lawful) current contracts.
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According to the decree, punitive measures were taken because S.B. 1070 and
H.B. 1262 will lead to racial profiling and the intimidation of certain groups of people
(local gardeners, nannies, home care workers), which could spread to everyone who
looks Latino. They will also jeopardize public safety, and create distrust between law
enforcement and ethnic communities. The resolution is meant to pressure Arizona to
follow Sacramento’s example of promoting ethnoracial equality and the elimination of
bias. Sacramento’s reputation as “the most ‘diverse and integrated” city in the United
States, and long tradition of supporting policies that prohibit discrimination, is
highlighted in the measure. It also urges the President and Congress to “work on
comprehensive immigration reform to fix our nation’s immigration system.” Councilman
Waters summarized the arguments of opponents by stating that city business should come
before intervention in another state’s business (Fehr, 2010).
Two days later, a small crowd of 150 people rallied in front of City Hall to protest
Sacramento's decision to boycott Arizona (Caprio, 2010a; Smith, 2010). Demonstrators
called for a recall of Mayor Kevin Johnson and the City Council.155 “The city of
Sacramento is a local city council and they should worry about local issues, not some
state that they have no business being in,” said rally organizer Paul Smith, a 5th
Congressional District candidate (Smith, 2010, para. 3). The event consisted of speakers
who echoed Smith.
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Targeted city council members include Mayor Kevin Johnson and city council members Ray Tretheway,
Sandy Sheedy, Steve Cohn, Robert King Fong, Kevin McCarty and Bonnie Pannell. City council members
Robbie Waters and Lauren Hammond are not targeted.
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Picking up on the crowd’s discontent, Eric Hogue, Sacramento’s last remaining
conservative talk show host launched the website www.recallsacramento.com.156 He
constructed it to advance efforts to recall city officials. “If the people here in Sacramento
can pick off one or two, maybe three city council members or start an active recall
campaign...it sends a message,” said Hogue (Caprio, 2010, para. 4 ). Arizona boycott
opponents used the now defunct website to build a base for the recall. Smith said he was
confident the group could get the signatures needed to force a recall election (Smith,
2010). Nationally-known Tea Party leader Mark Williams, a Sacramento resident, was a
leader in the recall effort (“Recall of the Sacramento City Council,” 2010).
According to Ballotpedia, the recall effort was abandoned in February. Still, the
initiative inspired a “Boycott Sacramento” movement, which was launched through
Facebook.157 The group, which supports SB 1070 and works to encourage the
Sacramento City Council to rescind its Arizona boycott, had 3,117 “Friends” as of
February 2012. A website created by former candidate for State Senate District 6, Gerald
Klaas, contains a link to the Facebook page (“New Website,” 2010).
Klaas’ website, www.BoycottSacramento.com, urges the boycott of businesses
within the Sacramento city limits in retaliation for the city council’s economic sanctions
against Arizona. The site’s main page features this message:
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In 2000, Mayor Fargo called for the revocation of KSTE’s broadcasting license after two morning talk
radio hosts made offensive remarks about immigrants, homeless people and gays.
157
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Boycott-Sacramento-CA-for-Boycotting-Arizona/121430504556943.
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We believe that local and state governments should not initiate economic
sanctions against fellow Americans, and to prove our point, we intend to fight fire
with fire. Members of Boycott Sacramento have decided that the City of
Sacramento is undeserving of our tax money, and so to prevent them from
receiving their .75% share of sales tax, we have decided to boycott businesses
located within the city limits. It is unfortunate that many local businesses will be
hurt in this showdown, but we didn't start this fight. Business owners should
contact their city council members to express their dismay (Klass, n.d., para.1).
Klaas explained his motivation in a press release: “Since I don't live in the city, I can't
vote to recall the idiots, so I'll do what it takes to keep my money out of city coffers"
(Klass, 2010, p. 4). His website contains links to several related websites, including the
Stand With Arizona (against illegal immigration) Facebook Page and an online retailer
that produces “Boycott Sacramento” bumper stickers. Its “Recall the Sacramento City
Council” link does not work.
Government benefits for noncitizens
In 1994, California citizens placed Proposition 187 on the ballot for voter
approval.158 The initiative commonly known as “Save Our State” would exclude illegal
immigrants from the provision of public education, publicly funded health care and social
services. To accomplish this, all government funded agencies would be required to verify
the legal residency of every applicant for education, health or social services, and report
suspected unauthorized immigrants to state and federal authorities.159
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California Proposition 187 election results: Sacramento County – no 40.6%, yes 59.4%; Yolo County
(West Sacramento – no 50.7%, yes 49.3%) from http://www.uselectionatlas.org.
159
Prop. 187 also required all law enforcement agencies in the state to attempt to verify the legal status of
every arrestee who is suspected of being in the United States illegally, and to inform and cooperate with the
INS and State Attorney General.
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After hearing a report from the city’s management analyst and deputy city
attorney, the council voted unanimously in favor of a resolution opposing Proposition
187 on the November 8 ballot (Yost, 1994).160 Besides adding costs, Sacramento’s decree
states that the Proposition 187 “could put the City at risk of losing certain federal funds”
for noncompliance, and raise liability issues “related to defamation and privacy.” City
staff would be also required to give advice on immigration law, which is “outside their
area of expertise,” the resolution states.
Sacramento’s self-proclaimed activist mayor, Joe Serna Jr., promoted the
council’s agenda at a downtown rally against Proposition 187. On October 26, Serna and
two city council members--Deborah Ortiz and Darrell Steinberg--urged a “no” vote on
the measure (Hayward, 1994b). “What this proposition does is fundamentally divide
Californians along race lines,” the former city councilman told a Sacramento Bee
reporter. As mayor of this city, would I be stopped and asked to prove my citizenship?”
(Hayward, 1994a, p. A1). Officials promised a multiethnic crowd of about 250 that they
would protect the interests of undocumented residents.
Two days later, the same group, plus council member Sam Pannell and council
candidate Steve Cohn, appeared before a crowd of more than 800 grassroots activists
(Davila, 1994). The meeting was organized to address concerns of delegates from the
Sacramento Valley Organizing Committee (SVOC).161 The crowd cheered wildly as each

Resolution No. 94-561 (September 13, 1994).
The SVOC is made up of congregations from Protestant and Catholic churches in the Sacramento area.
The coalition, a local arm of the nationwide Industrial Areas Foundation, is concerned with issues facing
low-income communities.
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elected official announced opposition to Proposition 187. Even so, a majority of
Sacramentans voted in favor of Proposition 187 (“California’s Proposition 187,” 2012).
In January 1995, Mayor Joe Serna Jr. accepted an invitation from President
Clinton to give the White House advice on federal welfare reform. He was one of two
mayors invited to Clinton's workshop, which included a bipartisan group of governors,
members of Congress, county and state representatives from across the country (Bee,
1995). John Molloy, Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency director went with
Serena (Hicks, 1995).
Before leaving for Washington, D.C., Serna shared with reporters the message he
planned to deliver to the nation’s leaders. “The best welfare check is a paycheck,” he
said. “If you’re gonna talk about reform, which I support, it has to be coupled with a
serious discussion about jobs” (Hicks, 1995, p. B1). Serna pledged to “test the
Republican mettle” on their commitment to restructuring welfare to provide opportunities
for the poor. “They’re for jobs, I’m for jobs. Put your money where your mouth is.
Republicans want to take people off welfare - fine. Train them and find them jobs in the
private sector” (Hicks 1995, p. B1). The new mayor also mentioned his ideas for local
welfare reform. The city of Sacramento, he disclosed, had begun discussions with county
officials about a pilot program that would place social programs, such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, under city control. “Most of the social services-dependent
population in the county lives in the city,” Serna said. “So though we may not run those
programs directly, they have a big impact on the city” (Hicks, 1995, p. B1).
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Despite opposition from municipal leaders, in 1996 President Clinton signed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) into law.162
To provide a safety net for those no longer eligible for assistance (which included
unauthorized and poor legal immigrants), Mayor Joe Serna Jr. called for shared response
to the local consequences of state and federal welfare reforms (Eifertsen, 1997). Even
though the county is responsible for welfare programs, he said, the city has a vested
interest in how the county implements welfare reform. “Forty thousand families will be
affected by welfare reform,” Serna said during a town hall meeting. “Sixty percent of
those 40,000 live within the city limits” (Eifertsen, 1997, p. N1).
Building on a partnership developed during a January 1996 Welfare Summit, the
city and county of Sacramento collaborated to implement its own version of welfare
reform. That conference, held at the Sacramento Convention Center, included the heads
of the boards of supervisors from the state's nine most populous counties, and big-city
mayors from those counties, including Sacramento, which convened the meeting
(Griffith,1996b) . “It’s only through this conglomeration of cities and counties that we
can bring enough political clout to get anyone’s attention,” explained Sacramento
Supervisor Dave Cox (Griffith, 1996a, p. B1).163
The group drafted a resolution calling for a say in the welfare reform debate,
greater flexibility in operating the General Assistant program, and more cash to pay for
the services needed to catch those who would be thrown off the welfare rolls (Griffith,
162
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PRWORA, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.

Counties on the invitation list are: Los Angeles, San Diego, Orange, Santa Clara, San Bernardino,
Alameda, Riverside, San Francisco and Fresno. Cities include: Los Angeles, Long Beach, San Diego,
Anaheim, Santa Ana, San Jose, San Bernardino, Oakland, Riverside, San Francisco and Fresno (Griffith,
1996b).
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1996b). The resolution was approved by the local jurisdictions and then forwarded to
state and federal legislators. The following month, the city-county coalition met to launch
its lobbying strategy. The aim was to increase public awareness of the pending funding
crisis (Griffith, 1996b).164 “There will be more indigent people on city streets which will
present problems to our fire and medical units as well as the Police Department and the
merchants,” City Manager Bill Edgar said in a press interview. “We are very concerned
about that” (Griffith, 1996a, p. B1).
After PRWOR, the city and county formed an interagency Welfare Reform
Partnership to ensure residents had uninterrupted access to social and municipal services.
The Sacramento City Council adopted two resolutions in 1997--one approving its
formation, and the other pledging support for the new partnership.165 The City’s role in
the welfare reform partnership was to provide “an array of support services to deal with
public policy issues and the mobilization of communities and their neighborhood-based
businesses” (County of Sacramento, 1997).
Still, many service employees in Sacramento and their families remained at or
below the poverty line.166 In response to this issue, in September 2003 the Sacramento
City Council voted 6-2 to adopt a living wage ordinance (Bacher, 2003a).167 A coalition
of labor organizers and living wage advocates proposed the ordinance and campaigned
164

Local leaders predicted that welfare reform efforts would cost an additional $40 million in General
Assistance in 1996.
165
Resolution No. 97-391 (adopted July 1997) approves a set of principles, created by the Welfare to Work
Policy Board (which includes representatives from the Sacramento City Council) to guide the collaborative
effort. Resolution No. 97-573 (adopted October 7, 1997) pledges to support the nine strategies for
comprehensive interagency welfare reform and directs city staff to participate in interagency efforts to
implement the strategies.
166
In 2001, about 30% of the city’s residents made less than the regions median income of $52,000 for a
family of four (Martineau, 2001).
167
Ordinance No. 2003-082 (enacted December 9, 2003).
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four years before achieving victory (Martineau, 2001). Since Sacramento is a principal
provider of social support services, and also contracts with employers who do not
adequately compensate workers or pay for health benefits, the council decided to
consider it.
Sacramento’s Living Wage Ordinance (LWO) broadly applies to businesses that
contract with the city, and companies that receive financial assistance from or through the
City (including grants, loans, tax abatements or tax increment financing). It also applies
to firms that lease property owned or controlled by the City. Nonprofit firms are exempt
under certain conditions. Direct employees of the City of Sacramento are covered, and
workers who are performing city-related work for businesses that receive city service
contracts, financial assistant or city leases. This applies whether the individual works fulltime or part-time, is a contingent or contract employee.168 The required wage is $10.00
per hour with health benefits, or $12.84 if health benefits are not provided.169 The
ordinance also includes a section about other labor standards such as paid day off
requirements, anti-retaliation rights and worker retention. Councilors also adopted a
resolution authorizing the City Manager to fund a full-time staff position in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the LWO.170
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“Covered Employee” does not include temporary or seasonal city employees, student interns or
individuals participating in specialized training programs.
169
The wages indexed annually to reflect change in the Consumer Price Index.
170
Resolution No. 2003-874 (December 9, 2003).
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While the LWO only covers a relative small fraction of workers within the city, it
covers a much higher proportion of immigrants.171 Immigrants working for city
contractors of services like facility and building maintenance, janitorial, laundry, pest
control, tree trimming, and security. Nevertheless, the LWO was not pitched as an
immigrant measure.
“Locally legal” identification cards
Uneasiness generated by September 11 added to the crush of Mexican citizens
flooding the Sacramento consulate for national identity cards, Consul Luis Enrique
Castresana explained in a press interview (Korber, 2001). In 2001, demand for the ID
cards more than doubled over last year. “This November, we gave out 5,600
identification cards,” he told the Sacramento Bee. “Last year, the same month, we passed
out just 2,000 cards. It’s a significant increase” (Korber, 2001, p. B1). The consulates
aggressive, month long campaign to inform Sacramentans about the money-saving
benefits of the Mexican ID card also heightened demand. In September, the consulate
distributed 40,000 information fliers at community meetings, in newspapers and at
matrícula application sites (Bazar, 2002). The flyers provided step-by-step instructions
on how to use the government-issued photo ID to open a bank account with ATM access,
to bypass expensive wire-transfer services.
The Sacramento Valley Organizing Community (SVOC), a coalition of more than
40 Sacramento area churches, also helped sign up Mexican citizens for the matrícula
consular card. In 2002, the group convened a series of rallies at local churches to get the
171

Project manager Mike Medema estimated that the ordinance would affect “less than a thousand” low
wage employees (Furillo, 2002).
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word out about the post-9/11 need for official ID (Davila, 2002). At the rallies, organizers
read letters written by Sacramento County sheriff’s officials, and Sacramento Police
Chief Arturo Venegas Jr., agreeing to recognize the card (Davila, 2002). Staff from Bank
of America and Wells Fargo Bank was on hand to open accounts for new cardholders,
while lawyers answered questions about immigration issues. After the meetings hundreds
of participants signed up to get Mexican ID cards (Davila, 2002).
While a police agency decision to recognize the card provokes protests in other
cities, it was not a big deal in Sacramento (even though the card is not recognized by the
state of California).172 The European American Culture Council of Sacramento—a group
that encourages people of European descent to learn more about their heritage—
threatened to protest at the Capital, but never did (Bazar, 2003d). Barbara Coe,
chairwomen of California Coalition for Immigration Reform (CCIR) and co-author of
Proposition 187, called the ID card “an outright free pass for terrorists” (Bazar, 2003d, p.
A1). When queried about this charge, Sgt. Justin Risley said officials at the Sacramento
Police Department were not overly concerned about the card’s security. “The fact of the
matter is, as far as being fraudulent, there’s probably more fraudulent California driver’s
licenses and Social Security cards than we’ve seen in this arena” (Bazar, 2003d, p. A1).
That was the end of that.
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In April 2003, the California Assembly approved legislation (AB 522) that would require city and
county officers and employees to accept identification cards issued by the Mexican Consulate for personal
identification. The measure was vetoed in the Senate (Sanders, 2003).
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Worksite deportation raids
Almost nothing is published in the local press about worksite immigration raids,
and city leaders took just one fleeting stand on the issue.173 In 1990, the Sacramento City
Council adopted a resolution urging “the President and the Attorney General of the
United States to direct the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
to implement a moratorium on any searches, raids or sweeps for undocumented workers
commencing immediately and ending on July 31, 1990.”174 City staff recommended the
resolution.
The First Vice President of La Raza National Lawyers Association, Larry Duran,
spoke in support of the moratorium. He also requested council action on the issue. A
community resident, Brian Weller, spoke against the raid halt. He argued that
“unnaturalized citizens should not be counted as part of the United States Census”
(Burrowes, 1990, p. 11). That was the extent of public testimony.
Undercounting of the Hispanic population in the 1980 census, and concerns about
a repeat in the 1990 census, prompted the City Council to act. Since INS raids create fear
among the Hispanic community, a moratorium was needed to encourage maximum
participation in the 1990 census, city leaders reasoned. Adequate state and federal
funding, district reapportionment, and budget forecasting depends on good census data.
According to the U.S. Census, persons of Hispanic origin comprised 14.2 percent of
Sacramento’s population in 1980, and 16.2 percent in 1990.
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There may be less ICE raid activity in Sacramento because there are far fewer unauthorized immigrants
in Sacramento than in other parts of California (Hill & Johnson, 2011).
174
Resolution No. 90-171 (adopted March 6, 1990).
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Unregulated day labor-contractor market exchanges
Unregulated day labor-contractor market exchanges have not provoked much
controversy in Sacramento. Crowds of mostly Latino day laborers started gathering in the
AMPM parking lot to look for work in 2002. The convenience store, on the corner of 47th
Avenue and Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, is in unincorporated south Sacramento
County (Milbourn, 2007). According to those familiar with the local immigrant labor
picture, there is no large day labor site in the Sacramento region besides this one (“Daylaborers Skirt Law,” 2006).
Numbers vary by day and season, but on summer weekends, the count swells to
400 or more (“Day-laborers Skirt Law,” 2006). According to the Sacramento Business
Journal, police respond to complaints from business owners by shooing people away,
knowing that day laborers will turn the corner and come right back. Unless there is an
arrest for an illegal act nobody checks for immigration paperwork, a sheriff department
representative told a local journalist. “Immigration is a federal issue,” he said (“Daylaborers Skirt Law,” 2006, para. 22).
The County sheriff’s department and County supervisor agree that law
enforcement time and money is better spent on serious crime prevention, rather than on
loitering calls. Immigration enforcement is not a local duty but health and safety is, they
told a Sacramento Business Journal reporter. So a coalition of representatives from city
and county government, law enforcement, business groups and the Mexican consulate,
worked together to establish a community center that would include a day labor hiring
center. “We are looking for a long-term, sustainable solution,” said Sacramento County
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sheriff’s Capt. R.C. Smith. “We want to take a multidisciplinary approach, not a simple
law-and-justice one” (“Day-laborers Skirt Law,” 2006, para. 30). The group has located
property in the nearby neighborhood and found a nonprofit to run the project-Community Resource Project Inc. (Community Resource Project Inc., n.d.).175
CRP bought a burned house a few blocks from where the workers congregate
informally, and is in the process of rehabbing it. The 41st Avenue Community Center, as
it is called, will be a hub that connects local residents with multiple community-based
organizations that offer employment and training programs, youth services, small
business and microenterprise courses, health and dental services, and a day labor center
(Community Resource Project Inc., n.d.). No public funds were used. CPR obtained
funding from Citibank, Kaiser and other private sources (Ferriss, 2007; “Proposed DayLabor Center,” 2007).
There does not appear to be any opposition to the proposed center, according to
Sacramento Business Journal staff, who has been tracking the CPR operation. Except one
man who sits across the street from the AMPM convenience store, “videotapes the crowd
and yells obscenities at them, claiming immigrant labor cost him his job” (“Proposed
Day-Labor Center,” 2007, para. 34).
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CPR was founded in 1972 to serve ex-felons, and offers a variety of services to low-income families in
the Greater Sacramento area.
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Population 600,158176

Denver, Colorado
City Profile

Denver, the capital and most populous city in Colorado, is a consolidated citycounty.177 It is located in the Intermountain West region of the United States. After losing
population in the 1980s, Denver has grown rapidly thanks to its reemergence as a
gateway for immigrants and “cool” destination for young adults. According to the
Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy (2003), the population
grew by nearly 19 percent in the 1990s, and 8 percent the next decade. Most of this
growth is attributable to foreign in-migration. Denver’s foreign-born population just
about tripled during the 1990s. Nearly two-thirds of those newcomers came from Mexico,
with smaller numbers arriving from South East Asia and European countries. Notably,
“62 percent of Denver’s foreign-born residents arrived between 1990 and 2000” (p.5).178
Still, Denver is an “Established Latino Metro”—an urban area with a large,
longstanding Hispanic population base (Suro & Singer, 2002). During the 1960s and
1970s, the city was one the epicenters of the Chicano movement (Esquivel, 2008). Today,
nearly one-third of Denver’s residents are Hispanic (with Mexican Americans comprising
31.2 percent). NonHispanic whites, the Census Bureau estimates, make up just about half
(52.3 percent) of the city’s population. No other group is present in a proportion greater
than 10 percent.179 The presence of single dominant minority group contributes to a
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U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010.
In operation, Denver is primarily a municipality, but some of its officers are also county official and
have jurisdiction and functions broader in scope than their counterparts in other cities.
178
Denver’s foreign-born population went from 142,434 to 369,903 between 1990 and 2000.
179
Black or African American 10.2% , Asian and Pacific Islander 3.5%, and American Indians and Alaska
Natives 1.4% (U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010).
177
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distinctive Denver attribute: “its centrality in legislative and public opinion debates
concerning immigration” (Denver Office of Community Support, n.d., para. 4).
Another factor that makes the city unique is its top ranking as a magnet for
twenty- and thirtysomethings. Since the mid-2000s, Denver has been a leading gainer of
young movers age 25-35(Frey, 2011).180 They helped made Denver one of the most
educated cities in the United States; slightly more than 40 percent of its residents age 25
and older hold at least a bachelor’s degree (Frey, 2011). Denver’s robust labor market has
made this “mountain mega” a good place for young people and immigrants to jump start
their lives (Frey & Muro, 2008).
Spurred by this growth, Denver’s economy has transitioned sharply away from
heavy dependence on resources-based industry toward “New West” business ventures,
linked to information and communications technology along with aerospace
manufacturing and tourism. The city is also home to the Western branch of many federal
agencies, and remains an important agribusiness and transportation hub.
Telecommunications and biomedical technology are two of the largest industries.
Construction, real estate, and retail trade are among the fastest growing industries
(Murray, 2002).
The median value of housing ($165,800) in Denver is above the national average,
and rents increased rapidly during the 1990s.181 Labor shortages in the construction
industry drove up the cost of building, which was passed onto tenants and homeowners.
An aging labor force, and the fact that high school seniors are not interested in doing
180

Denver moved from twelfth (2005-2007) to first (2008-2010) in rank as a destination for young adults
(Frey, 2011).
181
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000.
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back-breaking masonry when they can sit behind a computer for the same money,
account for the dwindling construction labor pool (Johansen, 2000). Denver’s technofueled economic boom further drained the city’s low-tech labor pool. Restaurants, hotels,
nursing homes and construction contractors looked to Mexico for a solution (Austin,
2000).
The city’s political leaders enthusiastically embrace Denver’s shifting image from
frontier cow town to international city. This spirit is captured on the it’s
GlobalDenver.org website, which highlights features that will, as Futurist McKinely
Conway predicted, make Denver a “supercity”; Denver ranks number 5 on his list of
cities posed to attain super status (Conway, 1999).182 The website showcases Denver’s
world-class airport, and positions the city as “a hub in the new global economy.” It points
out that Denver is home to 83 foreign-based companies with over 17,000 employees, and
743 local companies also participate in the global economy through exports. The city also
attracts over 180,000 foreign tourists and 5,000 foreign students to the region every year.
Another web page profiles the city’s various ethnic communities and connections to the
rest of the world. It emphasizes the number of foreign-born residing in the city (17%),
lists Denver’s sister cities, and local cultural activities. Denver’s big-league sports
franchises and convention engagements are also mentioned. Denver hosted the 2008
Democratic National Convention and the 2000 National Convention of the Green Party.
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A supercity is an urban area with three characteristics: it has a population over a million; a sustainable
capacity for meeting the physical and social needs of its residents; a healthy and dynamic economic
environment that produces, attracts, and nurtures economic investments that produce adequate jobs and
public revenues (Conway, 1999).
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It was the site of the G7 (now G8) summit in 1997 and hemispheric meeting of trade
ministries in 1995. The NCCAA Final Four in 1990, and visit of Pope John Paul II in
1993, helped put Denver on the world stage (Finley, 1995).
The city’s diverse leadership is another international asset. In the last twenty-nine
years Denver has elected only one Anglo mayor, John Hickenlooper (2003-2011). Voters
chose Federico Peña as the city’s first Hispanic mayor in 1983. Eight years later, they
elected Wellington Webb as their first black mayor (1991-2003). Webb won a contest in
which both candidates were African-American, and 68 percent of the left-leaning voters
were nonHispanic white (O’Driscoll & El Nasser, 2004). Guillermo “Bill” Vida took the
reins as Denver mayor when Hickenlooper left to become Colorado’s governor. Vida was
Denver’s first (Cuban) immigrant mayor. He served as deputy mayor under Hickenlooper
for six years. Denver’s second African American mayor, Michael Hancock, is the current
mayor. John Hickenlooper filled two-thirds of his top posts with blacks, Latinos and
Asians while in office (O’Driscoll & El Nasser, 2004).
While Denver elections are non-partisan, Democrats have long held a majority
sway on city politics with most elected officials having Democratic Party affiliation. The
office of Denver’s Mayor has been occupied by a Democrat since the municipal general
election of 1963. In a nationwide study of the most conservative and liberal U.S. cities,
Denver ranked 47 (out of 237 cities) on the liberal list (BACVR, n.d.). Denver has a
strong mayor/weak city council government, and is home to a strong grassroots antiillegal immigrant movement. Denver is also included among the top ten cities for Latinos
in the U.S. by Hispanic Magazine, on the basis of population share, political and cultural
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influence, and quality of life. The magazine describes Denver’s Hispanic political and
business community as strong and well-organized (Aguilar, 2001).
Unauthorized Immigration Policy
The biggest story in Denver has been the long, fierce campaign to rescind three
policies that opponents cite as proof that Denver is a “sanctuary city” for “illegal”
immigrants. Each of these policies extends the rights and benefits of citizenship to
unauthorized immigrants, through de facto political membership and access to publicly
funded services--police and social programs. Day laborer-contractor market exchanges
have also generated disputes. Immigration raids and the issue of amnesty for locals are of
lesser significance. Asylum for Central American refugees was not on Denver’s political
agenda.
Government benefits for noncitizen
Executive Order No. 116 was issued in 1998 by Mayor Wellington E. Webb. U.S.
Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-Colorado),183 and other Colorado anti-illegal-immigrant activists
have doggedly criticized the city’s policies on foreigners ever since. Opponents claim
E.O. 116, and policies like it, allow “illegal aliens” to live in the city without fear of
deportation. Denver officials deny it. In a 1999 letter to the Denver police chief, former
City Attorney Daniel E. Muse argues this:
Executive Order No. 116 expresses a clear intent and policy to preserve the rights
of residents of the City and County of Denver irrespective of their citizenship.
Executive Order No. 116 discourages reporting undocumented aliens who seek
essential services (Muse, 1999, p. 3).
183

Tancredo is a former Republican member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Colorado’s 6 th
congressional district; a district that includes most of Denver’s southern suburbs. He founded the House
Immigration Reform Caucus and was a declared candidate for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination
running on an anti-illegal immigration platform.

149

The “limited cooperation ordinance” as Muse calls it, does not explicitly state this. The
policy describes Denver as an ethnically and culturally pluralistic emerging international
city. It expresses opposition to 1996 PRWOR Act (with its unfair distinctions between
qualified and unqualified legal immigrants), spells out the city’s anti-discrimination
stance and commitment to deliver services to all of its residents. James Mejia, former
executive of Denver’s Agency of Human Rights and Community Relations drafted the
order. It was a response to the local impact of the federal legislation.
Webb introduced his new directive during a press conference at a Mexican
restaurant. He said unfair federal welfare reforms, and citizenship backlogs, compelled
him to act. This quote lays out the mayor’s position:
Denver will not allow the divisive policies and bureaucratic delays on the national
level to undermine our firm commitment to the delivery of services to all of our
residents. This is a pledge that I have made from the day I assumed office, and it
is a commitment that remains a fundamental principle of my administration. We
are an international City, enriched and energized by our immigrant population.
And while we are disappointed by the inequities of the federal legislation, we do
not accept its consequences passively (Webb, 1998, p. 5).
When issued, Executive Order No. 116 was estimated to cost Denver taxpayers about $1
million annually (Finley, 1998).184 Webb’s director of policy, Shepard Nevel, said we are
“providing food vouchers with state dollars to legal immigrants who are no longer
eligible for food stamps and are also providing job training, some medical care and
housing assistance” (Finley, 1998, p. B1).
Before introducing Executive Order No. 116, Webb traveled to Washington, D.C.
to urge lawmakers to soften the recently enacted welfare reform bill (Callaway &
Bierbauer, 1996). An act he, and other members of the U.S. Conference of Mayors,
184

Kitty Pring, senior Denver Department of Social Services official (Finley, 1998).
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feared would exacerbate existing hunger and homelessness problems in cities
(Harrington, 1994). Webb also used his position in the U.S. Conference of Mayors to
encourage public and private institutions in Denver, and other cities, to adopt measures
similar to Denver’s social policy for foreign residents—E.O. 116 (Finley, 1998).
Mayor Webb also spoke out against California’s Proposition 187—a law he called
“mean-spirited” and “flying in the face of NAFTA” (Harrington, 1994, p. B1; “Two
Wrong-headed Boycotts,” 1994, B7). At a 1994 rally, Webb told the crowd that a similar
ballot measure would not gain a toe-hold in Denver (Richardson, 1994). He also
promised to support community activists in their fight against the initiative (Covarrubias,
1994). Afterwards, his office was flooded with angry telephone messages and faxes.
Some Denverites mistakenly believed Webb had called for a boycott of California
(Lopez, 1994). No city-backed sanctions against California were ever taken, and the
mayor advised protestors to be geographically selective if they decided to boycott the
state.185
In the mid-2000s, Colorado’s “illegal alien” opponents coalesced to pressure
Denver’s new mayor, John Hickenlooper,186 to overturn the city’s social policy on
immigrants.187 In June of 2006, they erected a 48-foot-by-14-foot billboard near a
restaurant owned by Hickenlooper as part of their anti-sanctuary campaign (Kreck,
2006). The sign depicted a symbol for fallen soldiers and said, “Mr. President Mr.
185

Webb’s recommendations were based on his own experience with a statewide boycott. In 1992,
California boycotted Colorado products after state voters there approved an anti-gay rights measure.
Denver suffered even though it had not supported the amendment (Covarrubias, 1994).
186
Mayor John Hickenlooper, a geologist-turned brewpub pioneer (and downtown activist) was elected in
2003 and re-elected in 2007. In 2005, Time Magazine named the political newcomer one of the top five
“big-city” mayors in America (Brown, 2005).
187
Prior to this time Denver had no organized anti-illegal immigrant movement.
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Governor. Mr. Mayor--They did not die for ILLEGAL SANCTUARY!” Another similarsize billboard near I-25 declared: “Welcome to SANCTUARY CITY…Relax, you made
it! Brought to you by Executive Order 116” (Jones, 2006; Kim, 2006c; Mitchell, 2006)
A crowd of 100-130 supporters gathered in a parking lot under the sign on
California Street for the billboard unveiling ceremony. Denver radio talk-show host Peter
Boyles aired his show live from the site. Boyles spearheaded the billboard campaign.
KHOW listeners paid ($18,500) for the two billboards, which stayed up for one month
(“Two Billboards,” 2006). Rep. Tom Tancredo, and Jim Gilchrist, founder of the
Minutemen Project (border patrol effort), attended the event (Kim, 2006c; Mitchell,
2006).
Lindy Eichenbaum-Lent, spokeswoman for Mayor John Hickenlooper denied the
“sanctuary city” claim made by activists. She said:
There are no ordinances, executive orders or regulations that establish a
‘sanctuary policy’ in Denver. Denver’s policies comply with federal law, and
Denver law enforcement officers cooperate with federal officials on immigration
matters. Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials have said
Denver is not a sanctuary city, so merely erecting a misleading billboard doesn’t
make it true (Kim, 2006c, para. 6, 7).
Besides igniting the “sanctuary city” controversy, the billboard event provided a venue
for volunteers from Defend Colorado Now to gather petition signatures for the group’s
ballot measure.188 If voters approved their proposed constitutional amendment, it would
prevent unauthorized immigrants from receiving any state or local services, and would
allow citizens to sue any agency or local government suspected of providing services.
188

The success by anti-illegal-immigration forces in Arizona with Proposition 200 led to a nationwide
strategy to pass similarly worded initiatives across the country. Colorado was chosen as the next target,
according to Wade Henderson, of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in Washington, because it is
known to have a hard-core base of anti-immigration activists (Riley, 2006).
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The measure did not make it onto the November ballot.189 The Colorado Supreme Court
disqualified it (Aguilera, 2005b; Riley, 2006; Jones, 2006; Jansen, 2006). Former mayor
and U.S. Cabinet member, Federico Peña, led the Keep Colorado Safe campaign against
the ballot initiative. He called the amendment “mean spirited” and warned Colorado
voters that it would “hurt innocent children and create a health crisis by denying things
like immunizations” (Aguilera, 2006).
The court ruling incensed the group backing the proposal, which included Dick
Lamm, the former Democratic governor and current leader of Defend Colorado Now.
They pressured their representatives in congress to curtail “bottom up” amnesty for
“illegal” immigrants at the local level. In response, Republican Governor Bill Owens
called lawmakers into a special session. The Colorado Legislature approved a bipartisan
package of restrictive illegal immigration laws (“Colorado Lawmakers,” 2006).190 The
cornerstone measure requires state and local agencies to verify the immigration status of
persons 18 years old and older who apply for state, local or federal public benefits.191 It
also prohibits state agencies or political subdivisions from providing benefits in violation
of the act. The bill establishes reporting requirements and specifies criminal penalties for
“falsifying a required affidavit.” Emergency services are exempt.192

189

Their proposed constitutional amendment is identical to one filed in 2005 by Defend Colorado Now
leaders and Tom Tancredo, R-Colo (Aguliera, 2005b).
190
HB 06S-1023 (denies non-emergency state and federal benefits to undocumented immigrants); HB 06S1017 (requires employers to verify the legal status of their employees) (Jansen, 2006).
191
The bill uses a federal list of services that could be barred.
192
HB 06S-1023 (signed July 10, 2006; effective on August 1, 2006).
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The aim was to “put teeth into existing federal regulations,” Owen told Fox News
(“Colorado Lawmakers,” 2006, para. 9). According to reporters, the group that backed
the failed ballot proposal, Defend Colorado Now, was satisfied with the new bill
(“Colorado Lawmakers,” 2006).193
The devolution of immigration law enforcement
In the mid 1980s, Denver police officers would pick up and arrest unauthorized
immigrants simply because they were in the country illegally, Denver police sergeant
Mike Scanlon said in a Denver Westword press interview. But that stopped in the
1990s. “Now we can’t do that,” he said. “We’re not interested in immigration status and
nationalities. We don’t have room in the jails for our own crooks, much less them”
Bowers, 1995, para. 13). His policy on criminal aliens is different. “I have the guys
notify the INS when we pick them up. I don’t know what happens then,” Scanlon added
(Bowers, 1995, para. 15). Sometimes agents respond but often they do not.194
The Denver Police Department’s policy on foreign nationals—104.52, was
formalized after Mayor Wellington Web enacted Executive Order 116 in 1998. The
most controversial, misinterpreted element of the policy deals with the arrest and
detention of foreign nationals (Hudson, 2005; Spencer, 2006). The first section of
104.52 says Immigration and Naturalization Service (now ICE) is responsible for
enforcing immigration laws. It reads:
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The citizen initiative would have asked voters to bar state services to illegal immigrants and let the
Colorado Legislature define those services, while the bill uses a federal list of services that could be barred.
194
Bob Firth, one of the two agents assigned in the Denver city jail, confirmed the hit-or-miss situation.
Due to heavy workload, the agents were only interviewing and processing illegal aliens arrested on drug
charges (Powers, 1995).
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Denver Police officers shall not initiate police actions with the primary objective
of discovering the immigration status of a person.195 Generally, officers will not
detain, arrest or take enforcement action against a person solely because he/she
is suspected of being an undocumented immigrant.196 However, when a suspect
believed to be an undocumented immigrant is arrested for other charges, a
‘Refer to Immigration’ charge will be added to the original charges. Sheriff’s
Department personnel will then notify the I.N.S authorities according to their
procedures.197
The policy was fiercely attacked by anti-illegal immigrant groups beginning in 2005,
and opposition continues today.
Before then, another police policy was the center of debate. In 2002, leaders of
the All Nations Alliance, a coalition of over 80 community-based social justice
organizations, asked Mayor Webb to issue an executive order to stop cops from
assisting with the federal government's anti-terrorism campaign (Knight, 2002). The
Denver City Council adopted an anti-Patriot Act resolution instead.198 Councilwoman
Kathleen MacKenzie, who co-sponsored it, said the measure was needed to keep police
from trampling civil rights of Denver’s non-citizen residents after 9/11 (Cooke, 2002a;
Riley, 2002). After a two hour debate, council members approved the mildly-worded
decree by a 7-4 vote in front of a standing-room-only audience of advocates (Cooke,
2002a; Riley, 2002).
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Denver Police Department Operating Manual, 90-100, 104.52 (3a), Rev.1-06.
Denver Police Department Operating Manual, 90-100, 104.52 (3b), Rev. 1-06
197
Denver Police Department Operating Manual, 90-100, 104.52 (3c), Rev. 1-06
198
Resolution No. 14, Series of 2002 (March 18, 2002). Colorado passed a similar resolution on May 9,
2005.
196
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The decree lets federal officials know that the council is committed to fighting
terrorism but not at the expense of civil rights and liberties. It also reaffirms the City’s
already existing (but unimplemented) written policy on unbiased policing199 and
commitment to protecting people who haven't committed a crime from police
investigation.200 The Mayor, Manager of Safety, and Chief of Police vowed to ensure that
the police policy “will remain in full force and effect.”201 Language about limiting
cooperation between Denver police and federal terrorist investigators was removed from
the original resolution before the final version passed.202
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Denver was one of the first
U.S. cities to establish at Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).203 A detective from the
Denver Police Department’s Intelligence Unit has been working full-time for the Denver
JTTF since 1997. Since 2003, the Denver Police Department has assigned two full-time
detectives to the JTTF (ACLU of Colorado, n.d.; FBI, Denver Division, n.d.). “It makes
sense for an international terrorism unit to be based in Denver,” a FBI supervisor said in a
press interview. Being an international city, it “brings the good and bad from countries all
over the world” (Pankratz, 2001, A18). Even so, council members who voted against the
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Denver Police Department Operating Manual, 90-100, 118.02 (Rev. 01-06).
Denver Police Department Operating Manual, 90-100, 118.03 (Rev. 01-06).
201
According to a June 30, 2002 judicial review panel report, the captain of the Intelligence Bureau who
wrote the policy did not bother to distribute it to other officers (ACLU of Colorado, n.d.).
202
American Indian activist, Glenn Morris, wrote the original resolution.
203
Denver is home to FBI Domestic Terrorism “Squad 5,” a field intelligence group established to
proactively gather information on key security and criminal threats (FBI, Denver Division, n.d.).
200
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resolution claimed it would make Denver a haven for terrorists (Schabner, 2003). Mayor
Webb endorsed the resolution at a news conference anyway. Later, he incorporated its
language into the Denver Police Department Operating Manual.204
The city’s civil liberties resolution passed amid controversy over the Denver
Police Department practice of keeping secret files on peaceful protest groups. Resolution
text about information gathering and dissemination was prompted by the American Civil
Liberties Union’s class-action against the City for unconstitutional police practices.205
Mayor Webb convened a three-judge panel to review the city’s police spy files
and adopted most of their recommendations. Still, activists were critical of the limited
scope of the panel review, which did not include anti-terrorism investigations. According
to Steve Nash, a plaintiff in the Denver ACLU lawsuit, Denver had no public JTTF
renewal hearings. “I’ve seen nothing in the press about it. I’ve heard nothing from the
police about any kind of renewal process. Sometimes they do public things that aren’t
very public,” he reported (Hellegers & Mercier, 2002).
On December 30, 2004, the ACLU legal director in Colorado, Mark Silverstein,
wrote Denver’s elected officials urging them to reconsider the continued role of police in
the FBI JTTF. The letter explained that “JTTF activities may pose a greater threat to civil
liberties than the Denver Police Department practices that spawned the Spy Files
controversy” (ACLU of Colorado, n.d., para. 12). The ACLU sent another letter to Mayor
Webb and each member of the Denver City Council in May 2005. It stated that the
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Denver Police Manual, Rev.1-06, 118.00.
The March 2002 lawsuit against the City and County of Denver challenged the DPD's practice of spying
on nonviolent protestors, maintaining secret files, and disseminating information from the files to third
parties.
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DPD’s participation in the JTTF was preventing the City from fulfilling its
responsibilities under the Spy Flies settlement agreement. It suggested that Denver follow
the example of Portland, Oregon, which resolved a similar accountability problem by
withdrawing its detectives from the FBI task force (ACLU of Colorado, 2005).
The Hickenlooper administration refused to allow its two JTTF detectives to be
questioned by an outside auditor studying compliance with the legal settlement. City
Attorney Cole Finegan refused to comment (Greene, 2005). The Denver Police
Department maintains its partnership with the FBI.
Later in 2005, a dishwasher with a fake Social Security card, employed by
restaurant owned by Mayor John Hickenlooper, killed a Denver police detective.
Restaurant managers told police the 19-year-old had presented a resident-alien card when
he applied for the job (Crummy, 2005a). Gomez, Detective Donald Young’s accused
killer, was an unauthorized Mexican national.
The incident set off a fierce debate about unauthorized immigrants in Denver. It
also reignited Rep. Tom Tancredo’s campaign to abolish Denver’s “sanctuary policies.”
He blamed Hickenlooper and the Denver Police Department for the murder, alleging the
tragedy occurred, in part, because Denver’s “sanctuary city” rules prevent police from
cooperating with federal immigration officials and act as a magnet for illegals (“Alleged
Cop Killer,” 2005; Crummy, 2005a). The accusation fueled a series of heated debates
between City Hall and anti-immigration activists over whether Denver provides safe
haven or “sanctuary” for undocumented immigrants.
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During a testy exchange on the Peter Boyles talk radio show, Tancredo and
Denver City Attorney Cole Finegan sparred over E.O. 116 and police policy 104.52,
which Tancredo cites as proof Denver has a sanctuary policy. Finegan accused Rep. Tom
Tancredo of exploiting the killing of a Denver police officer to push an anti-immigration
agenda. He insists Denver has no so-called sanctuary policy—official or unofficial—that
keeps officers from making referrals to immigration authorities (Coffield & Hudson,
2005). “There's no executive order, no ordinance, no regulation in the city of Denver that
establishes a sanctuary policy,” Finegan countered (Hudson, 2005). Tancredo continues
to insist that such a policy exists.
The following week, members of the Colorado Alliance for Immigration Reform
(CAIR), and Defend Colorado Now, held press conference and rally to call attention to
Denver’s illegal alien “sanctuary policies.” Roughly three dozen people gathered on the
steps of the Denver City and County Building (CAIRCO, 2005a; Sanchez, 2005).
Protestors waved American flags and an image of the mayor urinating on a police badge.
They held signs saying “sanctuary kills” (Sanchez, 2005). After the rally, activists handdelivered a letter from CAIR directors to the mayor’s chief of staff Michael Bennet. It
asked Hickenlooper to issue an order that “unequivocally condemns illegal immigration”
in the city (Sanchez, 2005, B4). The letter accuses officials of “putting the ‘rights’ of
criminals over the rights, safety and welfare of citizens.” It states Denver’s sanctuary
policies and practices amount to “shameful, localized de facto amnesty for illegal aliens”
(CAIRCO, 2005a). Anti-sanctuary watchdogs demanded that the mayor rescind
Executive Order 116, which they described as an “artfully worded treatise on sanctuary
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for illegal immigrants.” They also wanted the mayor to change Denver’s police policy on
the arrest and detention of foreign nationals (CAIRCO, 2005a; Rodríguez, 2005a;
Sanchez, 2005).
In response, Bennet said Denver’s order only focuses on legal immigration and
says nothing about sanctuary for illegal aliens. “There are some who believe that a traffic
stop should become a moment of defining whether someone is in the country illegally or
not,” Bennet said in a post rally press interview (Sanchez, 2005, B4). “The Police
Department’s main job is catching people who are committing crimes.” He added the city
has cooperated fully with immigration officials (Sanchez, 2005, B4).
It is a matter of jurisdiction and manpower, local officers explained when asked
why Garcia-Gomez had not been detained or federal agents summoned after he was
involved in three traffic accidents. The only time we contact ICE is when we arrest a
suspected illegal immigrant for some jailable offense, Sheriff Dan Corsentino explained
to the press (Roper, 2005). Denver Police Chief Jim Billings said much the same thing:
If a police officer stops a car with suspected illegals in it, we would issue a ticket
to the driver for whatever violation had occurred, but if the occupants of the car
had not done anything wrong, we’d let them go. Just being a suspected illegal
alien is would not cause someone to be arrested or ‘detained’ in Denver (Roper,
2005, para. 8, 9).
Garcia-Gomez reportedly had a valid driver’s license from Mexico. Local law
enforcement officers are not authorized to do the job of federal immigration agents,
Mayor Hicklooper added (Roper, 2005).
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The Homeland Security bill recently approved by Congress provided $40 million
for training state and local law enforcement agencies how to initiate deportation
proceedings, but the Denver Police Department opted out of the 287(g) program (Osher,
2010f).
Another anti-sanctuary rally was held in Denver a few days later, but only about
40 people attended (O’Reilly, 2005). The low turn-out was the topic of the May 15, 2005
O’Reilly Factor Show. O’Reilly interviewed Denver radio talk show host, Peter Boyles,
who called the turn out “underwhelming.” He said there was not enough pressure on
Hickenlooper or the city council to change the sanctuary law (O’Reilly, 2005).
Congressman Tancredo increased the pressure on Denver officials. He wrote the
Department of Homeland Security in Washington asking Secretary Michael Chertoff to
enforce a ban on what he calls sanctuary states and cities. Others joined the attack on
Mayor Hickenlooper. Rep. David Schultheis (R-Colorado Springs) accused the mayor of
helping illegal immigrants steal jobs from Colorado residents and driving down salaries
for low-income workers (Crummy, 2005a). Former Colorado Governor Dick Lamm, a
Democrat and an outspoken opponent of illegal immigration, criticized Hickenlooper for
his lax immigration policies. Too many public officials "wink" at the issue, he said during
a radio interview. “It’s often said our immigration system is broken, but now our lawenforcement system seems to be broken, too,” said Mr. Lamm (Crummy, 2005a, A1). In
his interview with the governor, radio talk show host Mike Rosen graded Denver. He said
that, on a scale of one to 10, with San Francisco being a 10 as sanctuary cities go, Denver
was “about a seven” (Crummy, 2005a, A1).
161

“What do they want me to do? Should I build a wall around the city?” the mayor
said in response to Lamm’s accusations that he was skirting the illegal immigration
matter (Crummy, 2005a, A1). Hickenlooper told reporters he had refrained from taking
on his critics because it is not a local issue. “Local government’s role is not to arrest,
confine or expel those without valid visas,” he said in a press interview. “Our policy is to
follow the interpretation of federal law” (Crummy 2005a, A1). Mr. Hickenlooper further
explained that it would not be practical for police to take down names of suspected
unauthorized immigrants during traffic stops and forward them to U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement officials. Not only would such a practice cause people to fear the
police, it would encourage racial profiling, he said (Crummy 2005a). Besides, the mayor
told the Denver Post, the immigration agency “has already made it clear that they do not
have the resources or manpower to pursue minor traffic offenses” (Crummy, 2005a, A1).
Denver Police Chief Gerry Whitman agreed. He also questioned whether federal officials
would show up if police called them, and expressed concern about fear preventing
residents from reporting crimes or testifying as witnesses (Crummy, 2005a).
To further defend the city’s policies on foreigners, Hickenlooper cited a 1999
opinion from the city attorney’s office. Federal law, according to the legal brief, states
that solely being in the United States illegally is a civil violation enforceable only by
federal immigration officials. Local police may detain someone only if there is probable
cause to believe the person entered the country illegally (Crummy, 2005a). The Mayor
and Chief both argued that Denver’s police policy complies with federal laws and is
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similar to those used by local law-enforcement agencies in other cities. “It is unfortunate
that information being spread is untrue,” Mr. Hickenlooper said in a Washington Times
interview (Richardson, 2005a, p. A14 ).
On May 17, Congressman Tancredo issued a press release to deliver “a few
unpleasant facts” about the “sanctuary policy” that Denver officials say does not exist:
Denver jail officials do not routinely identify illegal aliens in custody and share
this information with the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Immigration agents must do this identification themselves with few exceptions.
(Tancredo, 2005a, para. 5).
ICE is only called when a major crime is committed and a criminal investigation is
already underway (Tancredo, 2005a). That is what happened in the case of the suspect
sought by police for the murder of Denver Police Detective Donald Young, Tancredo
wrote. “When a city stops calling the immigration enforcement agency to pick up illegal
aliens, that agency stops staffing to handle those calls” (Tancredo, 2005a, para. 11). If
Denver started making those calls, ICE might respond. “But why should a federal agency
worry if Denver doesn’t care enough to get these common criminals off their streets?”
concluded the congressman (Tancredo, 2005a, para. 11).
The Rocky Mountain News investigated. A few days later the paper issued a report
that poked holes in City Hall’s story. In a radio interview on KOA-AM (850), Mayor
John Hickenlooper said he was “embarrassed” by the News account indicating jail
administration practices were at odds with city policy. The report revealed that the
Denver Sheriff’s Department did not routinely notify federal agents about unauthorized
inmates. Talk show host Mike Rosen said he thought jailing an illegal immigrant would
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generate a computer record that alerts ICE about his whereabouts. “My understanding
was your understanding,” replied the mayor (Kilzer, 2005b, para. 10).
The mayor’s chief of staff, Michael Bennet, told the News, “We think it is
important that we be clear about what our policies are and that they are followed…If
there are inconsistencies, we want to know the cause of it” (Kilzer, 2005a, para. 8).
Bennet added that he was not sure if the apparent discrepancies were substantial, or
matters of semantics (Kilzer, 2005a). The next day, Hickenlooper met with director of
corrections, Fred Oliva, about the apparent inconsistency in procedures. Later, Oliva
showed the mayor’s office the sheriff department policy on illegal immigrants, which
differed from Denver police policy (Kilzer, 2005b). Federal agents announced that they
would start routinely asking the Denver Sheriff Department for a list of foreign nations in
city jails (Kilzer, 2005b).
Six months later, a local television story gives Tancredo another chance to
criticize Denver’s police policy. The undercover report alleged that Denver was a
gateway for human smuggling from Mexico, and that Denver police allow the trafficking
to operate without interference (Scott, Maass & Hartfield, 2005). In a November 2005
letter, Tancredo calls on Hickenlopper to initiate an investigation of his police
department’s policies. The Colorado Congressman claims he has received reports from
Denver police officers who say their superiors have reprimanded them for trying to call
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office in Denver to report illegal aliens,
even those involved in human trafficking (Tancredo, 2005b). This police indifference,
Tancredo contends, is a direct result of Denver’s notorious “sanctuary city” policies, and
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especially the written police department directive that forbids police officers from asking
questions about a person’s immigration status. “These smugglers know that Denver is
hospitable to illegal aliens, so they believe they can operate here without fear of arrest or
prosecution,” Tancredo writes (Tancredo, 2005b, para. 4). The letter urges Hickenlooper
to ask ICE to expand its enforcement capabilities in Denver. Mayor Hickenlooper does
not respond.
In December, twenty-nine Colorado Minutemen and CAIR members surprised
Hickenlooper at a breakfast fundraiser at El Centro Humanitario Para los Trabajadores, a
day labor center. They encircled him, hammering him with questions about Denver’s
“illegal” alien sanctuary policies. One man poked the Mayor in the chest (Rodríguez,
2005d). This incident was the Mayor’s third encounter with the group. They ambushed
him at a public meeting earlier in the year, and again after his State on the City address in
July (Rodríguez, 2005d). Protestors wanted Hickenlooper to change Denver’s Police
Manual to require full cooperation with ICE (CAIRCO, 2005-2006). The Mayor’s
response: “Denver police are underfunded and need to focus on their job, not the job of
federal immigration officers” (Rodríguez, 2005d, p. F1). The Minutemen videotaped the
event and afterwards, posted it on their website (CAIRCO, 2005-2006; Rodríguez,
2005d). Hickenlooper does not alter police policy.
At a tele-town hall meeting the following month (January 2006), Republican
gubernatorial candidate Marc Holtzman added his two-cents to the “sanctuary city”
policy debate. He calls the Democratic Denver mayor a “show horse” who runs a “rogue
city government” (Crummy, 2006b, B2). Holtzman claims Hickenlooper's policies are
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part of a liberal, “overly secularist agenda” that has permitted illegal immigrants to find
sanctuary in Denver (Crummy 2006b, p. B2). He was referring to the case of Raul
Gomez-Garcia who allegedly killed Denver Detective Donald Young and wounded
Detective John Bishop. “As governor,” Holtzman said, “I will make sure state laws
supersede the laws in that rogue city” (Crummy, 2006b, p. B1).
In September 2008, an unauthorized Guatemalan immigrant, charged with
causing a crash that left a toddler and two adults dead, pushed Denver’s police policy
back to the fore in an election-battleground state. Rep. Tom Tancredo was quoted in the
Washington Times saying the “blood from this incident” is on the hands of Denver
officials for protecting the suspect's identity (Richardson, 2008, p. A1). The suspect,
Francis Hernandez, escaped deportation despite numerous arrests in Denver. That is not
supposed to happen. A 2006 Colorado law (SB90) requires state and local police to notify
federal immigration authorities after arresting suspected illegal aliens for crimes more
serious than traffic citations. Cities that do not comply are denied grants by the
Department of Local Affairs (Aguilera, 2006).206 Before S.B. 90 passed police
departments only reported unauthorized immigrants arrested on felony charges.
In a follow up press release, Tancredo wrote: “How many more innocent people
must die before Denver gets serious about obeying the law?” (Tancredo, 2008, para. 5).
Hernandez has been arrested at least twenty times in the Denver metro area, five of which
came after the sanctuary city bill passed in 2006, the Congressman adds (Tancredo,
2008). According to press reports, Tancredo argues, Hernandez was never referred to
206

Municipalities are required to report the General Assembly how they have implemented the law
annually.
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them federal immigration authorities (Tancredo, 2008). ICE spokesman Carl Rusnok
confirmed that the agency had no record of being contacted about Mr. Hernandez
(Richardson, 2008).
Mr. Hickenlooper countered Tancredo allegations that Denver offers safe harbor
to “illegal” immigrants. He pointed out that Denver routinely refers more than 2,000
arrestees to federal immigration officials annually (Spencer, 2006; Osher, 2010f).207 “No
matter how many times Congressman Tancredo says it, Denver is not a sanctuary city,”
the mayor told the Denver Post (Osher, 2010f, para. 5).
Hickenlooper, in fact, welcomed the state law banning “sanctuary” policies for
undocumented immigrants. A month before S.B. 90 became law he said this in a press
interview:
I think if we pass this bill, that finally people will believe that there is no such
thing as a sanctuary city in Colorado. Nativists always mention Denver when
complaining about places that coddle undocumented workers. At hearings on the
anti-sanctuary law, anti-immigrant forces cited the city’s Executive Order 116 and
police policy 104.52 as proof that Denver is soft on undocumented foreigners
moving into the U.S. labor force. Nothing we’ve ever written or said to police
officers ever suggested they shouldn’t cooperate completely with the federal
government in every way they possibly can (Spencer, 2006, p. B1).
“The new law is applicable only to arrestees,” said Denver Assistant City Attorney
David Broadwell (Spencer, 2006, p. B1).208 Local law enforcement officers already
notify federal officials when suspected illegal immigrants are in custody. “It would be
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In 2007, out of the many thousands of foreign-born arrestees who went through the Denver city-county
jail, only 2,088 were referred to ICE according to reports filed with the state Department of Local Affairs
(Richardson, 2008). The city did not track such statistics before 2006 (Spencer, 2006; Osher 2010f).
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The new law says “a peace officer who has probable cause that an arrestee for a criminal offense is not
legally present in the United States shall report such arrestee to the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement office if the arrestee is not held at a detention facility. If the ‘arrestee’ is in jail, the sheriff
must report to ICE” (Spencer, 2006).
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much more problematic if it sent local law enforcement out to hunt down illegal
immigrants,” he told reporters. “We’ve looked at our provisions and don’t think they
violate the letter or the spirit of the (new) law” (Spencer, 2006, p. B1).
In October 2008, retiring Colorado congressman Tom Tancredo calls Denver a
“sanctuary city” again. The Republican called on Gov. Bill Ritter to cut Denver's
government funding because it’s a “sanctuary city.” Tancredo said in a letter to Ritter that
law enforcement has failed to implement laws against illegal immigration and is not
referring suspected illegal immigrants to ICE as law requires (Villa, 2008). In 2007,
congress passed Tancredo’s amendment to the Department of Homeland Security
appropriations bill. The law withholds federal emergency services funding from
sanctuary cities that protect illegal aliens.209 The amendment does not include a definition
of “sanctuary city.” Ritter spokesman Evan Dreyer called Tancredo's letter a "political
stunt" to distract attention from the slumping economy (Villa, 2008).
Tancredo was not the only anti-immigrant foe City Hall battled in 2008. A
group led by Dan Hayes, called Denver Future, initiated a petition drive for an
ordinance requiring police to impound cars driven by unlicensed drivers and “illegal
aliens” (Schroyer, 2008). Hayes claimed stories in the news about unlicensed drivers
causing fatal accidents and escaping motivated him to act. But Hayes was not
concerned with just any unlicensed driver. “It’s all these illegals driving around with no
identification,” he said in a press interview (Maher, 2009, para. 3), and then added this:
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Tancredo offer similar amendments at least seven times since 2004 and all failed.
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Denver is a mecca of all these problems. All our politicians want is cheap labor.
They roll out the red carpet for them. In the case of Denver, which I think
clearly is a sanctuary city, all they’re getting is a small court fine and are
allowed to walk out the door. If they don’t give police an ID, no one can prove
they’re an illegal alien. So these people get off the hook. It’s unfair! (Maher,
2009, para. 4).
While enforcing federal immigration laws is not the jurisdiction of municipal police,
enforcing traffic laws is. That is what inspired Hayes to launch the petition drive. “All
you can do is take their car away and put the burden of proof on the driver,” he
explained. “If you can’t come in and prove you’re a citizen with a license, then you
should lose your car” (Maher, 2009, para. 5).
The proposed ordinance states: “Unlicensed drivers including illegal aliens are
not eligible for auto insurance and pose a significant danger to the people of the city and
county of Denver when driving and must be prevented from doing so in every way
possible” (Osher, 2008a, p. A15). The measure would require the city to impound
vehicles operated by unlicensed drivers. Release of a vehicle would require a $2,500
bond to ensure that no unlicensed driver would drive the vehicle for one year. A $100
impound fee also would have to be paid (Grenoble, 20011).
Denver-area immigrants’ rights advocates said the proposal would chill
relationships between immigrants and police. “The more the police are forced to play an
immigration function, the worse the situation is going to get,” said Lisa Duran of Rights
for All People (Osher, 2008a, A15).210 The Colorado legislation enacted a law in 2006,
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Rights for All People is a Denver nonprofit that advocates for immigrants’ rights.
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which requires identification for anyone applying for state and local services. It had
already caused tensions between police and immigrants, Duran told the Denver Post
(Osher 2008a).
Councilman Doug Linkhart said the impound proposal was aimed at
intimidating unauthorized immigrants, who are not allowed to get driver’s licenses. “It’s
one more punishment for being here that is totally unnecessary and very punitive,”
Linkhart said in a press interview (Osher, 2008a, p. A15). “I think it could lead to a lot
of profiling and discrimination, and people will be stopped for looking like an
immigrant” (Osher, 2008a, p. A15).
Bruce Wright, a petition organizer, denied that the effort targeted immigrants.
Drunk drivers who have lost their licenses would be the ones affected he stressed
(Osher 20081). “I don’t think its discrimination against Mexicans or Indians or people
from Asia or Japan or anything like that,” Wright told the Post. “But you don’t belong
behind a wheel if you don’t carry insurance and you don’t have a valid driver’s license,
period” (Osher, 2008a, A15). Wright told reporters that he did not own a car and lives
in housing provided by the Colorado Coalition for the Homeless. He did admit that
undocumented immigrants would be affected. “If they’re not here legally, they need to
be deported back to their country,” he said. “You’re damn right, they do” (Osher,
2008a, p. A15).
In April 2008, backers of the ballot measure gathered enough signatures to put
the item on the ballot if city council members choose not to adopt it (Osher, 2008b).
The council’s safety committee, led men Councilman Linkhard, planned to discuss the
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Initiative 100 (I-100) in early May. In the meantime, the initiative stirred opposition
from Mayor John Hickenlooper, a majority on the Denver City Council, religious
leaders and advocates for immigrants (Osher, 2008b).
Councilman Lopez joined a coalition of religious leaders to urge a “no” vote on
I-100. The group announced its opposition to the “discriminatory” ballot measure on the
steps of the City and County Building in late July (Draper, 2008, p. B1). Rev. Andrew
Simpson, vice president of the Colorado Council of Churches, called the measure
“dehumanizing” (Draper, 2008, p. B1). Lopez called the measure was unnecessary;
driving without a license is already against the law in Denver. It also “establishes a
sense of fear in our community,” he said. “It does nothing to improve public safety”
(Draper, 2008, p. B1).
Later that same week, Mayor Hickenlooper called a news conference to express
opposition to the initiative and urge voters to defeat it. Flanked by religious leaders at
the St. Francis Center, he said the measure would create an unfunded mandate that
could cost the city more than $1 million dollars annually and create a bureaucratic
nightmare (Osher, 2008c). Existing city ordinances already give police the right to seize
vehicles for a host of reasons, including those operated by unauthorized immigrants,
Mr. Hickenlooper pointed out (Osher, 2008c). Initiative 100 would impose additional
requirements of showing proof of citizenship or legal immigration status in the United
States. He said that could lead to racial profiling, as well as burdening police with time
consuming paper work. It was a bad idea that would divert precious resources away
from more important problems, the Mayor told reporters (Osher, 2008b; Osher 2009).
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Registered voters also receive calls of opposition from Capt. Frank Gals, president of
the Colorado Fraternal Order of the Police (Osher, 2008d). A Denver Post editorial
claimed the measure would hurt the “city’s tourism business as well as our reputation
for basic fairness” (Vote ‘No’,” 2008, B10). Post editors called on Denver residents to
“go out in force and vote ‘no’” on the measure (Vote ‘No’,” 2008).
The following week (August 1, 2008), the Denver City Council voted 10 to 1 to
oppose the ballot measure.211 Besides hurting the city’s unauthorized residents, the car
seizure plan could violate the rights of all minority citizens and burden Denver
taxpayers, the council reasoned (Draper, 2008). In a memorandum sent months earlier,
Assistant City Attorney David Broadwell warned the council that such impoundments
would violate constitutional protections against unreasonable seizure (Vote ‘No’,”
2008). Councilwomen Jeane Faatz refused to support the proclamation (Draper, 2008).
Despite all of the official opposition Hayes’s controversial proposal passed with
53.5 percent of the vote (Maher, 2009; Osher, 2009). The election outcome surprised
many of Denver’s top civic, political and religious leaders. Initiative supporters did no
formal campaigning. They relied on word of mouth alone, and the argument that I-100
would get dangerous drivers off the road and drive down insurance rates (Osher,
2008c). Councilman Rick Garcia, who co-chaired the effort to defeat the initiative, said
opponents got a late start. The “campaign to sway voters to defeat the proposals had not
kicked into high gear until well after absentee ballots had been mailed in,” a Denver
Post reporter pointed out (Osher, 2008c, B1). Garcia added that Mayor John
Hickenlooper did not as stump strongly for defeat has he had done on other issues in the
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past (Osher, 2008c). Dan Hayes, who lead the campaign to pass I-100, called the win a
“big blow to the City Council,” which he said “is clearly working for illegal immigrants
and has no clear idea about safety and making the city a safer place” (Osher, 2008c,
B1).
After the election, Denver city officials evaded the new impound rule. They did
not require police to impound cars of unlicensed drivers (Osher, 2008e). Before police
were slated to start enforcing I-100 (in December 2008), Assistant City Attorney David
Broadwell’s office found discrepancies in the language of the law that allowed the city
to legally ignore the main intent of the initiative. “The actual language of I-100,”
Broadwell explained in his memo, “did not change the basic principle that the police
have discretionary authority” on when cars get towed (Osher, 2008e, B1). The city
enforced other provisions of the initiative that kick in once the car gets to the impound
lot, like the $2,500 bond that vehicle owners have to post before getting their car back
(Osher, 2009 & 2010b). A spokesman for Mayor Hickenlooper, Revekka Balancier,
told reporters that those pushing for I-100 intended to make such impounds automatic,
but legal analysis does not support that (Osher, 2008e). According to the Denver Post,
the city attorney’s memo advised that: “the actual language of the ordinance, not the
language of the ballot question, controls the interpretation of the law now that it has
been adopted by voters” (Osher, 2008e, p.B1).
The author of the initiative, Dan Hayes, said he would challenge the city
attorney’s decision. “Obviously, they’re not interested in public opinion,” he concluded
(Osher, 2008e, B1). In 2009, Hayes and his Future Denver Committee managed to place
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another measure on Denver’s ballot--Initiative 300. It attempted to shut the loophole in
the new impound rule. The proposed measure amended the wording of the original
initiative so that police would be “hereby commanded” to “immediately” impound a car
driven by any person who cannot show a valid license (Maher, 2009, para. 11).
Dozens of community groups campaigned against Initiative 300 (I-300), including
the Colorado Progressive Coalition, the Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police, the
Anti-Defamation League, the Denver Area Labor Federation, the Interfaith Alliance,
Metro Organizations for People, and even the Libertarian Party of Colorado (Maher,
2009 ). According to the Westword News:
Nearly every Denver politician—everyone from state senators to school board
candidates--declared their opposition; Hickenlooper recorded a robocall urging
voters to reject the ‘deceptive’ measure that would cost the city $1.2 dollars in
‘unintended’ costs (Maher, 2009, para. 14).
In 2009, Denver voters rejected Initiative 300 by an impressive margin, with
nearly 7 out of 10 voters rejecting it (Osher, 2010b). Council members Paul Lopez and
Doug Linkhart determined voter’s strong opposition to the mandatory impound ordinance
justified council action to repeal it (Osher, 2010a). Lopez worked with the city attorney’s
office to draft a repeal of the measure. He brought a proposal to the council’s safety
committee in early April 2010 (Osher, 2010a). The move infuriated initiative supporters.
“They are in bed with the open border people, who are the real ones against this
initiative,” Dan Hayes said about Denver officials. “They can call me racist, but [I-100] is
really about traffic safety” (Osher, 2010a, p. B8).
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During the meeting, López and Linkhart argued that new bonding requirements
and fees prompted people to abandon their cars at impound lots, which, in turn, clogged
up the system and caused police to tow fewer cars resulting in fiscal problems. The city is
losing money. “The only fix is to repeal this,” López argued (Osher, 2010b, B2). Council
member Jeanne Faatz disagreed. She said budget officials had advised that creating
another impound lot would free up space for more cars and turn the program into a profit
generator (Osher, 2010b). She added that she did not feel sorry for those without driver’s
licenses who have trouble posting the bond and paying the fees after getting their cars
towed. “When you talk about the costs, it’s hard to have sympathy for someone who
continues to break the law and flouts the law,” Faatz said. “This was intended to say,
‘Enough is enough’” (Osher, 2010b, B2). Council members voted 7 to 2 out of
committee to the full council for a public hearing and vote (Osher, 2010b).212
Councilman Paul López backed away from his push to have the City Council
repeal Initiative 100 a week later (Osher, 2010c). Mayor John Hickenlooper made it clear
he wanted voters to decide the issue instead of the council repealing the measure (Meyer,
2011). The mayor explained his position in a press interview:
I think once the voters pass something, we have to be diligent in supporting their
intentions. And on occasion, if the voters pass something and don’t realize what
the real consequences are, it’s not a bad idea to put it in front of the voters and let
them reconsider. But I don’t think we should reconsider for them (Osher, 2010d,
p. para. 5).
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With his gubernatorial campaign now underway, Hickenlooper also informed council
members that he might not be as heavily involved in the campaign against I-100 this time
around (Osher, 2010d).
In July 2011, the Denver City Council voted 9 to 1 to repeal the controversial
impound ordinance (Navratil, 2011).213 Before the vote, Councilman Paul López pointed
out that Denver’s charter allows councilors to rescind measures approved by popular vote
with a super-majority of nine votes by the city council (Navratil, 2011). According to Fox
News Latino, the decision to abolish I-100 was made because Denver’s new mayor,
Michael Hancock, would take office in a few days, and the new councilors elected last
year would be instated (“Denver Repeals Ordinance,” 2011). Fear of a legal action also
prompted council action. Initiative 100 explicitly mentions “illegal immigrants” and
includes a definition of such. It does not include any provision for people proving they
are not in the U.S. illegally. City attorney Broadwell supported the arguments of López
(“Denver Repeals Ordinance,” 2011). Even before the I-100 issue was settled, another
attempt to conscript local law enforcement officers into taking on immigration duties
came about. This time it was in Arizona.
The debate over Arizona’s tough new immigration law (S.B. 1070) spilled into
Denver in April 2010. Denver Public Schools’ superintendent, Tom Boasberg, was the
first to respond. He announced a ban on work-related travel to Arizona for all district
employees (Marcus, 2010). “This legislation is an assault on human dignity and our core
values,” Mr. Boasberg said in a message posted on the district website (McWilliams,
2010, p. A1). “We will not put our employee at risk of arbitrary and potentially
213
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discriminatory harassment that can now occur in Arizona as a result of this reprehensible
identity-document legislation” (McWilliams, 2010, p. A1). Boasberg encouraged other
school districts and organizations to enact similar bans. Students from Denver schools
(middle school to college) staged a walk-out and rally at the State Capital to protest
against the Arizona law (Roberts, 2010).
While not planning a similar travel ban, Mayor John Hickenlooper told the
Denver Post that he agrees with the DPS action (McWilliams, 2010). “Arizona’s law is
troubling,” he said in a statement. “But I am not surprised states are trying to address
immigration policy, because Congress hasn’t” (Crummy, 2010, p. A1). The Democrat
gubernatorial candidate added that he would veto an Arizona-style law if elected
(Crummy, 2010).
Amnesty for unauthorized immigrants and deportation raids
In the meantime, thousands of people swamped Denver streets to protest
Arizona’s SB1070. Organizers claimed nearly 10,000 joined the May 1, 2010 march;
Denver police refused to give a crowd estimate (Espinoza & McWilliams, 2010). Denver
Councilor Paul López, who headed up the march, told KDVR-TV reporter Jon Bowman
(2010) this: “We just want President Obama to keep his word…We will see more states
follow Arizona's lead if the federal government doesn't come up with a comprehensive
immigration plan.” City Councilman Doug Linkhart also attended the event (Espinoza &
McWilliams, 2010).
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Ten days later, the Denver City Council issued a proclamation calling for federal
action on national immigration reform. The council approved the proclamation 9-1, with
Councilwoman Jeanne Faatz providing the lone no vote (Osher, 2010f).214 The decree
states that any reforms enacted should include “robust border control” as well as “a path
to earned legalization, citizenship and social integration for our existing immigrant
workforce and their families.”215 It also calls for any new legislation to provide equitable
access to higher education for immigrant students already being educated in American
public schools.
Councilmen Paul López and Chris Nevitt introduced the proclamation (Roberts,
2010). “We cannot continue to allow people to be exploited or for good people to live in
fear,” López argued. “That is not what we are about in this country” (Osher 2010f, B2).
Denver representatives Sen. Michael Bennet and Rep. Diana DeGette also spoke in favor
of the statement (Osher 2010f). Faatz said she opposed the proclamation because it
supported a “path to citizenship” for those “who have jumped to the front of the line to
get into the country illegally” (Osher 2010f, B2). Councilwoman Marcia Johnson
summed up the majority view when she said “there was much to dislike” about Arizona’s
immigration law, but it has made people realize that the federal government needs to act
(Osher 2010f, B2). “We cannot do this state by state,” Johnson concluded (Osher, 2010f,
p. B2). Councilman Nevitt concurred, adding that federal foot-dragging on immigration
has resulted in a chaotic enforcement situation for local government, and “crazy stuff”
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like Denver’s I-100 and I-300 (Marcus, 2010). After the proclamation passed, Nevitt told
a Westword journalist this:
I understand where the people of Arizona are coming from. I think the way
they’re dealing with the situation is a huge mistake, but I can’t fault them for
trying. This simply has to be addressed at the federal level, and myself and
Councilman López wanted to make that clear, and to lay out what we’d like to see
in comprehensive immigration reform (Roberts, 2010, para. 4).
Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition (CIRC) applauded the “courageous step” the
Denver City Council took in issuing the proclamation (CIRC, 2010). The group opposes
Arizona’s “show me your paper” policies, which they claim resembles another bill that
traps many “low-priority people” in the “deportation pipeline”—Colorado’s SB 90
(CIRC, n.d., p.1).
On May 1, 2006, 75,000 protestors marched to the Colorado state capital to
oppose “the grandparent of Arizona’s S.B. 1070’s Section 2(B)”—S.B. 90 (CIRC, n.d.,
p.1), and draw attention to a bill in Congress that would make it a felony to be in the
United States illegally (Archibold, 2007). Former Denver mayor Federico Peña (19831991) was at the rally; the city’s current political leadership was not. In his address to
marchers, Peña underscored the importance of Latino workers to the national economy:
We should admire them for cleaning our buildings, building our homes, preparing
our food, producing our oil, working our mines, cleaning our hotels, mowing our
lawns, digging our ditches, and yes, even fighting our wars (Brown, 2006, p. A1).
He called for “compassion and decency” in immigration reform (Simpson, 2006, p. A1).
Then, outlined his vision for change which included sanctions for employers who hire
unauthorized workers, a guest-worker program and amnesty for illegal immigrants
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already living in the United States (Simpson, 2006). “If Congress has the courage and
wisdom to do this, we will not need to build any fences” (Carman, 2006, p. B1).
The following year, at the May Day 2007 march in Denver, Peña again
emphasized the need for policy reform and advocated an end to law-enforcement raids
(Aguilera, 2007). He told thousands immigrants and their supporters that legislation was
needed to normalize the lives of workers terrorized by ICE raids (Aguilera, 2007;
Carman, 2007); recent raids in the nearby town of Greeley, other Colorado towns, fueled
local anxieties about deportation and its aftermath (Aguilera, 2007). Speaking after the
march, Peña said told the Denver Post “the only reasonable, economically feasible
solution is for Congress to provide a path for those here illegally to achieve legal status or
citizenship…” (Carman, 2007).
A decade earlier, James Mejia, executive director for the City Agency for Human
Rights and Community Relations, offered his support to 150 anti-raid activists during a
1998 rally (Duran & Flores, 1998). INS deportation raids at a local manufacturing firm
and roofing company had shattered families and raised anxiety among Denver’s lowwage, mostly Latino workers. “Speaking in English and Spanish, Mejia described a new
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ that the city entered into with the Department of
Justice to stop workplace discrimination based on national origin, citizenship and/ or
accent” (Duran & Flores, 1998, p. G3). He reminded AFSC and union representatives
about Executive Order 116, that Mayor Wellington Webb issued in March, affirming the
City’s commitment to protect the rights of immigrants (Duran & Flores, 1998).
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“Locally legal” identification cards
In October 2002, without debate or public comment, Mayor Wellington Webb
issued Executive Order 119 (CAIRCO. n.d.). It authorized municipal acceptance of
Mexican matrícula consular identity card, and encouraged private businesses to so the
same (Allott, 2002). By recognizing the cards as acceptable ID in transactions with the
city, Webb made it easier for unauthorized immigrants to obtain business licenses, library
cards, access to recreation centers and medical services.
Webb made the announcement at a press conference, where he praised the
contributions of immigrants and highlighted shifts in Denver’s demographic makeup.216
The policy, he said, “is a goodwill gesture to a neighboring country and its citizens” who
now are part of the Denver community (Riley, 2002e, p. A1). A reliable ID card, he
added, would make it easier for police to deal with Mexican nationals, and should cut
into the burgeoning illegal trade in fake IDs (Riley, 2002e). The mayor also used the
occasion to voice his opposition to Amendment 31 (limiting bilingual education in state
schools), and lend support to a movement to protect a Mexican honor student and his
family from deportation (Riley, 2002e).217
Denver’s Police Department began accepting the card immediately. If stopped by
police, matrícula-holders can present the ID card just like a Colorado driver's license,
Webb told the Denver Post (Riley, 2002e). Days later, after the City Council approved a
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supporting resolution, other municipal agencies in the Colorado capital followed suit. The
Mexican Consulate in Denver, which lobbied local officials to win acceptance for its
card, was deluged with ID applications (Reid, 2002f). Long waiting lines at the Consulate
office prompted a swift reaction from individuals and groups that favor restrictive
immigration.
Rep. Tom Tancredo asked federal agents to stake out the Mexican government
office and deport illegal immigrants. The INS rebuffed him, saying that applying for an
ID card is not probable cause to suggest that the applicant is an illegal immigrant (Reid,
2002e). So Tancredo tried a different approach. He sent a letter to Mayor Webb urging
him to reconsider his decision to allow city agencies to recognize ID cards issued by the
Mexican Consulate. “Giving illegal aliens equal and unhindered access to the services of
our cities and towns is tantamount to a de facto amnesty granted by local authorities and
not authorized by the president or the U.S. Congress,” Tancredo wrote (McAllister, 2002,
p. A1). Andrew Hudson, spokesman for Mayor Webb, refused “to respond the numerous
errors and fallacies in Mr. Tancredo’s letter.” Instead Hudson told the congressman that
his “personal publicity campaign against the nation’s Hispanic community has grown
beyond offensive” (McAllister, 2002, p. A1).
Denver Post Columnist Al Knight was another critic of the city’s new ID plan. He
called it an “attempt to create a new class of immigrants, not quite legal but not quite
illegal either” (Knight, 2002, p. E5). Michael McGarry, spokesman for the Colorado
Alliance for Immigration Reform (CAIRCO), issued this statement about the
identification cards:
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Who would have a Matricula card? By definition, they are almost all going to be
illegal aliens. The mayor is asking us to give full faith and credit to an amazingly
corrupt government. It's absurd that we would put our security and our document
integrity in their hands. These are phony, sham cards (CAIRCO, n.d., para.4).
McGarry held a news conference under a “Denver celebrates diversity” sign on the steps
of the City and County Building, where he announced his intent to file formal complaints
with the U.S. attorney's office and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was
drowned out by protesters who chanted during his presentation and accused him of being
racist (Sarche, 2002). Undaunted, McGarry delivered a letter to the mayor’s office
alleging the city’s ID policy violated federal law. Webb stood firmly by his policies, and
declined to criticize his adversaries (McCallister, 2003).
In May 2003, the Colorado legislature passed a law forbidding state and local
governments from accepting identification not issued or recognized by state or federal
agencies in the United States. The law’s most immediate target—the ID card issued by
the Mexican government to citizens living abroad.218 This came in response to critics who
argued the IDs encourage illegal immigration (Quintero, 2006).
After it became illegal to accept the matrícula consular card in Colorado, antiillegal immigrant watchdogs zeroed in on the Denver Public Library (DPL). They
accused library officials of trying to skirt around the new state law by accepting a
Mexican driver’s license as valid identification for use of library facilities and services.
Employees do not collect any information from the patrons presenting these “non-secure”
and “unverifiable” IDs, critics complained; they just take it (CAIRCO, 2005b). Since no
attempt is made to verify the authenticity of a foreign driver’s license, it is easy for
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anyone to use a fake driver’s license to get full access to the DPL’s collection of books,
videos and other materials, argued critics.
CAIRCO members went to the library looking for evidence that DPL was
accommodating “illegal” immigrants. During their shelf search, members of the selfdescribed “immigrant-reduction” coalition came across a collection of fotonovelas, some
of which included sexually explicit drawings.219 They reported their findings to Denver
radio talk-show host Peter Boyles, who brought the issue to public attention (Aguilera &
Sanchez, 2005; Tancredo, 2006a). He revealed that the Denver Public Library was
spending thousands of dollars on Spanish-language pornography books, and was
throwing away English-language books to make room for Spanish materials for illegal
immigrants. Two months earlier, Congressman Tom Tancredo registered a public
complaint about the Library’s plan to beef up its Spanish-oriented resources. Boyles
added this tidbit to the controversy over the novellas (Aguilera & Sanchez, 2005).
After learning about the Library’s plans, Tancredo sent a public letter to Mayor
John Hickenlooper questioning his oversight of the Denver Public Library. He accused
the mayor of underwriting the “cultural balkanization” of the community by supporting
changes at the DPL, including, among other things, the shift to Spanish-language-only
libraries and the practice of coercing librarians to learn Spanish (Aguilera & Sanchez,
2005; Crummy, 2005c; Gartner, 2005; Tancredo, 2006). Hickenlooper responded with a
five-page letter denying each of Tancredo's 12 assertions, and telling him that he
“misplaced” his trust in sources who had given him bad information (Crummy, 2005c, p.
A1). He also wrote:
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Because more than 20 percent of all Denver residents speak Spanish at home, the
Library is interested in providing additional Spanish-language materials and
services, but it is not considering any ‘conversion’ plan along the lines suggested
in your question. English is and will remain the primary language of the Denver
Public Library (Crummy, 2005c, p. A1).
Hickenlooper further clarified the role of the Council in library affairs—to approve the
Library’s budget, not to debate or approve operational matters.220
On August 8, 2005, the Coalition for A Closer Look221 protested outside the main
branch of the DPL to draw attention to its foreign pornography collection. As news
cameras rolled the speakers veered off topic to rant about the alleged readers of the
books—“illegal” immigrants (Rodriguez, 2005c). After the rally activists marched to the
Library to deliver a letter demanding director Rick Ashton’s resignation. The letter
accused Ashton of accommodating illegal immigrants while “peddling porn” at taxpayer
expense (Crummy, 2005e; Rodriguez, 2005c). It also expressed the group’s opposition to
his “clandestine moves” to establish bilingual libraries with bilingual librarians; a change
the Coalition contends would prevent immigrants from assimilating to [European]
American culture. English has been the official language of Colorado in since 1998,
CAIRCO’s Mike McGarry pointed out. It is inappropriate for the library to purchase
books in languages other than English (Spencer, 2005b). A copy of the letter was also
sent to Mayor Hickenlooper's office (CAIRCO, 2005b).
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The Denver Public Library yanked all of its 6,569 novellas from the shelves for
an audit, and cancelled four of its fotonovela subscriptions (Richardson, 2005d). Library
director Rick Ashton announced his retirement (Crummy, 2005e). A Denver resident can
still get a library card with a Mexican driver’s license at the Denver Public Library.
Unregulated day labor-contractor market exchanges
In 1998, a brain injured day laborer was found wandering inner-city Denver near
an informal job pick-up site. Earlier he had been hired on this corner for a day’s work as
a roofer, but was injured by a fall off the roof (El Centro, n.d.). The employer dropped the
injured man off at night and sped away. The day laborer never fully recovered. He still
shuffles around downtown Denver. The employer was never located (Rinehart &
Robinson, n.d.).
The incident prompted the American Friends Services Committee (AFSC) to
reach out to the growing day labor community (AFSC, Denver, n.d.). Large numbers of
foreign-born day laborers begin arriving in Denver area in the early 1990s. That was
when the housing market took off and industries, like janitorial services, started shifting
their workforces to one that was predominately Spanish-speaking immigrant (Simpson
2001; Aguilar 2000a). As the numbers of day laborers increased so did the incidents of
labor abuse.
In 2000, AFSC hired Minsun Ji (a former union organizer with Denver’s local
chapter of the SEIU) to head up its day laborer organizing project, Humanitario Para Los
Trabajadores (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d.).222 Pressure was building for day laborers to
relocate. A housing development was pushing them out of their traditional staging area,
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and neighbors were starting to complain (Gutierrez, 2002). The idea for a permanent,
indoor day labor center came from the workers (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d.).
El Centro organizers found a site for a hiring center, but were forced to reconsider
their plans after opposition from local businesses (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d.). They
eventually found a landlord nearby who was willing to rent to them.223 The owner agreed
to lease his vacant car repair shop to El Centro for $2,500 a month. The group only had
two month’s rent guaranteed, and no money for staff or building repairs. El Centro turned
to Mayor Wellington Webb for help (Riley, 2002b). After hearing their plan, he offered a
$25,000 grant, enough to rent the building for one year. Council member Elbra
Wedgeworth, also contributed to the start-up. She got local businesses to donate supplies
to refurbish the El Centro site (Riley, 2002b). The mayor’s office received some phone
calls from irate citizens who said, “How dare you use city money for these illegals?” said
Phil Hernandez, city coordinator for the project. Hernandez corrected callers, pointing out
that not all day laborers are illegal. And even if some are, he added, “It’s better to
monitor their employment contracts rather than ignore them” (Riley, 2000b, p. A1).
In 2001, AFSC asked the City for $120,000 a year to run the center for day
laborers, but could not get a commitment. In the meantime, the organization continued to
donate the staff time of Minsun Ji (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d). The center opened its
doors on June 1, 2002 with volunteer staff and some community funds. Students from
Colorado University-Denver’s Westside Outreach Center (a service-learning program)
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staffed the front desk. Felicia Hilton, director of Colorado Jobs With Justice, also put in
volunteer hours, as did law students from Denver University (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d.).
After a year of pressure from organizers, Mayor Web agreed to fund El Centro’s
annual operating costs at a December 2002 meeting. But the money didn’t come in the
budget year of 2002 (Kane & Lingle, 2001; Riley, 2002a; Morgan, 2002). The City
Council held things up. Council members worried about community backlash. The city
attorney was apprehensive about the legality of funding a site that would serve mostly
unauthorized workers (Riley, 2002b&d).224 El Centro has a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy
about legal status (Gutierrez, 2002). It was a controversial use of funds at a time when
money was tight, said Phil Hernandez, director of the mayor’s Office of Human Rights
and Community Relations. Michael McGarry, president of the Colorado Alliance for
Immigration Reform, had already threatened a lawsuit if the city contributed (Riley,
2002d).
“If the city doesn't step up soon, I worry the center won't be able to continue,”
said City Councilman Doug Linkhart, who attended a fundraiser for the start-up (Shanley,
2004, p. C2). “Without the center, we'd have more people in jail, more on the street and
more in hospitals. We need to find funding to make the center more permanent”
(Shanley, 2004, p. C2). In 2003, the City Council awarded El Centro a $344,252 grant for
labor exchange services to cover the period of July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005 (Ji, 2009).225
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No law specifically prohibits using federal funds for a day laborers' center. However, several federal
laws, including the 1986 IRCA (makes hiring illegal workers a crime) and welfare reform legislation
passed by Congress in 1996, prohibits using federal funds to provide services to illegal immigrants. So, it’s
unclear if federal money can be used for a center that facilitates the employment of undocumented workers.
225
Council Bill No. 918.
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The funds came from a federal block grant (Kane & Lingle, 2001). Horror stories about
wage exploitation, and injured day laborers getting dropped off at the nearest emergency
room to fend for themselves, motivated officials to act. It is those abuses that the center is
meant to combat, explained Minsun Ji, the director of El Centro (Rinehart & Robinson,
n.d.).
In 2005, Denver became the third U.S. city to provide legal and police protection
for day laborers cheated out of their wages (Aguilera, 2005d; Valenty, 2006).226 The City
Council unanimously passed a local wage theft law in December.227 The ordinance
amended the city’s Municipal Code, adding nonpayment of “wages for labor” under $500
to a list of prosecutable offenses. Wage theft over $1000 is illegal under Colorado law.
But the statute leaves most day laborers, who are often owed less than $500, out of the
loop. Denver’s new ordinance addresses this uncovered area of labor abuse (Aguilera,
2005d).228 It also gives day laborers recourse when they are cheated (Valenty, 2006).
Under the new law, unpaid workers can contact either El Centro or other labor advocates
tied to church or community groups. If advocates cannot resolve the case, it is referred to
the Denver police, who have the authority to arrest predatory employers and pursue civil
and criminal penalties.
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Austin, Texas, was first in 2002, followed by Kansas, City (Aguilera, 2005d; Valenty, 2006).
Revised Municipal Code City and County of Denver, chapter 38, article III, sec. 38-51.8.
228
Until July 1, 2007, theft amounting to less than $500 constituted a violation of the Denver ordinance.
Then Colorado state law covered intentional theft amounting to more than $500. When the Colorado
Legislature revised state law to cover only amounts of $1000 and more, effective July 1, 2007, then the
Denver ordinance was revised to cover amounts under $1000.
227
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Councilman Doug Linkhart introduced the proposal. “I don’t like the face that
there are businesses out there that over and over again hire people and intentionally don’t
pay them,” he said in a press interview (Aguilera, 2005d, p. B3). “If someone steals a
wallet, the police can come and arrest you. But if you don’t pay (a person), the police
can’t do anything,” Linkhart told a Los Angeles Times reporter (Valenty, 2006, para. 8).
Inundated with complaints about wage theft, El Centro and its coalition partners
spearheaded the end-wage-theft campaign to persuade the City Council to passage the
new ordinance. Stakeholders met for more than a year to research solutions and draft the
law. The group included representatives from the City Attorney’s Office, Denver Police
Department, State Department of Labor, El Centro staff and volunteers, and Councilman
Linkhart (Linkhart, 2009).
Even though it is day laborers who are most often the victims of fraud, backers of
the law pitched it to the Denver City Council as a measure that would protect all workers.
The proposed ordinance “would make any amount of wage theft a crime and provide
protections for all workers, regardless of citizenship,” Linkhart said (Aguilera 2005c,
B1). Still, this ordinance is not about citizenship status, Linkhart added. It’s about
supporting basic worker rights (Aguilera, 2005d). “I support basic workers rights,” said
Councilwoman Judy Montero. “If they work the hours, they should get paid” (Aguiler,
2005d, p. B3). “Working with the Police Department is going to make a huge difference,”
Ji said after the ordinance passed (Aguiler, 2005d, B3). A short time later, the owner of
the warehouse donated the building to El Centro (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d.).
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Not everyone has been supportive of the day labor center. Representative Tom
Tancredo threatened to sue the city of Denver for supporting El Centro’s work with
undocumented immigrants. Colorado Minutemen and CAIRO) activists tried to
intimidate Mayor Hickenlooper at a December 2005 capital campaign fundraiser for El
Centro Humanitaro para los Trabajadores. He was the keynote speaker (CAIRCO, 20052006). The coalition was incensed that the city-supported day labor center helps “illegal”
aliens find work. Activists berated the mayor and other El Centro supporters (Rinehart &
Robinson, n.d.; Rodríguez, 2005d).
In January 2006, about fifteen anti-illegal immigrant activists picketed in front of
the center as part of the national “Stop the Invasion” protest against undocumented
workers (Crummy, 2006). “They’re invading our country,” said Eric Tavares, one of the
protesters outside the center. “They want jobs, free health care. I don’t want my country
turning into a Third World hellhole” (Crummy, 2006a, C1). Minsun Ji, executive director
of the day labor center, set up a counter rally to stand up for the vulnerable workers.
More than 200 immigrants’ rights supporters showed up (Kim, 2006a). El Centro
opponents have also tried to shut El Centro down by videotaping license-plate numbers
of employers, as well as businesses and centers assisting day laborers. Their video is
posted on the Colorado Minutemen’s website (Crummy, 2006a). “Targeting places like
El Centro that focus on workforce development for low-wage earners doesn’t solve
anything,” Hickenlooper said through a spokeswoman (Kim, 2006b, para. 17). Solutions
need to come from Washington, he concluded.
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As the issue of immigration became more politicized (in 2005 and 2006),
Denver’s only day labor center struggled. Several foundations grew hesitate to continue
their support. The City, however, continued to fund El Centro’s work with substantial
grants and public recognition efforts (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d.). At the organization’s
third anniversary celebration, Mayor John Hickenlooper made these remarks:
El Centro’s legal employment and education programs have helped countless
individuals in acquiring the skills necessary to be productive members of our
community. As Denver’s only non-profit dedicated to the protection of immigrant
day laborers, El Centro services are a valued partner in protecting the human
rights of all our citizens (Rinehart & Robinson, n.d., p. 22).
In 2006, the Denver Women’s Commission honored El Centro with its community
service award for its excellent work serving low-wage women (Rinehart & Robinson,
n.d.). The following year, Denver’s City Council issued a proclamation recognizing the
fifth anniversary of El Centro Humanitario Para Los Trabajadores.229 It acknowledges the
nonprofits efforts to “protect human rights and keep day laborers safe and protected from
exploitation and dangerous working conditions.” It also reaffirms the city’s commitment
“through policy and financial assistance to maintaining and enhancing the services that El
Centro Humanitario provides.”
Asylum for unauthorized refugees
Local government in Denver took no public stand on the Central American
asylum issue. Immigration was not on the city’s agenda before the 1990s. Its foreign-born
and ethnic minority population was numerically insignificant.
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Proclamation No. 51, Series 2007.
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Population 583,776230

Portland, Oregon
City Profile

Portland, the most populous city in Oregon, is near the coast between Silicon
Valley and Seattle. It has been called the last Caucasian Bastion in the United States,231
and a bastion of everything hip (Harris, 2012). In the twentieth century Portland was a
gateway for immigrants from Germany, Scandinavia, Canada and the British Isles
(Hardwich & Meacham, 2008). A legacy of Black and Asian exclusion laws, coupled
with the political influence of the Ku Klu Klan in the 1920s, helped turn Portland into the
whitest big city in the nation (Turnbull & Mayo, 2011). After waning mid-century,
Portland re-emerged as an attractive destination for refugees and immigrants in the
1990s. The foreign-born in the city more than doubled between 1990 and 2000,
accounting for 12 percent of the total population (Brookings Institution, 2003). Thirtyeight percent came from Asian nations, while Europe and Latin America each added onequarter to Portland’s foreign-born; many are refugees (Hardwich & Meacham, 2008).232
This demographic change helped diversify Portland.
At the same time, the city’s livability and robust job market in the 1990s made it a
magnet for domestic migrants as a well. More than a quarter of Portland’s residents lived
elsewhere five years prior. Portland was also a top gainer of young (25- to 34-year-old)
creatives due to its “cool city” vibe and DIY culture (Frey, 2011). The native-born
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U.S. Census, 2010.
Kaplin’s 1998 characterization in the Atlantic Monthly of the Pacific Northwest.
232
Portland was the twelfth largest receiver of refugees during the period. The largest refugee groups
residing in Portland are white, Protestant European groups (born in Russian and the Ukraine).
231
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moving into the city have been mostly nonHispanic white, while nearly 10,000 people of
color, mostly African Americans, have been gentrified out (Hahha-Jones, 2011). The city
today has nearly equal populations of black, Asian, and Latino residents, who together
represent 28 percent of all Portlanders (up from 20 percent in 2000). Despite small gains
in diversity, Portland is a city that prides itself on tolerance, social equity and
nonconformity.
Portland has a well-educated workforce (39 percent of Portlanders have a
bachelors degree), and a sustainable, diversified economy. Its economy consists of
primarily small businesses (in the retail trades and service sector) and is anchored by a
strong manufacturing base. Portland is also the hub for high-technology industry, the
largest of these is Intel. The city’s economy flourished in the 1990s due to exportoriented manufacturing. Despite these strengths “there remains a polarization between
high-skill and low-skill sectors which makes it hard for new arrivals to find employment
that pays them enough to survive” (Hardwich & Meacham, 2008).
Still, Portland is the most affordable city on the West Coast. It has been called
“the poor person’s Bay Area” (Abbott, 2001, p. 93). In 2000 the media value of housing
was $154,900. Affordability rates, however, are declining. Portland in the 1990s had a
tight market for new households and working class residents. Although real per capita
income in the city is above the national average, housing affordability is now a major
problem (Gibson & Abbott, 2002).
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The city of Portland has the last remaining Commission form of government
among large cities in the United States. The Mayor, four Commissioners and the Auditor
comprise the city's six elected officials. The Mayor and the Commissioners together
make up the City Council. The commission form of government differs from most other
municipal governments in that its members have legislative, administrative and quasijudicial powers. Community-based participation in all aspects of government planning
and administration is an established part of the political culture of Portland. In
comparison to other cities, Portland ranks high in citizen involvement (Abbott, 2001).
Middle-class Anglo citizens participate more than lower-income racial and ethnic
minorities (Johnson, 2004). City & state law give Portland citizens the ability to initiate
legislation through the initiative petition process, or to refer legislation passed by the city
council to a vote of the people through the referendum petition process. Portland is a
liberal-leaning city. In a nationwide study of the most conservative and liberal cities in
the United States, Portland ranked 29 (out of 237 cities) on the liberal list (BACVR, n.d.).
Unauthorized Immigration Policy
Federal efforts to enlist the Portland Police Bureau in the enforcement U.S.
immigration law has been the most hotly debated issue in Portland, though the city has
flip-flopped on its position. The conduct of Portland’s INS district office also generated a
fierce reaction. Controversy over the day labor dilemma was long-running, but less
intense than the other two issues. The same goes for ICE deportation raids. The matters
of taxpayer-supported public benefits for foreign in-migrants, and Mexican ID cards,
were nonissues in Portland. Asylum made it on the local political agenda for a day.
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The devolution of immigration law enforcement
Antagonism marked early relations between law enforcement and foreign inmigrants. For years Portland police and the INS worked together sweeping places where
immigrants lived and worked, apprehending those without documents (Bjorhus, 1997;
Daza, 2002b). That changed after the August 4, 1992 raid at the former Galaxy
Apartments, a complex with a high concentration of low income Latino tenants (Rede,
1992a; Bjorhus, 1997). Police and federal immigration agents went to the apartment
complex looking for undocumented immigrants. They arrested 26 Latino men. Neither
agency had a warrant. Police found no drugs or weapons. They did not file a report.
Criminal charges were never pursued against any of the men, who were eventually
deported (McVea, 1992a&d; Griffin, 2007a). Witnesses said officers overstepped their
“peacekeeping role” by knocking on doors and ordering residents out into the courtyard
where immigration officials arrested them.233
Afterwards, a spokesman for the Portland Police Bureau (PPB), Sgt. Derrick
Foxworth, issued a statement. “Our role is not to enforce INS violations but to ensure the
safety of citizens and INS agents,” he told reporters (McVea, 1992e, p. B3). Foxworth
mentioned that if citizens filed complaints, the Bureau would look into whether its
officers should help immigration agents conduct deportation raids in the future.
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In an August 25, 1992 memo to precinct manager, Chief Potter said, “peacekeeping” is defined here as
providing a presence to ensure that no crimes are committed while performing lawful duties” (McVea,
1992c).
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A week later, then-Police Chief Tom Potter met with Latino community leaders to
talk about the raid.234 The group accused the PPB of racial profiling, violating the
principles of community policing, and breaking Oregon’s 1987 immigrant protection
statue (McVea, 1992c; Rede, 1992a; Bernstein, 2001a&c).235 The law bars state and local
law enforcement agencies from using resources to look for, arrest, or detain people whose
only crime is being in the country illegally.236 Potter said bureau policy had not been
updated since the law was passed in 1987. He invited, Angel Lopez, the criminal defense
lawyer who brought up the issue, and other Hispanic community representatives to join
with the police and city attorney’s office in clarifying what officers can and cannot do at
deportation raids. Potter said he wanted a new policy that “not only conforms with state
law (but) does nothing to inhibit our relationship with the Hispanic community” (Rede,
1992c, p. C6). Both sides agreed to meet the following month to review the
recommended changes.
In the meantime, Potter promised to issue a temporary directive that precinct
commanders must approve all police bureau operations in conjunction with the INS. He
also agreed to investigate claims that Portland police routinely stop Hispanics to inquire
about their legal status. Community representatives offered to submit a list of people that
police could call on to help with cultural awareness and sensitivity training. Potter was
receptive to the idea, and reaffirmed his commitment to hire more bilingual officers
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Potter served as chief from 1990-1993.
OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (1987).
236
According to Rocky Barilla, a former Democratic state representative who sponsored the bill, the law
was inspired by a series of incidents in which police used immigration status--a civil matter--as an excuse
to question Latinos and foreign students whom they otherwise had no reason to suspect of criminal activity
(Green & Bernstein, 2001).
235
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(Rede, 1992c). He invited the group to review the bureau’s minority recruitment plan.
Both sides pledged to work together to rebuild public trust in the Police Bureau damaged
by the August 4 raid (Rede, 1992c). The tone of the 75-minute meeting was largely
conciliatory.
The next day, Potter made good on his promise. He issued a memorandum to
precinct managers that spelled out the limitations of their “peacekeeping” role during
deportation sweeps. The August 25 memo stated: “Officers will provide a ‘peacekeeping’
presence only at places where arresting Immigration and Naturalization Service agents
expect violence. This means we will take no action to assist the INS in the performance
of their duties unless a crime has been committed” (McVea, 1992c, p. B4). The message
was circulated at a morning meeting of the Chief’s Forum. Potter also reminded officers
that they may not detain motorists or pedestrians simply to check immigration status. A
Galaxy Apartments resident, who was present when the raid took place, complimented
the Police Bureau for Potter’s memo. “I think it’s pretty good,” Amelia Hernandez told
reporters. “They are here to protect us, not make things worse” (McVea, 1992 c, p. B4).
Later, Chief Potter updated bureau policy so it conformed to Oregon law (Green
& Bernstein, 2001). The new policy spells out cooperation between police and the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service in Portland.237 Officers cannot ask about the
immigration status of victims or witnesses of crimes, or detain motorists or pedestrians
simply to determine if they are legally in the country. Police supervisions must also
approve any INS requests for help with immigration raids, and will not set up perimeters
or arrest any non-criminal aliens. The police will still notify the INS when they make a
237

Policy (810.10) Arrest of Foreign Nationals (PPB Manual of Policy and Procedures, 2001).
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criminal arrest if the person turns out to be an unauthorized alien (Bernstein, 2001a;
Griffin, 2007a). The changes, the Chief said, were designed to address complaints by
Latinos who felt that police discriminated against them by stopping them only to ask
about their immigration status. “We feel this policy is not only good public policy, but it
takes into account the partnership we have within our community to include the Hispanic
community,” Potter told a reporter for the Oregonian (McVea, 1992c, p. B4).
In drafting the new policy, the Chief relied heavily on suggestions from Portland
Police Bureau’s Hispanic Advisory Council.238 Latino leaders praised Potter for his
willingness to listen to community concerns. They said the new policy would help rebuild
Latino community trust in the Police Bureau that was damaged during the Galaxy
Apartments raid (McVea, 1992c; Bernstein, 2001c). Oregon's congressional delegation
called the new policy a national model (McVea, 1992e).
Responding to objections from the Hispanic community, in March of 1993,
Portland police asked the district INS chief to remove an agent who had been assigned to
work with officers to curb drug dealing in Portland’s Old Town district (McVea, 1993).
In 1994, the PPB also ended its short collaboration on the Interagency Gang Enforcement
team (Ortiz, 1994; Pulaski, 1997).239 The change was a response to immigrant rights’
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This 10-year-old community-based police advisory committee--comprised of Hispanic community
representatives and more than a dozen local, state and civic organizations--was “originally formed out of
concerns about police-INS cooperation on raids on migrant camps in the early 1980s” (Ortiz, 1994;
Bjorhus, 1997).
239
In 1993, an INS agent was assigned to the Portland Police Bureau’s Central Precinct, “after Congress
called for more INS agents to help Portland’s Tar Heroin Task Force crack down on illegal sales of the
drug” in Old Town. Many of those arrested in this area for drug dealing are illegal immigrants (McVea,
1993).
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group claims that drug and gang operations were a thin guise for rooting our
undocumented immigrants (Bjorhus, 1997). Still, this did not end collaborative
arrangements between the Portland Police Bureau and federal agents.
Portland joined the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in 1997, to prevent
potential terrorist threats at the Nike World Masters Games (Schmidt, 2011a). Early
decisions about the partnership went unnoticed. But after the police watchdog group
Portland Copwatch brought it to the public’s attention in 2000, the ACLU and its
coalition partners mobilized to reverse the City’s decision to participate in the JTTF
(Helegers & Mercier, 2002).240 At the first public Portland JTTF hearing in September
2001, activists jammed the chambers of the city council to make their pitches about the
FBI’s long history of repressing political dissent. They argued against Portland’s
continued participation in the JTTF because the state’s anti-McCarthyism law prohibited
it (Green & Bernstein, 2001).241 The law prohibits state and local law enforcement
agencies from collecting or maintaining information about individuals, groups, or
associations unless the information directly related to criminal activity, or there are
reasonable grounds to suspect the individual may be involved in criminal conduct.242
But after five hours of heated testimony, the Portland City Council voted 4-1 to
keep officers in the task force. Critics walked out as politicians tried to explain (Attig,
2001; Hellegers & Mercier, 2002; Hellegers, 2005; Schmidt, 2011a). Still the mayor and
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Dan Handelman, of Portland Copwatch, noticed an item related to the JTTF on the City Council’s
agenda (Hellegers & Mercier, 2002).
241
OR. REV. STAT. § 181.575 (2001).
242
The law, introduced in the 1981 legislature on behalf of Associated Oregon industries, started as a bill to
allow employers to obtain background information on prospective employees. But after the ACLU
challenged it, the legislature added language to prohibit police from collecting or maintaining information
about the political, religious or social views of individuals or groups (Green & Bernstein, 2001).
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police chief signed a contract pledging vigilant police oversight to ensure that the statute
would not be breeched (Green & Bernstein, 2001). Dan Handelman, of Portland
Copwatch, later weighed in on the police department’s record:
They promised the community that the Portland-FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force
would not violate these laws, and they have followed through. That’s very
heartening. In a rare case we’re being supportive of the city and police here
(Green & Bernstein, 2001, p. A1).
The city further solidified its position on local cooperation with federal agents
when the PPB became the first city agency in the nation to publicly refuse to participate
in post 9/11 anti-terrorism investigations in 2001 (Learn, 2001). When U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft ask the PPB to interview Middle Eastern visitors in Portland on
visas, red flags went up (Learn, 2001; Hellegers, 2005). Andrew Kirkland, Portland’s
acting police chief, consulted with Deputy City Attorney David Lesh, who advised him
not to comply with the request. Kirkland told CNN that his agency could not comply with
the U. S. Justice Department because to do so would violate state law, which he said was
“more restrictive than federal law” (“Portland Decision,” 2001, para. 2).243 The names on
the Portland FBI list were not those of criminal suspects, so Kirkland deduced that some
of the questions were illegal. Oregon’s 1987 immigration statue and 1981 antiMcCarthyism law restrict police questioning when there is no evidence that an individual
committed a crime.244
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While many states and local jurisdictions have racial profiling laws, few states have laws similar to the
Oregon law, said Thomas Morrison, associate dean for the George Washington University Law School
(“Portland Decision,” 2001).
244
ORS 181.850 and ORS 181.575.
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Mayor Vera Katz endorsed the police command limited cooperation decision.
Flanked by Lesh and Assistant Chief Andrew Kirkland, she issued this statement
published in the Oregonian:
The city of Portland, the Police Bureau and the City Council are committed to the
fight against terrorism, but within the provisions of our state law. Remember, we
were sued because we violated [state] statute, so we are especially careful
(Bernstein, 2001c, p. A1).
Portland police were sued twice in the mid-1990s over intelligence gathering on political
activists. The city lost one of the lawsuits. The recent controversy over the role of
Portland police in the FBI-led JTTF also made city officials extra attentive to state
guidelines (Bernstein, 2001a&c). One of the repeated concerns at the September City
Council hearings on the Police Bureau’s renewed participation in the JTTF was that
Portland police would use their participation in the task force to get around the state’s
anti-McCarthyism statue. “This is exactly what the feds are asking the Portland Police to
do,” Rogers said (Bernstein, 2001a, p. A1).
Members of the local Muslim community, and civil liberties advocates, praised
Portland’s decision not to assist federal authorities. But more people criticized it.245
Angry mail and phone calls poured into the Portland Police Bureau and City Hall from
critics across the country (Bernstein, 2001b). Local business people worried about
national boycotts of Portland. Some rank-and-file street cops were embarrassed (Oliver &
Learn, 2001).
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Two-thirds of the 1,900 e-mails and letters Katz’s office received on the issue were negative, many from
out of state (Learn, 2001).
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The Portland bashing intensified after Portland Attorney Jeff Rogers supported his
deputy’s conclusion, despite legal opinions to the contrary.246 U.S. Attorney General
Hardy Myers and Multnomah County District Attorney Michael Schrunk ruled that
Oregon law did not prohibit law enforcement agencies from conducting interviews
(Bernstein, 2001b). Even so, Portland stuck by its attorney’s advice about not
participating (Bernstein & Larabee, 2001; Green & Bernstein, 2001; Trevison, 2001).
For this well-publicized legal debate Portland became the “poster child” of the
anti-terrorism interrogation issue, even though it was not the only city to refuse
participation (Oliver & Learn, 2001; Mitchell, 2002).247 The “City of Shame” was roasted
on talk radio and chastised on the cable news networks (Bernstein, 2001b; Oliver &
Learn, 2001). The Los Angeles Times ran an editorial cartoon of Osama bin Laden
heading for Portland on a goat. The local newspaper ran one depicting the city as an
island (Learn, 2001). Former director of the Portland district of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, David Beebe, lambasted Portland in his editorial published in the
Oregonian. He wrote:
By conveniently declaring Attorney General John Ashcroft’s request for assistant
‘illegal,’ the left-leaning body politic of Mayor Vera Katz and City Attorney Jeff
Rogers once again validates Portland’s reputation as a ‘little Beirut,’ or, as
another reader recently quipped, ‘The People’s Republic of Portland’ (Beebe,
2001, p. B7).248
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The state legislative council agreed with Portland (Bernstein, 2001b).
Police in Detroit, San Francisco, Seattle and Chicago dodged criticism for not participating by letting
others conduct the interviews after raising concerns about racial profiling and community relations (Learn,
2001; Oliver & Learn, 2001; Mitchell, 2002; Schabner, 2003).
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The “Little Beirut” nickname, that compared Portland to the troubled Middle Eastern city, was coined
by the staff of former president George H. W. Bush after violent protests during his visits to Oregon in the
early 1990s (Roe, 2002; McCall, 2003).
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To answer the barrage of criticism, Portland Attorney Jeff Rogers, Mayor Vera Katz, and
Police Chief Mark Kroeker convened a November briefing at City Hall. They outlined,
for the first time, the five questions that raised legal concerns and tried to explain why
they did not accept state Attorney General Hardy Myers’ legal interpretation. “Of all the
jurisdictions, we probably have the most experience dealing with these statutes," Mayor
Vera Katz said (Bernstein, 2001a, p. A1). “Hardy Myers didn’t.” Kroeker added “The
attorney general isn’t going to defend us if we face litigation” (Bernstein, 2001a, p. A1).
The next day the trio held a news conference to further discuss their legal
analysis. Officials emphasized that their decision to opt out of the interviews was based
on a careful reading of Oregon laws. It was not the result of public opinion, political
ideology, or a question of police commitment to the war on terrorism (Attig, 2001;
Bernstein, 2001a).
Even though Mark Kroeker kept his promise to JTTF opponents by not breaking
Oregon laws, this did not dispel Portlanders’ distrust of the government (Schmidt,
2011b). The City Council still faced a room full of angry citizens at September 2002
JTFF renewal hearing. The Patriot Act was pending in Congress. Portland police were
accused of using excessive force on protesters during President Bush’s visit, and an
exposé in the Portland Tribune on police spying had just hit the news stand (Hellegers &
Mercier, 2002).249 It is against this backdrop that the Portland City Council convened its
second public hearing on the city’s agreement with the FBI. Testimony at the meeting
was dominated by groups opposed to the partnership, including local Muslims worried
249

On September 17 the Portland Tribune ran a headline story about thousands of “red squad” style police
files unearthed on Portland activists compiled during the 1970s and 1980s.
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about being targeted by the Portland JTTF.250 Opponents called on officials to end the
city’s direct participation in the FBI task force, arguing that the police-FBI partnership
violated Oregon’s anti-McCarthyism law.251 The Council voted unanimously in favor of
renewal anyway (Hellegers & Mercier, 2002). Mayor Vera Katz and other city officials
insisted that they were compiling with state law. They cited the city’s refusal to
participate in the U.S. Justice Department’s anti-terrorism interviews as proof. Discontent
activists yelled, “Shame on you!” (Schmidt 2011a, p. A6). A few months later Chief
Kroeker issued a press release announcing the creation the Muslim/Arab Police Advisory
Council (Portland Police Bureau, 2000b, 2002a).252
By 2003 the players in city government had changed. Former police chief Tom
Potter took office as Mayor, and according to according to Portland’s Immigrant &
Refugee Task Force, there was “a noticeable shift in thinking at City Hall about
immigrants and refugees” (Lensen, 2007).253 Under Potter’s leadership, the City Council
established a clear division between the FBI and local police with its unanimous approval
of a resolution about the USA PATRIOT Act.254 The decree, adopted October 29,
reiterates the Council’s commitment to uphold Oregon’s 1987 immigrant protection
statue and 1981 anti-McCarthyism law.255 It also acknowledges the value of the city’s
diverse population and reaffirms Portland’s long tradition of protecting the civil rights
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Other opponents included: the ACLU, Japanese American Citizens League, the League of Women’s
Voters, Sierra Club, Physicians for Social Responsibility and the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees.
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OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (1987); and OR. REV. STAT. § 181.575 (2001).
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The Council was established in November 2002 to advise police about the JTTF, and other concerns of
9/11-affected communities (Portland Police Bureau 2002a, 2000b).
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Potter (2004-2008) limited his individual campaign donations to 25 dollars per person because he
believed that all residents should have equal access to their politicians.
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Resolution No. 36179 (2003).
255
Multnomah County passed a resolution opposing the Patriot Act in December 2004 (BORDC).
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and liberties of all persons. The resolution expressed strong opposition to some parts of
the UPA, and called on Oregon’s Congressional representatives to correct provisions that
impair or infringe on civil liberties. City leaders also vowed that the fight against
terrorism would not be waged at the expense of “the essential right and liberties” of
Portland residents.
Two years later Portland became the first city in the country to pull out of its Joint
Terrorism Task Force agreement with the FBI. Led by Mayor Tom Potter, the City
Council voted 4-1 to adopt a binding resolution authorizing the withdrawal of its two
police officers from the federal task force in April 2005 (Griffin, 2005).256 As a former
police chief, Potter made a compelling case for withdrawal, citing the potential for
trespasses against civil liberties. The landmark decision ended a decade-long battle
between the city council and activists over the role of Portland police in the JTTF.
Commissioner Randy Leonard authored the JTTF resolution during his first term on the
Portland City Council (Leonard, 2008). The action came after several public hearings on
the issue and a two-year dispute with federal agents over supervision, security clearances,
and the handling of the high profile Brandon Mayfield case.
Responding to public concerns about the task force targeting Muslims for their
religious and political views, the city council demanded that the FBI provide the mayor
and police chief with the same security clearances held by the officers on the JTTF. The
FBI refused (Frank, 2005; York, 2010). Since the mayor doubles as the police
commissioner, this reduced local ability to guarantee accountability. Without top-secret
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Resolution No. Substitute 36315 (2005). The resolution permits case-by-case cooperation with the FBI in
counter-terrorism investigations.
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clearance the mayor could not provide appropriate supervision of PPB personnel assigned
to the JTTF (Frank, 2010b). So the officers were removed from the task force. “[I]n this
country there’s an old-fashioned principle that the police or military have to be
answerable to civilian oversight,” Potter reasoned at one of the city council meetings
(Hellegers, 2005, para. 4). He expressed opposition to blind participation in the antiterrorism task force, and concern about potential trespass on the civil liberties of the
city’s Muslim community. Commissioner Randy Leonard agreed. “Here in Portland, we
are not willing to give up individual liberties in order to have a perception of safety,” he
told the press. “It’s important for cities to know how their police officers are being used”
(York, 2010).
Memories of the botched FBI investigation of Brandon Mayfield also heighted
local concerns about civil liberties. The case was invoked several times throughout the
hearings on the JTTF. Brandon, a Portland lawyer and convert to Islam, was wrongfully
arrested for the 2004 train bombing in Madrid Spain because of an erroneous fingerprint
match.257 “Obviously at least one Portland citizen, Brandon Mayfield, has been terrorized
by the terrorism task force that is supposed to protect us against terrorism,” activist Lily
Mandel said in her testimony before the Council (Hellegers, 2005, para.7). Abuse does
happen, Commissioner Leonard wrote in his Op-Ed piece to the Oregonian. “And for this
reason, it’s vitally important to maintain a chain of command that includes the elected
officials accountable to the citizens,” he said. “The buck stops here” (Leonard, 2008,
para. 6). Potter agreed. Before casting his vote on the Portland JTTF resolution, the
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The FBI held Mayfield even after Spanish authorities dismissed any link between him and the
fingerprint. Mayfield settled with the government for $2 million (Hellegers, 2005).
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Mayor emphasized that the City and Portland Police are committed to working with the
FBI on a case by case basis when threats of terrorism arise.258 “We will give you what
you need, but we’ll do it with the supervision and control that is put into the city charter,”
he said (Hellegers, 2005, para. 16).259
Ten years and another mayor later, Portland weighed in on another issue
involving police and civil liberties. In June 2010, the Portland City Council approved a
resolution condemning the immigration law signed by Arizona Governor Jan Brewer,
which critics claim encourages racial profiling. Portland’s measure stopped short of the
boycotts called by other cities. Instead, council members authorized city attorneys to
assist with legal efforts to overturn the Arizona law. The resolution also urges city
lobbyists to promote stronger Oregon laws against racial profiling (Frank, 2010a; Har,
2010).
Mayor Adams, who is openly gay, did not want to boycott Arizona travel or
contracts, because it would hurt cities suing the state of Arizona over the immigration
bill--Tucson and Flagstaff. “We’re taking what we feel is a more productive approach,”
Roy Kaufman, Mayor Sam Adams’ spokesman told the Oregonian, “by fighting the law”
(Frank, 2010a, para. 7).
Local Latino leaders praised the Portland measure. “All this is a message,” said
Gale Castillo, president of the Hispanic Metropolitan Chamber. “It’s a message that
Portland doesn’t like what it sees” (Frank, 2010a, para. 5). But a guest columnist for the
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The resolution does not prohibit cooperation with the FBI on specific counter-terrorism investigations as
long as the City Council reviews agreements to ensure compliance with the protocols established in the
resolution.
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All PPB personnel are accountable to the Police Chief and Commissioner-in-charge.
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Oregonian, who is also on the board of directors of Oregonians for Immigration Reform,
saw it differently. He suggested that local residents who opposed the council’s action
boycott Portland by doing business in the suburbs rather than in Portland. This, he
claimed, would pressure the city’s “reflexively leftist council” to stop supporting illegal
immigration (LaMountain, 2010, para. 9). A boycott did not happen.
Worksite deportation raids
A controversial raid at the Galaxy apartments in 1992 brought the conduct of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service into question. Police and INS agents without
warrants rounded up about 30 men at the complex and deported them, leaving behind
some wives and children. As discussed earlier, police did not file reports, find drugs, or
accuse any of the deported men of criminal charges. The apartment manager asked agents
to see a warrant but was ignored. Police and agents, she said, went into apartments and
dragged men out into the courtyard where they were arrested (McVea, 1992d&e). Critics
questioned whether the INS agents should have carried warrants.
Joseph Shaffer, the INS district director of investigations, said immigration agents
did not need a warrant to arrest illegal aliens on public property. He also said that the
apartment manager gave officials permission to enter the complex McVea, 1992e).
Federal immigration law states that warrantless searches are not permitted on
“commercial cartilages,” or courtyards (McVea, 1992e).
Public response to the raid was fiercely critical. After news reports of the raid,
Oregon’s congressional delegation asked Oregon’s top immigration official, David
Beebe, to explain the agency’s actions (Rede, 1992b). Elected officials wanted to know
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why he used limited INS resources for a non-criminal deportation raid. Congress, they
wrote in their August 20 letter, specifically directed the Portland INS to combat the city’s
heroin problem. They also asked Beebe to respond to reports of alleged civil rights
violations during the operation (Rede, 1992b). Gale Castillo and U.S. Rep. Ron Wyden
also wrote to Beebe on behalf of the Portland Tar Heroin Task Force. Their letter
expressed concerns about the apartment raid damaging working relationships between
law enforcement agencies and the Hispanic community. They also asked Portland’s
district INS chief to explain how the August 4 raid conformed to the agency’s
enforcement priorities, and to address possible breaches in civil rights that day (McVea,
1992d&d; Rede, 1992b).260
David Beebe refused to explain the raid to the task force. But he defended INS
tactics in a letter to U.S. Sen. Mark O. Hatfield and in an interview. He told a reporter for
the Oregonian that the raid did not violate INS policy, despite agency guidelines that
restrict immigration searches to workplaces (McVea, 1992d).261 When questioned on the
matter, Beebe said the handbook was written only as guidance. “It’s not an edict,” he said
(McVea, 1992d, p. D21).262 In his September 26 letter to Hatfield, the INS chief said the
apartments were a hotbed of criminal activity and the raid was aimed at detecting and
deporting criminal aliens. He called the “area control operation” a success, even though
no criminal charges were brought against any of the men deported. “Having reviewed the
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The Tar Heroin Task Force was comprised of law enforcement, business and Hispanic community
representatives.
261
An immigration and Naturalization Service policy handout says “raids should be limited to workplaces,
except in unusual circumstances, and agents should have warrants or the consent of occupants for such
searches at homes (Rede, 1992b).
262
An INS spokesman in Washington, D.C. told an Oregonian reporter that the agency uses the handbook
to explain federal laws to its agents (McVea 1992b).
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relevant facts at my disposal, I also find that our officers acted well within the scope of
our statutory authority,” Beebe wrote (Rede, 1992b, p. E5).263
The Portland Police Bureau did not try to defend itself, but instead the chief
promised policy changes in federal raids. Other city officials stayed out of the matter
until 1993. That is when members of two Hispanic advocacy organizations met with
Mayor Vera Katz to seek her help in ousting the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s Portland district director (Rede, 1993).264 The group was fed-up with David
Beebe. He “refuses to talk to us,” Luis Machorro, a member of the Hispanics in Unity
board of directors, told Katz (Rede, 1993, p. C8). The group wanted the INS to work
independently of the Portland Police Bureau. Federal agents were piggybacking on police
raids even after police issued a limited cooperation directive; no rules prevented it (Rede,
1993; Ortiz, 1994; Bjorjus, 1997). This worried Hispanic activists. Relations between the
community and police sour when “la migra” works side-by-side with police, they told
Katz. Latino leaders also accused Beebe of misusing agency resources by focusing
deportation efforts on people in violation of civil immigration law, instead of on
convicted felons (Rede, 1993; Ortiz, 1994).
Mayor Katz was noncommittal on Beebe’s removal, even though those who met
with her made it clear that the simmering tensions between Oregon’s Hispanic
community and the INS had boiled over (Rede, 1993). Katz did agree to work with the
group on five of the six issues presented in the 90 minute meeting: additional
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According to the INS special agent handbook “area control operations,'' such as the one conducted at the
Galaxy Apartments, are to be limited to workplaces, except in unusual circumstances. Investigations at
places of residence are permitted only with a properly issued search warrant or with the consent of the
occupant (Rede, 1992b).
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Katz, Portland’s third female mayor, served 1993 to 2005.

211

employment and training programs, extra contracting opportunities, more
bilingual/bicultural workers at City Hall, a greater voice in the development of law
enforcement policies and expanded bilingual education in the schools (Rede, 1993).
Unable to get local government to take action against Portland’s INS chief,
workers rights’ groups took their grievances to the people. When a surge in worksite
raids across the state created “a reign of terror” in the late 1990s, a coalition formed to
stop the sweeps (Blackmun, 1997; Pulaski, 1997). Worksite arrest and deportation rates
soared after agents were added to the Portland INS office.265 The district’s detention and
deportation staff grew from 10 to 35 in two years, and its investigation and apprehension
staff, from 20 to 25 (Taylor, 1995; Blackmun, 1997; Pulaski, 1997). Escalated district
efforts, Beebe said, were the result of a congressional mandate powered by a boost in
funding from national headquarters.266 Immigration officials announced plans to double
deportations of immigrants working illegally in Oregon. That worried community
activists who say that the INS has trampled the civil and human rights of those arrested in
raids (Blackmun, 1997; Portland Copwatch, 1998b). Many of the deportation arrests were
caught on film by the Workers Organizing Committee Migra Watch program (Hortsch,
1998).267 According to Copwatch, Portland INS Enforcement Chief Joe Shaffer was one
of the officers catch abusing workers (Portland Copwatch, 1998b). About 100 people
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“From October 1995 to September 1996 officials for the Portland district (which covers all of Oregon)
arrested 2,045 illegal immigrants after workplace and criminal investigations, said Phillip C. Crawford,
deputy district director. INS expects to deport 3,200 this year, he said. Since October 1996, he said officials
have surpassed the workplace arrests and expect the number to rise well past 800—doubling the number
arrested last year—by September” (Blackmun, 1997, p. C1).
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In 1996 Congress passed laws that increased the agency’s budget and enforcement authority.
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The WOC began working with day laborers in 1994 to identify problems and generate solutions (Rede,
1993). Migra Watch was formed as a team from the community who stand on the corner with cameras
(Wallace, 2001).
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picketed the agency’s Portland district office in May 1997 in response. The protest was
organized by Causa ’98.268 The group released a statement complaining about
immigration policies and mistreatment (Blackmun, 1997).
After laying low during months of public criticism and protest, the INS resumed
its raids in February and March of 1998. The raids were prompted by business owners’
complaints about day laborers congregating on street corners. The Workers Organizing
Committee (WOC) and its allies held a press conference and rally at the site of the March
25 raid—the Plaid Pantry parking lot, to publicize what was happening on the “job
corners” in Portland. Teresa Enrico, director of the WOC, and others spoke out about INS
sting operations and thuggish arrest practices during arrests. She said INS agents wearing
civilian clothes, and driving unmarked vehicles, lured workers into a van under the
pretense of employment. Workers, she charged, were punched, chased down, held in
choke holds and handcuffed; some were legally in the United States. Religious leaders
and others condemned the INS violence or talked about the laborers right to work
(Pulaski, 1997; Hortsch, 1998; Jacklet, 2000).269 Portland Copwatch accused the INS of
racial profiling in its April 1998 issue of Peoples Police Report, which read:
In Portland, the INS has almost exclusively targeted dark-skinned, Spanishspeaking people, even though there are large numbers of undocumented ‘aliens’
from Asia and Europe. Clearly, the selective enforcement of immigration laws
belies the fact that the law isn’t what’s being served here (Portland Copwatch,
1998a, para. 6).
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Causa ’98 is coalition of various Hispanic, labor and other groups.
Speakers included: Rev. Lynn Lopez, pastor of Ainsworth United Church of Christ; Raul Velazques,
director of Hispanic Ministries of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Portland; and Joseph Tam, a member
of the Portland Rainbow Coalition (Hortsch, 1998).
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Joe Shaffer, assistant director of the Portland district for the INS, confirmed the
raids, but disagreed on the nature of the tactics (Hortsch, 1998). He also denied
allegations from raid witnesses who claimed agents did not identify themselves as INS
officials when they gave chase to suspected “illegal” immigrants (Snell & Anderson,
1997). Shaffer said that wasn’t what happened. A number of private citizens left their
own cars when the raid began to track down people who ran away from INS agents, he
told reporters. Shaffer swore agents wore jackets identifying themselves (Snell &
Anderson, 1997).
The Workers Organizing Committee, in cooperation with local religious and labor
organizations, held a series of vigils and marches to protest INS undercover sting
operations (Portland Copwatch, 1998c). The group initiated a letter writing campaign to
try to force the INS to respect workers’ rights. They asked their allies to send letters to
the INS. The letters ask agents to stop the raids and join the ongoing community dialogue
between day laborers, the WOC, and neighborhood residents and businesses. This led to a
1998 negotiation between day laborers, their advocates and the director of Portland’s INS
(Portland Copwatch, 1998c).
Beebe agreed to meet with a coalition to discuss the issue. The coalition-comprised of representatives from CAUSA ’98, Oregon Council for Hispanic
Advancement, American Friends of Service Committee, Jobs with Justice, Hispanic
Ministries (part of the Catholic Church), the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and
WOC—met with Beebe and other INS agents on June 18 (Portland Copwatch, 1998a).
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When the INS crew arrived, they were greeted by a group of about 150 immigrant
and workers’ rights supporters standing vigil near the doorway. Inside, coalition leaders
presented a list of demands:
They demanded that District Director Beebe maintain communication with the
coalition. They also demanded that the INS refrain from propagating false and
derogatory myths and stereotypes about immigrants to the public, as they have
often done to justify their attacks (Portland Copwatch, 1998c, para. 6).
Afterwards, Beebe told the still standing crowd outside that he would expect all his
agents to behave in a “professional manner.” He also promised to continue meeting with
the community on a regular basis (Portland Copwatch, 1998c, para. 8). The meeting got
the INS to back off. Raiding on the corner stopped (Jacklet, 2000; Wallace, 2001).
A few years later, the conduct of Portland INS agents ignited another firestorm. In
August of 2000, Mayor Vera Katz joined Mike Thorne, the executive director of the Port
of Portland, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber and Northwest members of Congress, in
calling for David Beebe’s resignation (Flecther, 2000; Read & Sullivan, 2000c).270 A
four-month investigation by the Oregonian found an agency culture imbued with racism
and riddled by questionable conduct (Christensen, 2000; Christensen, Read, Sullivan &
Walth, 2000; Read, 2000). Complaints were piling up about the abusive treatment of
immigrants and foreigner travelers by Portland immigration agents. INS officials at the
Portland International Airport were refusing foreign-travelers entry into the country at
rates far higher than their counterparts at other West Coast airports (Fletcher, 2000).
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On Aug. 30, 2000, two senators called on INS Commissioner Doris M. Meissner to remove the head of
her agency’s Portland office (Fletcher, 2000).
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The final straw was when inspectors strip-searched and jailed a Chinese
businesswoman with a frayed passport, who was later declared innocent (Fletcher,
2000).271 They also deported the German wife of a U.S. citizen back to Europe without
her breast-feeding baby. Mayor Vera Katz, described the incident as ''monstrous''
(Verhovek, 2000; Thomas, 2001).
Portland officials blasted Beebe for damaging Portland’s international reputation.
The highly publicized incidents generated negative press in foreign countries, and earned
the city the nickname “Deportland” (Fletcher, 2000; Burghart & McCall, 2000;
Christensen, Read, Sullivan & Walth, 2000; Read & Sullivan, 2000b&c).272 The problem
had gotten so bad, airport officials told a reporter for the Washington Post that some
Asian travel agents were advising their clients against entering the United States through
Portland (Fletcher, 2000). “For them to fall back on their old Gestapo-type actions is just
unacceptable,” Thorne told Asian Week. “Enough is enough” (Burghart & McCall, 2000,
para. 20). Community members demanded an overhaul of the Portland INS office.
In an August 23 letter to Attorney General Janet Reno, Katz and others accused
INS inspectors of treating foreigners unfairly at local jails and the Portland airport. They
demanded a top-down federal investigation of Beebe’s Portland-based operation
(Burghart & McCall, 2000; Christensen, 2000; Christensen, Read, Sullivan & Walth,
2000; Read & Sullivan, 2000a; Verhovek, 2000). David Beebe retired under pressure
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She was released after spending two nights in jail when forensics experts determined her passport was
not fraudulent (Fletcher, 2000).
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That is what airport officials and others called the INS mistreatment of foreign travelers—particularly
Asians—in Portland.
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after an INS task force report went public. The report found that the Portland district
office suffered from rigid, heavy-handed enforcement of laws and lack of communication
between the INS and the citizens it services (Read & Sullivan, 2000c).
The debate over INS tactics did not end when Beebe left the agency. In 2007,
Mayor Tom Potter blasted ICE after federal agents raided the Fresh Del Monte fruit
packing plant in North Portland. The June 12, 2007 immigration raid was the largest in
recent Oregon history (Denson & Hunsberger, 2007). One hundred sixty federal agents
swooped into the packing plant and arrested169 line workers accused of immigration law
violation. Agents also arrested three staffing managers at American Staffing Resources
for their role in helping employ the alleged undocumented workers (Denson &
Hunsberger, 2007; McCall, 2007).273
The arrests sparked criticism from immigration reform supporters, workers rights
advocates and Tom Potter. Immigrant rights supporters held a protest at the federal
building in downtown Portland the day of the raid, and later at the detention center. Potter
issued a same-day written statement expressing anger that “Portland residents” were
swept up in the arrests, and blaming Bush and Congress (Denson & Hunsberger, 2007) .
The statement read:
I certainly understand why federal officials executed criminal warrants against the
three individuals who stole and sold Social Security numbers. But to go after local
workers who are here to support their families while filling the demands of local
businesses for their labor is bad policy. It also serves as a reminder of the failure
of our national leaders to deliver an immigration policy that is both fair and
humane and acknowledges the economic realities of our country.

273

“The action was part of a six-month criminal investigation into the North-Carolina-based employment
agency, which U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement accuses of conspiring with Fresh Del Monte to
hire and employ undocumented workers” (Denton & Hunsberger, 2007).
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Our nation would be better served if this kind of energy was focused on
creating a comprehensive approach to immigration reform that provides a path to
citizenship; addresses the immigration backlog that keeps families apart; and
provides a safe and legal way for workers to enter our country and be productive
workers and taxpayers. Immigrants provide more than mere labor in our
community. They have long enriched our history, our culture and our city. My
heart goes out to families dealing with the aftermath of this morning (Portland
Office of the Mayor, 2007).
Potter’s office received about 800 emails and phone calls after his statement on
the raid was released (Anderson, 2007). “It’s the most e-mails we’re ever gotten on a
single subject,” Potter’s spokesman, John Doussard, told the Portland Tribune
(Anderson, 2007a). Many came from people outside Oregon, who did not understand
why a former police officer and ex-police chief would condemn instead of support the
raid. Doussard thought most of these calls were fueled by national talk radio (Anderson,
2007a). Other calls came from Oregonians who thought Mayor Tom Potter violated the
oath of his office by not supporting the laws of the land (Anderson, 2007a).
Local newspapers and blogs were also inundated by citizens expressing both
opposition and approval for Potter’s response. “The chairman of the People's Republic of
Portland is again in a snit over rounding up illegal immigrants,” one reader of the
Oregonian wrote in a letter to the editor. “What is it that Potter does not understand about
the English word illegal?” (Furrer, 2007, p. D11).
Even with the criticism, a day later, Potter implied the raid was a political ploy.
He suggested the federal government used warrants against the three managers as an
excuse to conduct deportation sweeps during a tense debate in Washington, D.C. over a
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change to the nation’s immigration laws (Griffin, 2007b).274 “How many people did they
arrest?” he said. “They certainly didn’t have many warrants…It’s just very
disappointing”275 (Griffin, 2007b, p. A10).
The Mayor made it clear that no Portland police officers participated in raid,
although a few did provide traffic control. And the Bureau’s Crisis Response Team was
activated to help the families of the workers detained (McCall, 2007). ICE wouldn’t have
gotten more help even if they’d asked. “We don’t do that kind of thing,” Potter told
reporters (Griffin, 2007b, p. A10).
What the city of Portland did do was donate $20,000 to help people caught in the
raid pay rent. Immigration and Customs Enforcement prohibited those arrested from
working while they awaited deportation. The donation was made through the Bureau of
Housing and Community Development. According to the Oregonian, the money came
from a fund for a housing project that never materialized (Bermudez, 2007c). Catholic
Charities distributed the funds. Commissioner Erik Sten, whose office oversaw the
donation, notified Mayor Potter about the possibility of whole families ending up in the
street if the city did not provide shelter. The contract with Catholic Charities was
approved without public input or City Council approval, although officials did hold a
meeting with concerned community groups (Bermudez, 2007c). According to the

274

The arrests came the same day that President Bush paid a rare visit to Capitol Hill to try to revive
support for immigration overhaul legislation that faltered in Congress week.
275
Worksite raids increased after the ICE agency was formed in 2003, which was a significant departure
from the practice of targeting “illegal” immigrants who have committed other crimes (Read, 2007).
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Oregonian, city officials anticipated that their support might provoke some criticism, but
they believed it was necessary to prevent homelessness. “It just doesn’t make sense to not
have children sheltered,” Sten explained (Bermudez, 2007c, p. C4).
Jim Ludwick, president of Oregonians for Immigration Reform (OFIR),
questioned the city’s donation.276 “Where are the priorities of a government that spends
money on people who are in the country illegally instead of spending it on American
citizens?” (Bermudez, 2007c, p. C4). Ludwick argued that if city officials rush to prevent
homelessness among displaced illegal immigrants, they should also aid the families of
jailed bank robbers and drug users (Bermudez, 2007c).
The grant helped twenty three families. Besides helping pay their rent, the city
asked Catholic Charities to increase the families’ knowledge of immigrant and renters’
rights users (Bermudez, 2007c). At the same time, members of Oregon’s New Sanctuary
Movement moved to support those arrested (Bermudez, 2007b; Haught, 2007b).277
Ludwick told the Portland Tribune that he wasn’t surprised by the group’s efforts. He
called Portland a “sanctuary city,” claiming support from Mayor Tom Potter and other
city commissioners for a day labor center in Northeast Portland proved it. The site,
Ludwick complained, made it easier for illegal immigrants to get paid jobs (Law, 2008).
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OFIR, which was organized in 2000, claims its membership has grown from about “100 originally to
well over 2,000” by 2010 (Har, 2006; OFIR, 2010). However, President Jim Ludwick stepped down in
December 2010 and nothing much has been published on the website since.
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Today, the Oregon New Sanctuary Movement (ONS) is an interfaith coalition of over 20 different
Oregon faith communities—Christians, Jews, and Muslims--called to respond actively and publicly to the
suffering of immigrants residing in the United States (Oregon New Sanctuary Movement , 2011).
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Unregulated day labor-contractor market exchanges
Day labor was another point of contention in Portland. Day laborers, many of
them second generation farmworkers, began showing up in Portland in 1992. Then, as
many as 75 mostly Latino men gathered at several pick up corners or in parking lots
outside nearby stores, weekday mornings waiting to be hired as day laborers (Tongue,
1997; Gonzalez, 1998; Jacklet, 2000; Bermudez, 2006). As the numbers grew to 150-200
in the late 1990s, so did the complaints (Bermudez, 2006).
Business owners grumbled about workers urinating and defecating on sidewalks,
leaving garbage behind, and scaring off customers (Snell & Anderson, 1997). They called
the mayor and police chief. But local officials did nothing to rid the neighborhood of day
laborers (Jacklet, 2000). Other business owners were bothered more by the employers
who picked up the workers (and did not pay for health care benefits or taxes) than by the
workers themselves (Tongue, 1997).
Business owners were not the only group concerned. Laborers and their advocates
started to chime in too. They complained that day laborers were being taken advantage
of: employers were not paying workers for a day’s work, or refusing to pay medical bills
when an employee got hurt. Workers also objected to the racial epithets shouted at them
from passing cars (Griffin, 2008). Police working in the area were aware of these
problems and concerned. “We actually had a problem with people who were robbing the
people seeking jobs there,” Lt. John Drum of the Portland Police Bureau’s Southeast
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Precinct reported (Tongue, 1997, p. D1). Drug dealers using the steady morning traffic of
trucks and sports utility vehicles as a cover for their trade, also troubled police (Tongue,
1997).
Several community groups tried to come up with a permanent solution. In 1996, a
group of police officers, area business owners and community groups gathered to discuss
the issue. Ed Blackburn, the director of an area alcohol and drug detoxification program,
spearheaded the discussions. “We agreed that there was a problem,” Blackburn said in a
press interview. “But it was a labor problem, we decided, not a law enforcement
problem” (Tongue, 1997, p. D1). The group’s discussions lead to the conclusion that the
workers needed a safer place to market their labor and a community organization needed
to create such a place.
The Workers Organizing Committee agreed to try, but ran into difficulties: the
instability of the day labor community (WOC contacts were picked up and deported in
raids, or scared away), and trouble funding a center for workers who do not all have legal
papers. Peter Finley Fry, a land-use planner for the Central Eastside Industrial Council,
faced similar obstacles when he tried to create a center for day laborers (Tongue, 1997).
The Council, a private, nonprofit business association dedicated to the revitalization of
Portland’s central eastside, had asked Fry to move the day laborers off the street corner
and into an indoor center. The crowd of men hanging out on the street was scaring away
potential shoppers and apartment renters (Tongue, 1997). When discussions produced no
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concrete solutions, business owners called the INS to complain. Federal agents responded
with deportation sweeps on “job corners.”278
To open a day labor center, community organizers needed city support. In 1998,
Serena Cruz, an aid to Commissioner Erik Sten, tried to find a solution to the day labor
dilemma. To support her effort, the city and state paid for $20,000 worth of community
mediation sessions (Jacklet, 2000; Decker & Associates, Inc., 2004). The funding came
after Migra Watch volunteers held a press conference to publicize INS human rights
violations (Hortsch, 1998). But the dispute resolution failed to break the stalemate
between contending factions. Business leaders, who were determined to move the
laborers along, refused to support a hiring hall in their neighborhood (Jacklet, 2000).
Workers’ rights advocates objected to establishing a center elsewhere, arguing that doing
so would jeopardize job opportunities for day laborers. The “job corner” is a known
location by workers and employers, they explained. It is strategically located close to
major highways and high traffic streets (Wallace, 2001).
“I haven’t been able to understand why we can’t talk about this and figure it out,”
Cruz (later a county commissioner) said in a Willamette Week interview afterwards
(Jacklet, 2000, para. 4). The reporter interviewing her came to this conclusion on the
matter: “Part of the problem is bad blood. For years, the Worker’s Organizing Committee
fought aggressively for the rights of the day laborers” (Jacklet, 2000, para. 4).
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In Portland, the “job corner”' actually includes several corners at the intersections of East Burnside
Street and Grand Avenue and Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard.
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Confrontations between day laborers, advocates and the INS continued until the
raids ended in 1998. Afterwards, control of the day labor problem shifted to the Portland
Police Bureau. Police started running workers and their potential employers off the street
corners.279 Day laborers and their advocates complained. Eventually a new process of
negotiations began (Portland ON1, 2003b).
In January 1999, police and the workers’ committee drafted a non-harassment
contract. The agreement outlined standards of conduct for day laborers and police, while
also addressing the concerns of area business owners and residents.280 But Chief Charles
Moose refused to sign it (Bernstein, 1999; Wallace, 2001).
After a couple of run-ins with police, discussions between day laborers and the
PPB broke down. In March, the Day Laborers Committee of Portland sent a letter to
Chief Charles Moose demanding action (Bernstein, 1999). The letter, written on Workers
Organizing Committee stationery, was signed by 53 people. In it, the group alleged two
specific incidents of police harassment.281 “What we are asking is that if nothing unusual
is happening, that the officers do not stop to intimidate us,” they wrote (Bernstein, 1999,
p. D2). Day laborers claimed they were not engaged in criminal activity or creating
disturbances while waiting for work (Bernstein, 1999). The letter was also sent to Mayor
Vera Katz and several Latino associations.
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Mainly along Southeast Sixth Avenue and East Burnside.
For example, workers would not gather in front of homes or block driveways or businesses and would
be off the street by noon each day. In turn, the police would increase their presence in particular areas of
concern to discourage illegal activities and would appoint a police officer to serve as a liaison between the
day laborers and the bureau (Bernstein, 1999).
281
March 6, 1999, day laborers claim a police officer told a worker to move off Sixth Avenue or federal
immigration agents would show up. The day before, they say a potential employer was stopped by police
and told he would be arrested if he was seen picking up workers from street corners (Bernstein, 1999).
280
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Assistant Chief Lynnae Berg, speaking on behalf of Moose, said the chief was
offended by the workers’ ultimatum. The bureau wants to reach an agreement that would
protect the laborers’ rights to look for work while also guaranteeing public safety, she
told reporters. But Moose will not sign any agreement with an organizing group, only
with individual laborers (Bernstein, 1999). The idea did not seem feasible to workers.
Overtime, disagreements within WOC caused the group to spilt-up. A splinter
group, VOZ (Voice) Workers’ Rights Educational Project emerged.282 They sought to
win over the same business community that WOC alienated (Jacklet, 2000). In 2003, the
city of Portland awarded City Repair and VOZ a $5,000 grant.283 The funding came from
the Project Interwoven Tapestry, which was part of the Building the New American
Community Project (Portland ONI, 2003a).284 The group built a “Plaza Latina” in the
neighborhood where day laborers congregated to look for work.285 They also created
events to bring together residents, SE neighborhood businesses, and day laborers who
often wait there for work (Portland ONI, 2003a).
Meanwhile, the relationship between business leaders and workers’ rights
advocates grew more strained. The two groups had regularly attended Monthly
Community Policing Action Committee meetings in an effort to foster positive
relationships (Davis & Ruiz, 2007). But as the number of day laborers in the area
increased so did the complaints. “The business people have been angry with day laborers,
282

VOZ was established in 2000 to secure and protect immigrant workers’ rights through education,
leadership development and community organizing.
283
The grant came through the Southeast Uplift Neighborhood Coalition (SEUL) because neither group had
nonprofit status.
284
The Building the New American Community Project was an effort to foster successful refugee and
mainstream community integration by developing leaders, coalition building, and encouraging participation
in the political process.
285
Plaza Latina is located at SE 8th and Ankeny.
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saying it’s time to move on from the corner. And now they’re trying to use police to get
rid of day laborers,” VOZ director Romeno Sosa told the Portland Mercury (Davis &
Ruiz, 2007, para.7). The two sides disagreed on the laborers’ right to wait for work on the
sidewalk. Business owners, wary of waiting for a hiring center to open, wanted police to
move the workers somewhere else since they do not have a permit to congregate on the
sidewalk. Sosa said there was no law prohibiting it. City Attorney Woboril weighed in:
“There is no law against a number of people congregating on a sidewalk as long as they
don’t block traffic.” (Davis & Ruiz, 2007, para. 14).
When the issue of an anti-solicitation ordinance came up again, Kevin Easton,
Potter’s business and arts policy manager and point-person on the day labor issue, said
city officials do not foresee adopting one. Easton was quoted in the Portland Tribune
saying:
[It’s seen as a] police answer to a more complicated question. The mayor believes
you can’t police your way out of the situation. There’s too many economic forces
that pull it back and don’t address need of the community, as well as (concerns of)
business and traffic congestion (Anderson, 2007c, para. 32).
As pressure mounted to relocate the day laborers, Mayor Tom Potter took a
greater role in the creation of the day labor center, which he first talked about during his
2004 campaign (Griffin, 2008). At his urging, the City Council gave VOZ another $5,000
on March 8, 2006. The grant, part of the Community Grants Program, was one of the
components of the overall Engagement Plan for the visionPDX project.286 VOZ used the
funds to identify a new vision for the ways in which day laborers wait for work in urban
Portland. Focus groups, questionnaires, and a cultural event to were used to reach out to
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VisionPDX, launched in 2005 by Mayor Tom Potter, was an extensive public engagement process to
develop a shared vision for the Portland community for the next 20 years and beyond (VisionPDX, 2013).
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400 people--day laborers, local officials, businesses and nonprofits at the corners where
day laborers find work, as well as members of VOZ and partners of day laborers
(VisonPDX, 2007).
That same year $200,000 was set aside in the city’s 2006-2007 budget for a day
labor center (Maushard, 2007; Pein, 2008a).287 Still, it took a while for the day labor
relocation project to get off the ground. Securing a good location took nearly a year. The
advisory committee appointed by Mayor’s Potter’s office had to decide where to locate
the center. Seven sites were proposed, all on the inner east side. Then Potter’s staff had to
negotiate with landowners (Anderson, 2008a). In the meantime, the city hired a project
leader to get things moving--run meetings, collect input from all sides, and help
determine day labor center programming and logistics.288 Local officials also convened a
series of hearings at City Hall to solicit public comment on the proposed site—a vacant
city-owned lot near the day laborers existing pick-up area in the eastside business district
(Maushard, 2007). “As far as the legality of immigration, that’s a national problem,” Bob
Wentworth, a member of the First Steps Committee said. “We’re dealing with a local
problem—a large group of men gathering on a corner.” (Anderson, 2007d, para. 13).
Wentworth was a Central Eastside Industrial District (CEIC) board member and leading
figure calling for the relocation of the day laborers. The committee formed by Potter’s
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City officials first tried to lump the center in with initiatives for the homeless--the mayor’s Street Access
for Everyone (SAFE) public safety initiative, until advocates convinced city officials that the two groups’
needs were different (Davis & Ruiz, 2007;Anderson, 2008e; Eyck, 2008).
288
A portion ($20,000) of the $200,000 day labor center financing went to the hire the project director.
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staff held meetings above the Wentworth Chevrolet showroom. The committee had
several big issues to address: where to locate the center and who should foot the bill
(Griffin, 2007a; Maushard, 2007).
“It’s amazing that we have somebody elected, in office, who forms a committee
to talk about how to evade the law,” Jim Ludwick, president of Oregonians for
Immigration Reform, said in an Oregonian interview (Griffin, 2007b, p. C1). “Even if
this thing were privately funded, you’re basically aiding and abetting illegal activity
loudly as possible” (Griffin, 2007b, p. C1). After learning about the funding for the
center, the conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch faxed a warning letter to Potter.
According to the Portland Tribune, the letter advised the mayor of the group’s “serious
legal concerns” about using taxpayer money to fund a center for illegal day laborers,
which they contend violates federal law (Anderson, 2007d, para. 7). In an earlier press
interview, Chris Farrell, director of research for Judicial Watch, accused the city of
Portland of “subsiding criminal activity,” and threatened to sue (Anderson, 2007c, para.
7).
Despite the threat of legal action, Potter and his committee continued to work on
the project. The mayor has been criticized constantly for supporting day laborers, Kevin
Easton told the Portland Tribune, adding:
But it doesn’t affect the mayor’s opinion on this, one way or another. They’re
residents of this city. The most vulnerable residents of the city deserve things as
well. The community this impacts deserves it all well. It’s not just an investment
in the job-seekers on the site. It’s an investment in the community and in Portland
(Anderson, 2007b, para. 4).

228

In 2008, at Potter’s urging, the Portland City Council unanimously approved the
day labor center project and appropriated the money for it.289 The Mayor, like several of
the other commissioners, said the ordinance was about “basic human dignity” (VOZ,
2008). The council took testimony at City Hall beforehand. More than 30 people testified
on the grant, most of them in support. The critics argued that the center would attract
more illegal immigrants. Some nearby business owners complained about not getting
adequate notice of the proposed site. The conservative watchdog group, Judicial Watch,
threatened the mayor’s office with a lawsuit again (Green, 2008; Pein, 2008b).
The $200,000 grant provided operating funds for the nonprofit VOZ Workers
Rights Education Project--the group awarded the contract to manage the day labor site.290
VOZ was the only group that responded to the city’s request-for-proposals (Anderson,
2007d). A staffer in Mayor Tom Potter’s office, Kevin Easton, was selected to oversee
the day labor development project (Green, 2008; Griffin, 2008b; Mayer, 2008).291 Day
laborers would decide how the center should be run (Anderson, 2007d).
Project director, Romeo Sosa, planned to open the center on May 6. But land use
issues put site preparations behind schedule. According to the Willamette Week, an April
30 memo from the Bureau of Development Services stated that plans for the center were
“unable to meet zoning-related standards” (Pein, 2008b, para. 4).292 The City Council
voted to waive building requirements for the planned center. The council also waived a
city design-review process that usually takes two or three months, and rarely favors
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The money was “rolled over” from the 2006-2007 budget cycle.
City Council members expect the center to support itself after the first two years (Griffin, 2008b).
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Carmen Rubio took over the project after Potter staffer Kevin Easton left the city to join a nonprofit.
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Those standards require building walls at least 15 feet high, with windows and a door facing the street,
pedestrian walkways and a storm water filtration system (Pein, 2008b).
290
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trailers. The purchase of a tent and a trailer was also delayed; the first check from the city
arrived late (Pein, 2008b). Commissioner Randy Leonard, who oversaw the Bureau of
Development Services, sponsored the April 30 ordinance. To get the hire site open on
time, the Bureau waived hundreds of dollars in permit fees for VOZ, noted the Willamette
Week (Pein, 2008b). VOZ pays the Portland Development Commission $1 a year to lease
the property.293 The previous tenant, Wentworth Chevrolet, paid $300 a month (Pein,
2008b).
The city held meetings in January and March of 2008 to try to get neighbors to
hammer out a good-neighborhood-agreement before the center’s revised June opening
date. The “effective engagement solutions” coordinator for the Office of Neighborhood
Involvement told the Portland Tribune that she was disappointed with the low turnout.
Mediators spent the next three weeks knocking on doors and posting flyers to try to get
neighbors engaged in the process (Anderson, 2008a). The Central Eastside Industrial
Council and other stakeholders in within a two block radius of the new center, signed off
on a good-neighborhood-agreement before it opened (Anderson, 2008d). The nonbinding
agreement states that VOZ will use outreach and education efforts to address concerns
that may arise, like crime and nuisance in the area or day laborers who solicit work offsite (Anderson, 2008d).
After years of negotiations with the city and local businesses, on June 13, 2008
VOZ held a ceremony commemorating the opening of the new day labor center. Latino
activists, workers and Portland City Council members, including Mayor Tom Potter,
were present for the ribbon cutting ceremony (Sosa, 2008). During the party Potter made
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The property is on the corner of Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. and Northeast Everett Street.
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this statement: “[The day labor center] represents the values of Portland. We believe
people who want to work should be allowed to do that” (Griffin, 2008b, para. 6).
Mayor Potter told the Oregonian that the idea behind the center is to provide a
safe, warm place where the often-exploited, low-wage workers can connect with
employers in a humane, dignified atmosphere. He explained his rational this way:
All you have to do is drive down MLK early in the morning and look at people
out in the cold, in the rain, in the snow, looking for work. They are not
committing crimes. They are looking for work. That's a basic right of anyone in
our community (Mayer, 2008, p. B1).
A few days later (on June 16) Portland’s makeshift day labor center officially
opened (Griffin, 2008c). It consists of a parking lot and a mobile trailer (containing
offices for a site director and a dispatcher), two port-a-potties, a 30-foot tent (to shelter
workers), and bike racks. The center has a site manager and an organized job distribution
system. It is open Monday through Saturday from 6 a.m. to noon. There are strict rules
against drinking, drug use and drug dealing. Workers sign up when they arrive. Their
names are entered into a raffle to determine the order for available work. Contractors
must agree to pay at least $10 an hour. The aim is two-fold: offer laborers a safe place to
wait for work and clear people for looking for work off the sidewalks in front of
businesses. People who come to the site are not required to show identification or proof
of citizenship in order to work (Heye, 2008; “Day Labor Site Open,” 2008). This policy
does not sit well with everyone.
On opening day, one man sat in protest in the driveway leading to the citysubsidized site. He held up a sign that simply said “no.” Officers gave the man a warning
for blocking the entrance to the new day labor center. He left but returned the next day to
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wait for police to arrest him, and that is what happened. Police charged Tom Wenning
with criminal trespassing (Anderson, 2008c; “Lone Protestor Arrested,” 2008).
According to KATU-TV, a judge convicted Wenning of disorderly conduct and ordered
him to pay a $500 fine in August. He filed a civil lawsuit against Mayor Tom Potter and
three other council members for using public funds to support illegal activity (“Day
Labor Center Protestor,” 2008).
Oregonians for Immigration Reform, and members of the Oregon chapter of the
national Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, picketed near the old informal day labor site in
October 2006.294 The sign-toting, flag waiving protestors carried video cameras and
recorded license plates of vehicles that stopped. The four-hour protest was marked by
occasional shouting matches but no violence (Green, 2006; Maushard, 2007). The group
vowed to continue confronting people who try to hire day laborers at the Burnside “job
corner.” But neither group showed up to protest the new taxpayer-funded workers’
center. The center did draw opposition in the blogosphere, including calls for police
action and immigration raids (Anderson, 2008f).
On the day the center opened for business, Mayor Potter tried to set critics
straight. “Street corner hiring is not a police issue, it’s a community issue,” Potter said in
press release. “A day laborer hire site represents a practical, safe solution to keeping our
neighborhoods livable and our businesses strong” (Anderson, 2008b, para. 18). A
reporter for the Portland Tribune summed up Tom Potter’s position this way: The day
labor initiative addresses a livability issue. The illegal immigration debate is a matter for
Congress to sort out (Anderson 2008b).
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The informal solicitation site was on the corner of Southeast Sixth Avenue and Burnside Street.

232

Despite the controversy, two months later (August 2008), the Portland City
Council awarded VOZ a $10,000 “Vision into Action” grant to help the group fight the
anti-immigration backlash. The funding for the grant came from the city’s Bureau of
Planning for an initiative called “Building Bridges” (Anderson, 2008f).295 VOZ used the
grant to conduct outreach to the community through neighborhood cleanups and cultural
events (Anderson, 2008f). VOZ leaders hoped the initiative would also help with the
street corner dilemma.
About a month after the new day labor center opened, some workers gravitated
back to their old street corners, just blocks away. VOZ operators complained about
getting far more job seekers than employers at the center (Heye, 2008). Since there was
not enough work for everyone waiting, some day laborers tried to improve their chances
by returning to unregulated roadside job hunting.
Before the new center opened employers expressed skepticism about the idea
working. Some thought city involvement might cause them to pay laborers higher wages.
Others feared anti-immigrant groups or federal investigators might target the job center
and anyone seen pulling up there (Griffin, 2007c). When asked for his view on the
matter, Southeast Precinct Lt. Bob Heimbach told the Portland Tribune that employers
might be staying away from the hire site out of desire to remain anonymous (Anderson,
2008d). At the center, employers are asked to give their name and contact information,
but it is not mandatory. Employers must also agree to pay workers a minimum of $10 per
hour, instead of setting their own rate.
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The grants supported some of the goals developed during the Community Vision Project that Potter
championed during his first term in office.
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Critics claimed the center was not working because it failed to keep workers off
their old street corners and failed to attract enough employers to the hire site. Members of
the good-neighbor group pressured VOZ to rein in day laborers who were soliciting work
off-site (Anderson, 2008d). VOZ leaders agreed to try to promote the site better, but said
they could not force workers to come there. Police Lt. Heimbach told the Portland
Tribune that there are no laws restricting roadside job hunting--the city’s sit-lie ordinance
only applies to downtown, and there is no loitering statue on the books. And going after
people solely for their immigration status, he noted, is against Oregon law (Anderson,
2008d). The PPB relies on community policing instead. Officers regularly drive by the
work site to chat with the workers on the street corners (Anderson, 2008d). According to
Carmen Rubio, Mayor Potter’s community affairs director, Southeast Precinct
Commander Derrick Foxworth instructs officers to refer laborers to the new hire site. But
still, Heimbach noted, “You can’t force people to go places. We are very limited at what
we can do from a law-enforcement perspective” (Anderson, 2008d, para. 26).
To solve the problem, VOZ asked the National Day Labor Organizing Network
for help. The group got contractors to agree to consistent wages and basic labor laws
(Eyck, 2008). In 2009, the VOZ center also switched from a lottery system to a firstcome, first-serve job distribution method. More employers started to use the site, as did
workers (McFadden, 2009).
As Mayor Tom Potter’s term of office came to an end, some worried that
Portland’s day labor center might not survive after his tenure. Without a vocal proimmigrant figure like Potter, there was no guarantee that Portland’s next council will be
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as supportive of the site (Pein, 2008a). Commissioner Sam Adams, the front-runner in the
race to replace Potter, was absent when the council voted in favor of the site in March.
He said in a radio interview, that he was sick but would have voted aye (Pein, 2008a).296
Adams was Potter’s successor.
The center is still going, even though the Portland City Council did not any give
money to the labor site after its first $200,000 investment (Griffin, 2008c). VOZ did not
request any funding; the organization operated on donations and fundraisers (Anderson,
2011). In September 2010, VOZ tapped into Portland's wildly popular food cart scene.
The group opened, Tacos El Jornalero, a taco truck on the day labor site (Bingham,
2010b). All its cooks are day laborers. They volunteer for two morning shifts during the
busiest hours from 7 to 9 a.m. Their efforts put them at the top of the list when someone
stops the next morning looking for a worker (Bingham, 2010b). The Archdiocese of
Portland gave the cart operation a $5,000 anti-poverty grant as part of the Catholic
Campaign for Human Development program (Bingham, 2010a).
Asylum and amnesty for unauthorized foreign in-migrants
Unlike Sacramento, Portland did not weigh-in on the criminalization of Central
American asylum-seekers. Local officials were, however, moved to act on the issue of
amnesty and a controversial piece of legislation known as H.R. 4437. As 8,000 people
took to the streets of Portland to protest Congressional efforts to enact that bill, Mayor
Tom Potter lobbied to prevent the law from passing.
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Adams, who took heat from some Latino leaders for resisting their preference for renaming North
Interstate Avenue after Chávez, has shown more caution around immigration issues than Potter (Pein,
2008a).
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He sent a letter to Oregon’s Congressional delegate urging them to oppose
Senator Sensenbrenner’s H.R. 4437. A bill he said, would “criminalize millions of hard
working, tax-paying undocumented immigrants, and drive them further underground”
(Potter, 2006, para. 1).297 The April 10, 2006 letter, which Potter posted on his website,
he also encouraged Oregon representatives to support the Senate Judiciary Committee
Bill (which creates an earned path to citizenship for undocumented workers), and the
DREAM Act amendment to that bill.
In his last year in office, Tom Potter became the first and only mayor in the
United States to sign a proclamation declaring July 17 as International Justice Day two
years in a row (AIUSA, 2008). Potter urged all Portland residents to observe the date and
participate in activities to advance justice, and peace and security. Echoing Martin Luther
King’s statement, which is engraved in concrete on the Federal Justice Center building
across the street from the Mayor’s office, Potter said: ‘If we don’t have equity and justice
for everyone, we don’t have it for anyone.’ (AIUSA, 2008).
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236

CHAPTER 6
Comparison and Theory Evaluation
This chapter starts with a description of the similarities and differences among the
unauthorized immigration policies of three U.S. cities: Sacramento, California; Denver,
Colorado; and Portland, Oregon, as summarized in Table 3. It then goes on to explore the
theoretical expectations presented in the study to see if correlations emerge in the data.
The chapter concludes with a section on lessons learned.
Intercity Policy Similarities and Differences
In the cities studied, the “illegal” status of immigrants did not create barriers to
community membership or equitable access to key services. Local governments in
Sacramento, Denver and Portland were “responsive” to the needs and preferences of
unauthorized immigrants; city officials proactively initiated policy with positive
outcomes for this vulnerable population group. They took steps to guarantee residents
without legal status membership in the city’s polity, and with that, the civil rights and
liberties associated with citizenship, including deportation relief. This political
commitment is grounded in principles expressed by one of the slogans of the Immigrant
Workers’ Freedom Ride: “No human is illegal.”
These “human rights cities” differ largely in their policy priorities, approach, and
timing. On the first difference, timing, each municipality entered the immigration policy
arena at different points in time. Sacramento adopted its first local citizenship policy in
1985, followed by Portland in 1992, and Denver in 1998. Policymakers in Portland acted
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to safeguard their own interests, more than the interests of foreign in-migrants, with
respect to policies produced prior to 2005. Earlier policies benefited foreign-born
residents, but the primary intent was to protect the city from lawsuits involving police.
Another difference relates to policy priorities. Issues related to citizenship
(asylum and amnesty) were most important in Sacramento, but were given little or no
attention in the other two cities. Unregulated migrant day labor, on the other hand, was
barely discussed in Sacramento, while dangers related to day labor-contractor market
exchanges were considered a big problem in Denver and Portland. Concern about the
social welfare of noncitizens was not apparent in Portland. The city generated no policies
on the matter, though it was a major policy issue in the other two cities. Worksite
deportation raids appeared on Portland’s the policy agenda. It was a nonissue in
Sacramento and Denver. Debates about police involvement in civil immigration law
enforcement were prominent in all three cities, but most contentious in Denver. Denver
was the only city with policy on identification cards for foreign nationals.
Municipal policy approach was also an area of variance. Most of the immigration
strategies initiated in Sacramento were unbinding resolutions, while the other two cities
opted for methods offering more legal protection--executive orders and ordinances. Also,
policymaking in Denver and Portland was piecemeal, while the California city took a
blanket approach. Degree of transparency is one more field of dissimilarity. Sacramento
openly embraced its so-called “sanctuary city” label, whereas Denver repeatedly denied
it. The issue of sanctuary protections for unauthorized immigrants did not get a lot of
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attention in Portland, likely due to the relative absence of organized anti-illegal
immigrant groups.
Why have each of these cities pursued a sanctuary-oriented policy direction?
What accounts for the nuances in their actions on unauthorized immigration? I will
attempt to answer those questions next.
Exploring Theoretical Expectations
This section sets forth and tests my policy model in all three cities. My approach
is consistent with what Karl Hempel (1965) might call a “deductive-nomological”
explanation. In offering this explanation, I examine how three cities match up to my
theory-derived variables and deduce some key observations. My theoretical framework
posits the following propositions.
Proposition 1: Municipal immigration politics and policy choice are shaped by a
city’s ethnoracial composition and configuration, which can which can be broadly
delineated into three types according to degree and level of racial and ethnic diversity:
homogeneous, heterogeneous, and bifurcated.298 Since policymaking occurs within the
broader system of racial and ethnic stratification, local governments can be expected to
initiate immigration strategies that reflect and reinforce their city’s racial and ethnic
structure. City governments in homogeneous locations will, under threatening conditions,
adopt policies that protect Anglo interests over those of nonHispanic white immigrants. If
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Homogeneous jurisdictions are comprised of a dominate Anglo group—which includes all non-Hispanic
English-speaking whites, regardless of their religion or ethnicity-- and a very small (less than 40 percent)
minority population. Heterogeneous municipalities are characterized by the presence of multiple, more or
less equally-sized racial/ethnic groups. Bifurcated cities have a relatively equal-sized Anglo and minority
population, but, unlike multiethnic localities, one minority group is significantly larger than the others
(Toussaint, 2013).
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the dominant group does not feel threatened by these newcomers the probability of a
nativist reaction in reduced. Public officials in heterogeneous jurisdictions can be
expected to take legislative steps to protect the rights and interests of minority
immigrants—legal and unauthorized, if the situation warrants it. In a bifurcated
environment, policy decisions will be determined by the ethnic/racial group with the most
influence. Given that racial and ethnic populations are not equally distributed across the
United States, and dominant-minority stratification arrangements vary as well, these
different diversity patterns (heterogeneous, homogeneous, and bifurcated) account for
city-to-city variation in policy outputs.
Findings: In light of my sample size, and the fact that there is no variance in the
general outcome (all three cities were “responsive” to unauthorized immigrants), I would
not even hazard a guess about the implications that social diversity might have on policy
choice.
Where my sample has variation in outcome (policy approach) this factor correlated.
Intercity differences in ethnoracial structure accounted for differences in the policy
approach of the three case study cities. Unlike Denver and Portland, most of the
sanctuary policy produced in Sacramento carried no legal weight; non-binding
resolutions were most common. Elected officials used these moral statements to publicly
express their constituents’ disapproval of legislation that they had no vote on, rather than
to regulate the behavior of city residents. Formal laws are not necessary when those with
the power to get things done—elected officials, police, and social workers—can readily
identify with and understand the interests of unauthorized minority immigrants.
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Sacramento’s open embrace of its “sanctuary city” status is also related to its
multicultural context. In spite of challenges from immigration foes, there was no need to
deny it. Most everyone thought it was the right thing to do; there was little chance of
polarizing the community. This collective consensus allowed city officials to take a more
holistic policy approach than was possible in the other two cities. The city’s sanctuary
plan integrated protection for immigrants into municipal operating practices in one
swoop. It provided a conceptual framework which could be applied whenever a new
threat to the city’s unauthorized population occurred, which reduced the need to adopt
new polices. That would be improbably in a less diverse community.
In a city with little racial or ethnic diversity, like Portland, piecemeal policy is a
wise approach. It reduces the likelihood that the dominant Anglo group will feel
threatened by measures intended to protect minority immigrants; if the nonHispanic
white group does not feel threatened, then the probability of a nativist reaction is reduced.
And since minorities are not well-represented in politics or public institutions, there is a
greater need for formal policy with legal sanctions in Portland. Relatively little diversity
also contributes to Portland’s lack of defensiveness about its “sanctuary city” label. There
are too few minorities in the Portland to alter the city’s social or political hierarchy—that
and the fact there are no well-organized anti-illegal immigrant groups to speak of in
Portland.
In bifurcated Denver, the potential for competitive politics explains the city’s
secretive, piecemeal approach and strong preference for executive orders and ordinances
(enacted without public testimony).
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In conclusion, differences in the ethnoracial structure of cities (homogeneous,
bifurcated, and heterogeneous) accounted for variations in the policy approaches of local
government. A larger study with more variable outcomes could help determine which of
Hero’s patterns merit further investigation.
Proposition 2: A local government’s capacity to act on policy preferences is
dependent upon its ability to form an urban regime with immigration purposes.299 If local
leaders can build an urban regime to co-produce immigration policy capacity, then that
city will have the social production power to take on major immigration initiatives.
Without such a governing arrangement, little or no immigration policy will be produced
locally. Since regime development does not occur at the same time across the country
(due to variations in urban contexts), difference in regime development patterns—present
or not present—explain variation in municipal immigration policy outputs (some or
none), and the point in time when immigration policymaking begins.
Findings: Local governments in Portland, Denver and Sacramento adopted
immigration policies. Yet, I find no evidence of direct business participation in the
relevant coalitions of the three case cities,300 which Stone (1989) argues must be included
to qualify as an urban governing regime. But my data may not be well suited to that
factor. It misses important indirect channels of business influence that are present when
policy initiatives do not constitute a major challenge to business interests. This was the
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The formal structure and rules of city government often makes it difficult for local officials to act.
In Portland, businesses directly affected by day labor congregation in their parking lots joined a
coalition to build a formal work site. But their involvement was short-term and limited to this single issue,
which does not fit the definition of an urban regime partnership.
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case in the cities that I studied. Undocumented-friendly policy did not threaten business
interests.
Data suggests, on the issue of immigration, business interests stepped back
allowing progressive regimes to more directly dominant the city’s policy agenda. In each
of the three case cities, a regime devoted to expanding opportunities for unauthorized
immigrants emerged with support from local social movement organizations301 and
national lobby groups.302 An innovative mayor facilitated coalition formation. These
progressive coalitions have remained stable for many years and across a number of
administrations: thirty years and five mayors in Sacramento,303 twenty-two years and four
mayors in Denver,304 and eight years and two mayors in Portland.305
More qualitative research could help identify areas of indirect business
involvement in local immigration policymaking, such as: helping struggling economies
adapt to the neoliberal environment by providing employment opportunities for
unauthorized immigrants (Fluery-Steiner & Longazel, 2010); offering grants to local
organizations that provide services for this oft exploited workforce; or hiring third parties
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Social movement organizations are “associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims
about how personal or group life ought to be organization that, at the time of their claimsmaking, are
marginal to or excluded from…the dominant construction of what is realistic, reasonable, and moral”
(Lofland, 1996, pp. 2-3).
302
SMOs generally have the institutional resources—professional leadership, financing, an office and
phone, publication, a list of members, and other accruement—needed to mobilize action for social change
(Lofland, 1996, 12).
303
List of Sacramento mayors: Anne Rudin (1983-1992); Joe Serna, J. (1993-1999); Jimmie Yee (19992000); Heather Fargo (2000-2008); and Kevin Johnson (2008-present). Before becoming mayor, Joe Serna
Jr. served 11 years on the Sacramento City Council.
304
List of Denver mayors: Wellington Webb (1991-2003); John Hickenlooper (2003-2011); Guillermo
“Bill” Vidal (2011); and Michael Hancock (2011-present). Mayor Federico Peña (1983-1991) is not
included in the list, because no major immigration initiatives were pursued during his tenure, although he
likely paved the way for future political leader.
305
List of Portland mayors: Tom Potter (2005-2008); and Sam Adams (2009-2012). Mayor Charlie Hales is
not included in the list, because he was not elected until January 1, 2013.
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to sway public policy through corporate-funded research, campaign contributions and
constituent lobbying. Additional studies would also help us better understand the origins,
organization, dynamics and effects of progressive regimes with immigration purposes.
Proposition 3: Municipal policy on unauthorized immigration is shaped by local
political ideology. There are two main political orientations in the United States—liberal
(typically associated with the Democratic Party) and conservative (characteristic of the
Republican Party). Liberals believe unauthorized immigrants should have the same rights
as United States citizens. They expect government to protect the civil liberties and human
rights of all people, regardless of nationality or citizenship. Conservatives oppose
“sanctuary policies” for unauthorized immigrants. They believe those who break the law
by entering the U.S. illegally do not have the same rights as citizens, or immigrants who
obey the law by entering legally (“Conservative vs. Liberal,” 2010). Accordingly, local
governments in cities with a liberal political culture are more likely to pursue urban
citizenship policies306 than city officials in places with a more politically conservative
outlook, if committed leadership from a policy entrepreneur exits. Without such a change
agent, liberal ideals are less likely to be translated into action. Since local political culture
and political leadership varies across cities within the same country, these different
political patterns explain intercity similarities and differences in strategic policy
direction.

These measures guarantee unauthorized immigrants formal membership in a city’s polity, and with that,
the civil rights and liberties associated with citizenship (Varsanyi, 2006), including freedom from
deportation.
306
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Findings: Analysis of policy on unauthorized immigration in the three case study
cities supports notions about local political culture shaping policy decisions governing
the rights of foreign nationals without legal status.
Portland, Denver and Sacramento are left-leaning “blue cities,” meaning the
majority of municipal residents vote for candidates from the Democratic Party in a
general election.307 Consequently, Democrats control city government and uphold liberal
principles, including the idea that no human is illegal. Local governments in all three
cities took legislative steps to promote and protect the civil rights and liberties of
unauthorized city residents; a policy preference guided by human rights norms.308
Another critical factor that the three cities share in common is the skilled and
committed leadership of a local policy entrepreneur. A policy entrepreneur is an
individual—in or out of formal government—who exploits an opportunity in order to
introduce innovative policy and influence its adoption without regard for the absence of
resources required to take on such activity (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, pp. 652-654;
Cohen, 2012, p. 10); like other entrepreneurs, they act in conditions of risk and
uncertainty (Hart, Stevenson & Dial, 1995, p. 53).
The capacity to take action on unauthorized immigration in all three case cities
can be traced to the emergence of a local policy innovator with a human rights agenda:
Mayor Tom Potter (Portland), Mayor Wellington Webb (Denver), and
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I applied the concept of “red states” and “blue states” to cities. According to Wikipedia, red states and
blue states refer to those U.S. states whose residents predominantly vote for the Republican Party (red) or
Democratic Party (blue) presidential candidates. The terms were coined by journalist Tim Russert during
his televised coverage of the 2000 presidential elections. Since then, usage of the term has been expanded
to differentiate between states being perceived as liberal and those viewed as conservative.
308
Human rights are commonly understood as "inalienable fundamental rights to which a person is
inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being" (Sepúlveda et al, 2004). Human rights are
universal (applicable everywhere) and egalitarian (the same for everyone).
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Councilman/Mayor Joe Serna Jr. (Sacramento).309 Legal protections for unauthorized
immigrants were not considered or adopted until these men were elected.310 It was these
policy innovators who translated liberal human rights principles into action. They took up
the immigrants’ rights cause and made it part of the local political agenda before other
city officials were fully onboard. These mayors also carried out the entrepreneurial tasks
of identifying a “window of opportunity” (Kingdon, 1997) for introducing the idea of
municipal policy on unauthorized immigration; developing a rationale for local
intervention in international immigration affairs; formulating a context-specific policy
design and implementation plan; attracting broad base political support; building
momentum for policy adoption; and using their power of translation to persuade decisionmakers to take legislative action.

309

The timing of this innovator’s appearance coincided with increases in the number of minorities living
within each city, and the subsequent need to protect unauthorized minority immigrants from federal
policies harmful to this vulnerable population group.
310
Early immigration policy produced in Portland, Oregon was adopted in response to lawsuits. Local
government acted to protect the city from liability, not to protect vulnerable foreign in-migrants.
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Lessons Learned
A number of lessons can be drawn from the cases studied. Here are some of the factors
that promote successful adoption of policy to protect unauthorized immigrants:
1. The presence of a risk-taking leader devoted to social justice. Inclusive policy is
most likely to succeed where a policy entrepreneur is present. In the three cities
studied, capacity to take action on unauthorized immigration can be traced to the
emergence of a local policy entrepreneur. In each case, these political innovators
lead by example. They took a potentially risky policy stand on unauthorized
immigration before other city officials were fully on-board. Laying their political
careers on the line for the immigrant rights cause helped mobilize institutional
insiders and attract coalition partners.
2. Broad-based coalition building. To build capacity to take on major immigration
initiatives, city officials must commit to building a complex web of unlikely
alliances across multiple racial lines and social movement organizational sectors.
In the cities that I studied, mayors sought this kind of support.
3. Human rights claim making. To gain broad-base support, focus on human rights
issues rather than narrow political interests like immigrants’ rights. The mission
of many ethnic networks and SMOs fit under the human rights umbrella. Mayors
in Sacramento, Denver and Portland used humanitarian arguments to define
injustices against unauthorized immigrants, build community consensus that this
was a problem, and lay out a plan for ameliorative action. Los Angeles Times
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political columnist George Skelton (1999) noted how Sacramento Mayor Joe
Serna Jr. exemplified this approach.
Serna showed that you can make it politically without pandering to ethnic
constituencies, without playing to your ‘community.’ His only community
really was the 400,000 citizens of Sacramento, as Pollyannaish as that may
seem to critics…And that was Sacramento’s sense of him—that and a
sense of his exercising fairness, rather than favoritism (paras. 7, 9).
4. Place-specific policy approach. Inclusive policy outputs are more likely when the
policy approach matches the social context. In a city with little diversity, or where
the potential for competitive politics is high (as in a racially bifurcated setting), a
piecemeal policy approach is wise. It reduces the likelihood that the dominant
Anglo group will feel threatened by measures to protect minority immigrants.
There is also a greater need for strong legal sanctions in racially homogeneous or
bifurcated cities than in multiethnic places, where the need to regulate racially
biased behavior is less.
5. Incorporate newcomers into the local political system. Initiate a hiring plan to
ensure that first generation immigrants are well-represented in government
agencies and institutions. This reduces the need for formal policy on unauthorized
immigration. Laws are not necessary when those with the power to get things
done—elected officials, police, and social workers—can readily identity with and
understand the interests of unauthorized immigrants. This was the approach taken
in Sacramento, where the equitable treatment of residents without legal status was
controlled, for the most part, by informal community norms.

248

6. Encourage citizenship. Establish a program to assist foreign-born residents
become citizens. Local government in Sacramento, California used this strategy to
increase political support for programs and policies affecting unauthorized city
residents
7. Take back the facts. To sustain policy in the face of opposition, use research to
refute a challenger’s disinformation campaign. In Sacramento, sanctuary foes—
national anti-immigration lobby groups, members of the legal community, and
regional INS directors- dropped their campaign to recall policy backers, and
overturn Sacramento’s “City of Refuge” policy, after research conducted by a task
force disproved their claims.
8. Tell the truth and do it fast. Immediately and directly contradict disinformation
via a point-for-point rebuttal of the opponent’s propaganda allegation. Denver
used this strategy to withstand a fierce, decade-long campaign to resend the city’s
policies on foreigners waged by state and federal congressional members, national
anti-immigrant lobby coalitions, and radio talk show hosts. Elected and appointed
officials in Sacramento also employed this tactic.
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CHAPTER 7
Contributions, Limitations and Future Directions
Municipal immigration policy is happening all around us, but it is ad hoc from
city to city and not well understood. More research is needed to help us understand this
increasingly important dimension of immigration policy. My research helps fill this gap
in scholarship.
The dissertation addresses two questions. First, what unauthorized immigration
policies do local governments pursue, under what circumstances, and for what reasons?
Second, what explains intercity variation in municipal responsiveness to the policy
preferences and interests of residents without legal status?
Multicity Policy Exploration
To answer the first question, I conducted multicity exploratory policy research. I
gathered data on policies adopted and considered by U.S. city governments in response to
seven hotly debated, locally important immigration issues: asylum for unauthorized
refugees, worksite deportation raids, government benefits for noncitizens, devolution of
immigration law enforcement, “locally legal” identification cards, unregulated day laborcontractor market exchanges, and amnesty for unauthorized immigrants.
I found that there are far more positive responses to these issues than negative
examples. Cites crafting policies to protect the rights of residents without legal status
have been at it longer (since the 1980s), than localities with deter and deflect settlement
agendas, which only emerged in the last decade. Local officials in cities with lots of
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diversity and foreign-born residents, and governments in places with little of either,
generated both kinds of policy.
The policy direction pursued by municipal authorities—pro- or anti-unauthorized
immigrant—was shaped by city political culture—liberal or conservative. Either way,
municipal policy development coincided with federal action (or inaction) on unauthorized
immigration. The aim of these measures is three-fold: to address controversial local
issues associated with unauthorized immigration; effectuate change in public opinion on
the topic; and urge local governments in other cities, or at the state and federal level, to
shift their policies in accordance with local ideas about the rights of residents without
legal status.
The day labor issue generated the largest volume of policy action on both sides of
the debate, followed by post-9/11 devolution of immigration law enforcement. Asylum
for unauthorized refugees and federal deportation raids also sparked a lot of local policy
action, most of it on the pro-sanctuary side. The issue of public benefits for noncitizens
caused a great deal of controversy but far fewer policies were considered or passed. The
fewest policies are those related to “locally legal” identification cards and amnesty for
unauthorized immigrants. In all areas, intercity policy copycatting is common and
involves a range of tactics well beyond those represented in existing literature.
This research verifies and expands existing policy data, most of which is based on
a limited pool of municipal tactics and drawn from patchy secondary sources. My policy
inventory situates responses to seven different hot button issues under one umbrella. It
reveals previously unidentified policy strategies, and covers a twenty-five year period.
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The typology that I constructed from this data will make future comparative study easier.
It can used to guide data collect and classification. Still, it has some limitations.
Empty cells in the matrix highlight a key limitation of the multicity policy
research: missing policy information and how to account for it. There is no way of
knowing whether the absence of a policy means a city is unwilling, or unable, to take
action in that area. The issue may have been addressed by a nongovernmental agency or
other level of government. The rationale for the presence of a policy is also unknown.
Does a policy benefiting foreign in-migrants always mean that was the intent, or was a
potential lawsuit the motivation? Also sometimes policies that appear immigrant-friendly
may not be. For instance, to encourage use of a formal hiring hall a city might prohibit
soliciting work on sidewalks. This can hurt day laborers if employers do not use the
hiring center. More descriptive and contextual depth is required to make these kinds of
distinctions. A comprehensive comparison of cities is not possible with the data available
in my inventory. Case studies are needed.
Multiple Case Study Research
To answer my second research question, I conducted a theory-driven, comparative
case study of local government response to unauthorized immigration in three U.S. cities:
Sacramento, California; Denver, Colorado; and Portland, Oregon. These issues were the
same topics included in my exploratory policy study.
I found that, despite differences in the racial and ethnic structure of these cities,
local governments in all three municipalities were “responsive” to the needs and
preferences of residents without legal status. A liberal political culture, as expressed
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through entrepreneurial political leaders, has been important in shaping regime
development and policy action on unauthorized immigration in these cases.
In each city, greater responsiveness to unauthorized immigrants can be traced to
the emergence of a policy entrepreneur with an immigrants’ rights agenda; prior to this
time, no protections for residents without legal status were considered or adopted. These
political innovators used humanitarian arguments to rally together enough support from
social movement organizations, and national lobby groups, to carry out their inclusive
policy agenda—expanding opportunities for unauthorized immigrants. The progressive
regimes that they built held fast during economic downturns, and across numerous
political administrations.
The policy approach taken by these entrepreneurial mayors and their allies varied
city-to-city, and was shaped by the ethnoracial composition and configuration of each
locality. Multiethnic Sacramento openly embraced its “sanctuary city” status, produced
mostly nonbinding resolutions, and took a blanket policy approach. Bifurcated Denver
and homogenous Portland relied on a binding, piecemeal policy strategy, albeit for
different reasons.
My case study research thus supports and refines previous research that
emphasizes political factors: political mobilization, partisanship and policy
entrepreneurship. It substantiates claims made by Miriam Wells (2004) about the de facto
role that local government plays in the immigration regime, which is to adjust federal
policy in accordance with local ideology and interests. It also supports Ramakrishnan and
Wong’s (2010) empirically-based hypothesis about political affiliation, which is that
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Democratic counties (and by extension, cities) are less likely to pursue anti-illegal
immigration policies than Republican areas. Moreover, the research underscores the
importance of urban political leadership and SMOs in local governance; insights that
contribute to scholarly discussions about the explanatory usefulness of the urban regime
model, and the budding body of empirical literature on policy entrepreneurship.311
My dissertation also fills a gap in the emerging literature on new immigrant
destinations by describing and explaining what is happening in reemerging immigrant
gateways. New immigrant destinations with a progressive stance on the membership of
unauthorized immigrants have not been extensively studied. The findings also highlight
the “liberty-enhancing” role city government can play in protecting the rights and
liberties of non-U.S. citizens and in doing so, adds to the discussion on immigration
federalism, which has focused primarily on local immigration controls. By zeroing in on
local responses to unauthorized immigration issues, I have generated a richly detailed and
deep elaboration of this particular aspect of municipal foreign policy, contributing to
international relations scholarship. Finally, my insights about a city’s human rights valueorientation shaping policy choice might focus more attention to culture in the study of
contemporary immigration.
I have also drawn lessons from the cases studied that might prove useful in other
similarly situated cities. These suggestions could inform the decisions of urban planners,
community organizers, public administrators, and municipal policymakers. Also, by
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See Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1997; Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, 1997; Mintrom 1997, 2000;
Edwards, C., Jones, G., Lawton, A., & Llewellyn, N., 2002; Mintrom & Norman 2009; Huitema &
Meijerink, 2010; Cohen, 2012; Niedhardt, 2012; Seifert, 2012.
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highlighting the urban aspects of national immigration policy, my research could promote
greater involvement of local government in federal policy discussions, and consequently,
more “city-friendly” foreign policy. The study will certainly challenge the assumption
that localities are powerless over immigration processes imposed from above. City
governments across the United States act autonomously to adjust federal immigration
policy in accordance with local interests, and in doing so allow for finer regulatory
controls than the one-size-fits-all policy that can be implemented at the national level.
These “second-order immigration regulations…provide a means by which, in the absence
of a national consensus, the competing interests surrounding immigration can still be
negotiated and regulated” locally (Su, 2010, p. 370).
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A Checklist of Potential Municipal Unauthorized Immigration Strategies
1. Lawmaking (legal and extralegal). Local government (mayor or city council)
might use its legislative authority to formulate new policies pertaining to
immigration issues, or amend or rescind existing policies. These policies may be
general or specific to a particular government agency or department, and take the
form of an executive order, administrative law, statue, code, ordinance, resolution,
license, permit, or memorandum.
2. Law enforcement. Municipal authorities might use their regulatory and police
powers to actively enforce existing municipal laws that were not originally
intended to address immigration-related issues, but have that effect. In practice
this may involve charging police, or other municipal employees (e.g., building
inspectors and social workers), with enforcement of previously unenforced rules
and regulations governing sanitation, health, housing, transportation, and labor
standards (Light, 2006). A local government might also choose to turn a “blind
eye” to local or even federal law violations. In some cases, municipal employees
may be required to enforce federal immigration laws, or a local version of the
same.
3. Legal opinions. Local authorities might use legal opinions to support their
position on immigration or foreign in-migrants.
4. Finance appropriation. City officials might use their investment powers to
directly or indirectly provide monetary grants or in-kind contributions (e.g.,
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facility space) to support immigrants, or withhold public investments from the
same.
5. Provision of public benefits. Local government might use its fiscal discretionary
power (i.e., power to use public revenues) to either guarantee or deny foreign inmigrants equitable access to: job services; public parks, libraries and schools;
police and fire protection; health and emergency services; housing and
transportation; water and waste disposal.
6. Property policy management. A municipality might use its property clout to
purchase, hold, condemn, lease, sell, or manage a property for the purpose of
advancing or hindering the interests of foreign nationals.
7. Public works authority. City authorities might use their say-so over the
construction and operation of public works (i.e., public facilities like hospitals,
schools, libraries, parks) to help or hinder its new foreign-born residents.
8. Land use and urban planning. City bureaucrats might use their expertise to plan
for the physical and social development of a city in a way that serves the interests
of foreign in-migrants, or hinders these newcomers.
9. City strategic planning. To attract foreign investors or needed laborers, a
municipality may develop a blueprint to advance its vision of becoming more
internationally-oriented (e.g. Cleveland’s internationalization plan). A local
government might also develop a strategy for ridding the city of unwanted foreign
in-migrants.
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10. Community image building. Local government might chose to use its city
branding clout to create a welcoming or unwelcoming settlement environment for
foreign in-migrants. In practice this may involve the use of officially or
unofficially sanctioned symbols (billboards, flags, or logos), city value statements
or mottos, and so on.
11. Municipal human resource oversight. Local officials might use their control over
city human resources to establish personnel systems—like selection, promotion,
salary standards--that benefit or disadvantage foreign in-migrants.
12. Corporate policy control. Local government might use its contract and litigation
power in a manner that either benefits or disadvantages foreign in-migrants.
13. Lobbying. A city official might use his or her lobbying privileges to persuade
representatives in the national or state legislature, or courts, to support their policy
preferences or position on immigration.
14. Coalition Building. To enhance its capacity to achieve immigration-related policy
objectives, a local government might build cooperative alliances with public
officials in other cities or states. It might also facilitate the development of publicprivate partnerships, or even partner with federal immigration authorities.
15. Public relations. A city official might use his or her position of prominence as a
platform for informing the public about immigrant-related issues and resources, or
to shape public opinion in accordance with the city’s immigration agenda. In
practice this may involve: launching a public education or advocacy campaign,
issuing public service announcements, publishing information on the city’s
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website, sending a press release to the media, staging a news conference or
signing ceremony, writing and submitting an opinion piece in a local newspaper,
distributing a press kit, making a presentation to a civic group, delivering a State
of the City address, disseminating research reports that bolster a city’s position on
immigration, writing a letter to the president of the United States or Congress, or
testifying for governmental hearings and regulatory bodies.
16. Political participation planning. City officials might use their political
appointment and meeting convening authority to establish mechanisms for
incorporating the concerns of foreign in-migrants into government decisionmaking. Or conversely, municipal authorities might refuse to support the public
participation of refugees and immigrants. In practice this may involve: appointing
foreign-born residents to public commissions, advisory groups and tasks forces
(or excluding them from the same); allowing noncitizens to vote in local
elections, or not; or holding meetings, public hearings, and workshops to get
policy feedback from foreign in-migrants (as opposed to establishing a discussion
process that only elicits feedback from natives, or does not provide language
access to non-English speakers).
17. Civic mediation. Local government might use its community planning process to
diffuse immigration-related civic disputes or facilitate collaborative problemsolving. In practice this might involve providing a venue and discussion
facilitator. A municipality might also hire an outside professional to design a
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discussion process, or assign a police officer to act as a liaison between
contending community groups.
18. Ballot box crusades. Elected officials might refer to voters a pro- or antiimmigrant measure, or campaign on a pro- or anti-immigration platform.
19. Protests. Municipalities might instigate direct protest actions to call attention to
insufficient immigration assistance from the federal government. Halting
construction of a federal mandated public housing project for immigrants is an
example.
20. Civic membership. City officials might use their jurisdictional authority to decide
who is considered a legitimate community member. In practice this may involve
issuing municipal identification cards to federally unauthorized city dwellers, or
accepting an ID card issued by a foreign government.312 It might also entail
efforts to deflect unwanted refugees and immigrants to other cities, through use of
no trespassing laws or other unfriendly ordinances.
21. Taking no action. A municipality might also decide to do nothing when
immigration-related issues arise locally. There are a number of plausible reasons
for this laissez-faire approach: indifference or ambivalence towards immigration
and foreign in-migrants; local government lacks the capacity to act on its policy
decisions; or the issue has already been addressed by a higher level of government
or by community-based agency.

312

These ID cards typically extend to holders the rights and benefits of citizenship, including access to
government services.
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Table 1.1 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (asylum for unauthorized refugees)
ISSUE: ASYLUM FOR UNAUTHORIZED REFUGEES
Policy
Types

Responsive
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Domain: Legal-Political
Issue Areas:
Local government petitions Congress for
Protest
nondiscriminatory compliance with
Federal
refugee policy and suspension of
Policy
deportations pending investigation.313
&
Political
City council adopts a nonbinding “City or
Membership Refuge” resolution declaring its
jurisdiction a safe haven for specific
groups of unauthorized refugees,314or all
persons unjustly denied refugee status
(Seattle, WA), and pledging to protect
asylees, and humanitarians offering them
assistance, from deportation by limiting
city cooperation with the INS.315

313

Somewhat Responsive

Unresponsive

Establish Sister City relationship with the
home nation of refugees/alysees denied
protection by the U.S. federal government
as an indirect way to protest uneven
application of U.S. refugee policy
(Berkeley, CA).

City officials take no stand on the federal
refugee policy debate, because they want
to prevent a flood of unwanted refugees
from settling in their jurisdictions, or
because they are oblivious to the plight
of asylum seekers.

Establish citizen commission to study
becoming a “sanctuary city”; asylum
seekers incorporated into the deliberation
process (Seattle, WA).

Local government repeals a declaration
of sanctuary to stem the tide of
unauthorized refugees into the city (Los
Angeles, CA), or after challenging a
federal law in court and losing (New
York).

Local government takes no stand on the
U.S. refugee policy debate, because a
“sanctuary” policy was already adopted at
the state level (e.g., cities in New York
and New Mexico).

Berkeley, CA; San Francisco, CA; Chicago, IL; Cambridge, MA.
Berkeley, CA; Davis, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Oakland, CA; Sacramento, CA; San Francisco, CA; San Jose, CA; Santa Barbara, CA; Santa Cruz,
CA; West Hollywood, CA; Boulder, CO; Chicago, IL; Takoma Park, MD; Bookline, MA; Cambridge, MA; Sommerville, MA; Detroit, MI; East
Lansing, MI; Duluth, MN; Minneapolis, MN; St. Paul, MN; Fargo, ND; Santa Fe, NM; Ithaca, NY; Rochester, NY; Swarthmore, PA; Burlington,
VT; Olympia, WA; Seattle, WA; and Madison, WI (Bau, 1994; Hobbs, 1994).
315
While the language contained in the resolutions differs somewhat, most proclamations discouraged municipal employees, including police, from
gathering or disseminating information on the citizenship status of city residents, or otherwise cooperating in the investigation of civil immigration
violations.
314

Table 2.1 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Spatial, Socio-Economic & Legal-Political (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Public
Space/
Labor
Market/
Policing
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No municipal restrictions on solicitation at
informal job hiring sites; DLs freely solicit
work on public streets and sidewalks in
accordance with their constitutional rights
(New York, NY; Graton, CA; Seattle, WA).

Limited anti-solicitation enforcement;
police only ticket motorists who stop to
pick up day laborers in the street, but they
do not stop anyone who pulls into nearby
parking lots (Concord, CA).316

No municipal restrictions on loitering
exist; DLs are allowed to stand on the
sidewalk while waiting for work
(Berkeley, CA).

To appease local businesses, police
temporarily scatter crowds of day laborers
with no intent to prosecute; workers return
quickly.

Police department assigns a fulltime patrol
officer to civic dispute mediation duty;
officer acts as a liaison between
stakeholders involved in the DL land use
dispute (Herndon, VA).

Police responds to complaints made by or
about workers seeking day labor by
shifting responsibility to another level of
government or NGO, e.g., bilingual legal
aid services (San Francisco, CA), state
labor relations, or federal immigration law
enforcement.

A police department forms a separate unit
to manage public space disputes between
DLs and oppositional neighbors
(Glendale, CA).

316
317

Elected officials enact a “blanket” antisolicitation ordinance (that criminalizes
DL solicitation everywhere within the
city), or a limited solicitation law
imposing time, place and manner
restrictions on DL soliciting on public
property (Herndon, VA; Marietta, GA).
Local government adopts a DL-specific
anti-loitering ordinance making loitering
317
to obtain a job a crime (Miami, FL).
Elected officials pass a citywide
no-trespassing law regulating DL
solicitation on private property (Lake
Forest, CA).
Police selectively enforce a state notrespass law arresting suspected
unauthorized DLs and charging them with
trespassing into the U.S. (New Ipwsich &
Hudson NH; Brewster, NY).

Day labor (DL) program staff said police enforcement of the ordinance is fair and supportive of day workers’ interests (Alindor, 2007).
These unevenly applied codes have been dubbed “Standing While Latino” laws since day laborers are overwhelmingly Latino.

Table 2.2 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Socio-Economic & Legal-Political (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Labor
Market/
Policing

Police enforce existing zoning and lands
use codes not originally intended to
restrict DL activity but has that effect,
e.g., anti-solicitation laws against
newspaper hawkers (Carlsbad, CA) or
prostitution.
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Police enforce existing laws targeting
offenses associated with DL sites, rather
than regulating the act of solicitation itself
(e.g., trespassing, loitering, public
intoxication, jaywalking, littering and
vandalism activity).
City council enacts a minor crimes
initiative that allows police to crack down
on DL activity by charging suspects with
minor crimes, like riding a bicycle
without a bell or sitting on a milk crate in
the city limits (Miami, FL).
Uniformed police establish a highly
visible, intimidating presence near areas
where DLs congregate as part of a
deliberate and coordinated campaign to
drive them off the streets (Mamaroneck,
NY).

Table 2.3 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Spatial, Socio-Economic & Legal-Political (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Public
Space/
Labor
Market/
Policing

Town council amends a local harassment
ordinance to make it illegal to follow
someone in or about a public space with
the intent of harassing, annoying or
alarming (Carbondale).
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City council prohibits independent police
deportation sweeps, and calls on federal
agents to clearly state they are not local
police (Richmond, CA).

Local government enacts a resolution or
issues a statement of opposition to the
Minutemen, and groups like them, that
harass DL at job sites (San Francisco, CA;
Austin, TX).

Undercover police posing as contractors
seeking to hire workers arrest DLs for
violating traffic control measures
(Redondo Beach, CA).
Police conduct a large-scale, INS-style
arrest campaign targeting suspected
illegal immigrants at DL sites; workers
without ID cards are detained for arrest
by ICE or Border Patrol agents
(Riverside, CA; Mesa, AZ).
Police chief refuses to sign antiharassment agreement drafted by migrant
day laborers and their advocates
(Portland, Oregon).
City authorities take no action to curb
harassment and intimidation of DLs by
anti-illegal immigrant citizen brigades at
job sites (Vista City, CA).
Police officers harass potential employers
by reporting the license numbers of
vehicles seen picking up DLs to federal
immigration authorities, the IRS, and
State Department of Labor (East
Hampton Village, NY).

Table 2.4 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Socio-Economic & Legal-Political (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Labor
Market/
Policing

City officials ignore local employer
infractions of federal laws prohibiting the
hiring of unauthorized immigrants, to
protect the free speech and equal
protection rights of employers who hire
DLs.
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City council passes an ordinance that
criminalizes day labor wage theft (Kansas
City, MO; San Francisco, CA; Seattle,
WA; Phoenix, AZ).318
City enforces the criminal provisions of
state theft of services wage laws through
the police department. (New Haven, CT;
Austin, TX).

Public works personnel sets up a noparking zone at informal DL gathering
site, so police can fine employers who
stop under a state parking law (Riverside,
CA; Chandler, AZ).
Public works personnel block access to
the ad hoc DL gathering site with
temporary fencing and/or adjust traffic
signals for higher volume of pedestrian
traffic through crosswalks, or by moving
a nearby bus stop, to reduce loitering
(Herndon, VA).
City council passes a resolution declaring
its disapproval of city contractors who use
illegal immigrants (Tulsa, OK).
Local officials adopt an ordinance
requiring contractors to employ minimum
numbers of native-born residents on city
construction projects (Boston, MA;
Chicago, IL).

318

These amendments to municipal petty theft code supplement state law by covering cases for lesser amounts than prosecutable at the state level;
most day laborers, who most often are owned less than $500, were left out of the loop.

Table 2.5 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Spatial & Socio-Economic (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Housing/
Labor
Market

Local government adopts ordinance
establishing housing for DLs (Graton,
CA).
City does not enforce anti-crowding
codes.

City denies permits and contracts to
businesses that hire unauthorized
immigrants (Bernadino, CA).

338

Local government passes an employer
registration ordinance requiring
employers, or agents who hire DLs off the
street, to register with the city, display
permits in their car windows, and present
workers with written terms of
319
employment (Vista City, CA).
Local officials initiate a moratorium on
apartment construction (only big lot
single family houses are allowed), forcing
DLs to share housing (Santa Ana, CA).
City council passes a strict anti-crowding
ordinance reducing the number of housing
occupants above the state standard (Santa
Ana, CA), or changes the definition of
“family” in city code so households are
restricted to immediate family members.
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Since workers did not request these protections, and the names of registrants are public record and easily accessible by anti-immigrant activists,
day labor advocates contend the ordinance is an attempt to break up local day labor sites under the guise of protecting workers from unscrupulous
contractors. They argue that mandatory employer registration hurts workers by discouraging contractors and homeowners from hiring (Rodrigues
& Gaona, 2006).

Table 2.6 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Spatial & Socio-Economic (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Public
Space/
Housing/
Labor
Market

City officials vote down a proposed
comprehensive anti-illegal immigrant
ordinance that would have prohibited DLs
from soliciting work, punished businesses
that hired unauthorized day workers, and
mandated that official city business be in
English only (San Bernardino, CA).

Local government adopts new housing
codes forbidding use of rooms other than
bedrooms for sleeping, or limiting the
square footage of driveways.

339

Mayor ‘beefs up’ inspections of
properties where DL “stacking” is
suspected; inspectors issue citations after
counting cars parked in front of houses
(Danbury, CT), looking for violations of
local landscaping ordinances (Palmdale,
CA), or by monitoring water use to
identify the practice (Brewster, NY).
City prosecutes slum lords without
replacing lost dilapidated tenements with
affordable housing, deflecting DLs to
cities that do not sanction for illegal
housing (Los Angeles, CA).
City council adopts an ordinance that
imposes penalties on employers who give
illegal DLs jobs and landlords who rent to
them (Hazleton, PA; Valley Park, MO;
Escondido, CA; Farmers Branch, TX;
320
Fremont, NE).

320

The Farmers Branch ordinance was approved by voters and also requires city residents to ‘register’ and obtain an ‘occupancy license.’

Table 2.7 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Legal-Political & Socio-Economic (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Political
Participation/
Labor
Market

City officials provide community
planning support for stakeholders
working on a win-win solution to a local
day labor problem; day laborers are
included in the problem identification and
321
resolution process (Portland, OR).

Elected officials organize a regional
summit or forum to bring together experts
to discuss an area-wide response to the
322
DL phenomenon (Phoenix, AZ).

340

City officials appoint a temporary
commission or task force to oversee
research on the local DL-contractor
market exchange problem and investigate
policy options; DLs are included in the
appointed advisory group (Mesa, AZ;
Gaithersburg, MD; New York, NY;
Austin, TX).
Local government hires an external expert
to study the local DL dilemma (including
interviewing DLs), evaluate DL center
models in other jurisdictions, and design
a process for discussing alternative
solutions (Berkeley, CA; Mesa, AZ;
Queen Creek, AZ).

321

City officials convene a public hearing or
town meeting to get public feedback on a
proposed formal day labor site; DL are
not included (Farmingville, NJ).
Local government provides community
planning support for stakeholders
working to get rid the city of unwanted
DLs; solutions discussed benefit nativeborn community members only, and DLs
are excluded from the decision-making
process.

Community planning support includes a discussion venue, meeting facilitator, staff support for research, a policymaker and possible translation
services.
322
COG is a nonprofit association comprised of 21 local governments surrounding out nation’s capital, plus area members of the Maryland and
Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives.

Table 2.8 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Spatial & Socio-Economic (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Land use/
Labor
Market

Local government purchases, leases or
condemns public property to secure a
good location for a formal DL hiring site
(Houston, TX; Laguna Beach, CA).

341

City planning commission or zoning board
authorizes conditional or special use
permits that allow a NGO to open and
operate a DL hiring site in an area
previously off-limits (Portland, OR).
City council amends municipal code to
encourage the location of DL hiring sites
in
an area conveniently located for
employers and DLs.
City attorney offers free legal advice to a
private property owner willing to donate
or lease space for a city-sanctioned DL
center.

City council adopts a conditional use
permit that makes approval of a new
Home Depot store contingent upon the
retailer’s agreement to construct and
maintain a DL facility onsite (Burbank,
CA).
City council adopts an ordinance
amending municipal code to create a
conditional use permit process and DL
operating standards for home
improvement chains seeking to renovate
their big-box stores (Los Angeles, CA).
City issues a conditional use permit for a
city-sanctioned DL center that forbids the
provision of services other than job
matching and ESOL classes onsite
(Herndon, VA).
City officials convene a community forum
or town meeting to overcome NIMBY
opposition and facilitate successful
adoption of a planned DL job site.

City council passes an ordinance
prohibiting the use of public property for
a DL center.
City planning commission or zoning
board turns down a special use permit
request blocking a proposed DL hiring
site.
Local officials adopt an ordinance
authorizing the location of a formal DL
site in an area that pleases local residents
and business owners, but is out of the way
for employers and hard for DLs to get
there (Glendale, CA; Fort Worth, TX).
City adopts an ordinance requiring local
businesses that want to allow DLs, and
those who employ them, to congregate on
their property to apply for a permit;
violators are penalized with a fine or jail
(Orange, CA).

Table 2.9 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated day laborer-contractor market exchange)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Labor
Market

Vendor activity at DL hiring sites is
permitted; city officials enforce existing
civil liberty protections that guarantee DLs
opportunities to sell goods in public areas
(Portland, OR).

342

Local government solicits help from area
merchants to provide materials and/or
financial assistance in building a DL
center (Glendale, CA).
City council provides monetary grants or
in-kind contributions to a DL center
developed and run by a NGO (Denver,
CO; Portland, OR).
City council adopts an ordinance
approving the use of public funds to set up
a formal DL center (Los Angeles, CA; San
Francisco, CA; Houston, TX), or funds a
DL program that operates on the street
323
(Berkeley, CA).

323

Public works personnel improves
organization at an existing informal DL
gathering site by installing a 4-way sign to
slow traffic down, posting rules for DLs
and employers to follow, placing trash
containers and portable restrooms onsite,
or providing seating and shelter to protect
workers from the elements (Berkeley, CA).
City council and/or community advisory
board enacts a resolution in favor of a
community-funded and run DL center; this
show of support lends legitimacy to the
project, but little else.

Local government denies DL-vendors
access to public space to sell goods, or
authorities amend city contracts requiring
vendors to certify that they do not employ
unauthorized workers and hire code
enforcement officers conduct spot checks
(Santa Clarita, CA).
City council and/or community advisory
board enacts a resolution opposing a
community-funded and run DL center.
City council adopts an ordinance
prohibiting the use of taxpayer money to
establish or run a DL center, or votes to
defeat a proposal for a the same (San
Rafael, CA; Farmingville, NJ).
City withdraws approval for public
money to fund a DL center, after
constituents threaten officials with their
jobs (Suffolk County, NY), or the
following year authorities delete funding
for a DL center from the municipal
budget (Houston, TX).

Fund sources: the city’s general fund, the mayor’s budget (e.g., the Mayor’s Office on Immigration and Refugee Affairs), or the city’s
Economic and Community Development Department funds, which come from federal Block grant money.

Table 2.10 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (unregulated DL-contractor market exchanges)
ISSUE: UNREGULATED DAY LABORER (DL)-CONTRACTOR MARKET EXCHANGE
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Labor
Market

343

Municipal officials shuts down taxpayersubsidized DL center due to litigation
(Herndon, VA), budget woes (Austin, TX),
lack of DL use (El Monte, CA; El Monte,
CA), liability issues (Laguna Beach, CA),
location zoning code conflicts (Chicago,
IL), a change in political leadership
(Passaic, NY), to make way for a
community revitalization project
(Huntington Town, RI), or anti-illegal
immigrant protests (Costa Mesa, CA).

Mayor and/or city council members solicit
donations from individuals and businesses
to keep a day labor center afloat, usually
after city funding is discontinued or before
it starts (Houston, TX; Denver, CO).
City government promotes a local DL
hiring site by proving information about
day laborer resources on their websites
(Chandler, AZ; Los Angeles, CA; Plano,
TX).
City-funded DL center allows unrestricted
access (either implicitly or explicitly) to
immigrants regardless of citizenship; staff
does not check the immigration status of
workers (Plano, TX).
Local government establishes
supplemental programs at DL hiring
centers.

City’s ordinance to fund DL center
requires people seeking employment to fill
out a federal eligibility form; but the law
is not enforced (Houston, TX).
Do nothing: the DL issue has already been
addressed at that state or county level; a
suburb is using the resources of a nearby
city; or local constituents have a high
threshold of tolerance for day labor
activity (New York).

City-funded DL center required to post
eligibility requirements stating job
services are restricted to U.S. citizens and
permanent residents (Garland, TX);
workers who use a city-run center are
required to present two forms of ID and
be able to provide proof of illegal status
(e.g., a federal I-9 form) (Orange, CA).
Do nothing, because local government
lacks understanding of the issue, or the
community is so divided over the day
labor debate that no resolution will work.

Table 3.1 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (worksite deportation raids)
ISSUE: WORKSITE DEPORTATION RAIDS
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Legal-Political & Socio-Economic (overlapping)
Issue Areas:
Policing/
Protest
Federal
Policy/
Social
Services

Local government adopts a resolution
declaring its jurisdiction an “INS Raid-FreeZone” to protect the city’s unauthorized
workforce from unfair federal deportation
sweeps (San Francisco, CA; Mendota, CA);
or broadens provisions of an earlier adopted
324
“City of Refuge” law (Oakland, CA).

344

A regional alliance of mayors adopts a
resolution asking the U.S. president to
suspend raids and deportations of
noncriminal immigrants, until “unequal
protection” concerns are addressed.325
City council awards grant to NGO providing
housing for victims of federal immigration
raids (Portland, OR), or authorizes foster
care for children of raid victims (San
Francisco, CA).
City officials call for removal of a district
INS director, and request a federal
investigation of local immigration operations
(Portland, OR).
324
325

City officials denounce raids at local
workplaces (via press conference or
letter to congressional representatives)
(Santa Fe, NM; Portland, OR; San
Rafael, CA).
Police chiefs issue public statements
voicing opposition to immigration raids
(Austin, TX; Sacramento, CA; LEEI).
City council resolution calls for a
moratorium on immigration raids during
the Census count (Sacramento, CA).
Mayor declares state of emergency
seeking federal disaster relief in the
aftermath of an financially devastating
immigration raid (Postville, IA).
Mayor urges the distinct INS director to
sign a MOU with immigrant advocates
promising to shift its focus to criminal,
instead of civil, immigration law
violations.

City council adopts a resolution declaring
its jurisdiction an “Illegal-Free-Zone.”
Police officers assist federal agents on
local immigration raids, or conduct largescale, INS-style deportation raids
themselves (Riverside, CA; Mesa, AZ).
Local authorities use a federal
racketeering law to sue companies that
hire illegal workers (Canyon County, ID).
Mayor writes Secretary of Homeland
Security to request local immigration
enforcement and deportation help.
City government urges the federal
government to approve more funds for
immigration law enforcement.
Elected officials ignore complaints from
immigrants’ rights groups about an
abusive INS director and local raid
operations.

The original decree only applied to specific refugees from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, or South Africa.
Los Angeles, CA; Oakland, CA; Seattle, WA; Chicago, IL; Fresno, CA.

Table 4.1 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (devolution of immigration law enforcement)
ISSUE: DEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Legal-Political
Issue Area:
Policing

Police department confidentiality order
prevents local law enforcement from
asking about immigration status unless
police make criminal arrest (Sacramento,
CA: Chicago, IL).

Police department does not have a written
policy, but its unofficial procedure is to
“don’t ask” about immigration status
during police routine work (Sacramento,
CA).

345

Police commission or chief initiates a
police department order limiting
cooperation between police and federal
immigration agents; local law enforcement
prohibited from detecting, arresting or
detaining persons for noncriminal
326
violations of immigration law.
City council adopts a nonbinding
resolution limiting police-INS
cooperation; the decree vows that city
personnel will not be used for immigration
327
law enforcement purposes.
City officials approve ordinance banning
use of public funds for local enforcement
328
of civil immigration laws.
326

Los Angeles, CA (1979); Denver, CO; Washington, DC; Portland, OR; New York, NY.
San Francisco, CA; Sacramento, CA; Chicago, IL; Santa Fe, NM; Austin, TX; Dallas, TX.
328
Berkeley, CA; San Francisco, CA; San Jose, CA; Santa Cruz, CA.
327

Local law enforcement officers inquire
about immigration status during routine
police work.
Police department assists federal
authorities with federal immigration law
enforcement.

Table 4.2 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (devolutions of immigration law enforcement)
ISSUE: DEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Legal-Political
Issue Areas:
Policing/
Protest
Federal
Policy/
Political
Participation

Local government adopts a “Civil Liberty
Zone” resolution opposing sections of the
PATRIOT Act and affirming/reaffirming
their commitment to protect the civil and
329
human rights of all immigrants.

346

Police department opts out of federal
investigations of foreign visa overstayers
(San Francisco, CA Chicago, IL; Detroit,
MI; Portland, OR).
City council authorizes the withdrawal of
police officers from the FBI-led antiterrorism task force (JTTF) (Portland,
OR).

329

Mayor and police chief sign contract
pledging vigilant oversight to ensure
confidentially laws are not violated by the
PATRIOT Act (Portland, OR).

Police assist with federal anti-terrorism
interrogation of foreign visa overstayers.

Police chief creates a police advisory
council comprised of representatives
from groups targeted by federal agents
for deportation, e.g., Muslim and Arab
visa overstayers, and/or Latinos without
green cards (Portland, OR).

City council convenes public hearings
on its JTTF agreement with the DHS,
but renews a MOU agreement despite
opposition from a majority of citizens
(Portland, OR).

City council member writes Op-Ed piece
in local newspaper defending city’s
position on withdrawing police from the
FBI-led JTTF (Portland, OR).

As of December 7, 2007, 406 cities and counties passed resolutions opposing sections of the USA Patriot Act. See Bill of Rights Defense
Committee at: www.bordc.org; and American Civil Liberties Union at: www.aclu.org.

Table 4.3 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (devolution of immigration law enforcement)
ISSUE: DEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Legal-Political & Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Protest
Federal
Policy/
Policing

City council adopts a nonbinding
resolution opposing federal legislation to
transfer federal immigration enforcement
responsibilities to local police (Los
Angeles, CA; Boston, MA; Dearborn, MI;
Seattle, WA).

Mayor or city council issues a press
release to announce opposition to
devolution of federal immigration law
330
enforcement (Dearborn, MI).

347

Police department or police chief issues a
statement criticizing federal programs
(e.g., 287(g), CLEAR Act) to transfer
immigration law enforcement authority to
local police agencies, or signs a statement
issued by the national police chief
association (Sacramento, CA; Denver,
331
OR; Portland, OR).
Police department opts out of federal
programs deputizing trained police
officers to act as immigration agents.

330

City council adopts ordinance authorizing
police participation in the federal
programs that allow trained police
officers to arrest and detain unauthorized
foreign nationals for noncriminal
infractions of immigration law.
Police department signs MOU agreement
with U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to train police to
332
enforce civil immigration laws.
Mayor publicly criticizes ICE for
ignoring the city’s application for 287(g)
training to deputize police as immigration
agents (Waukegan, IL; Carpentersville,
IL).

Arizona’s new immigration law (SB 1070) requires local law enforcement officials and agencies to enforce federal immigration laws.
A list of 57 member cities involved in the Major Cities Chief Association is available at: http://www.majorcitieschiefs.com.
332
Participating cities as of September 2011: Task Force only: City of Springdale Police Dept. (AK), City of Rogers Police Dept. (AK), City of
Danbury Police Dept. (CT), City of Durham Police Dept. (NC), Farmers Branch Police Dept. (TX), Herndon Police Dept. (VA), Manassas Park
Police Dept. (VA), Manassas Police Dept. (VA).; Jail Enforcement only: Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (NV), Carrollton Police Dept. (TX);
Jail and Task Force: City of Mesa Police Dept. (AZ), City of Phoenix Police Dept. (AZ), Florence Police Dept. (AZ).
331

Table 4.4 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (devolution of immigration law enforcement)
ISSUE: DEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Legal-Political
Issue Areas:
Protest
State
Policy/
Policing

348

City council adopts resolution condemning
an ordinance adopted by another city/state
that requires police to check the
immigration status of suspected civil
immigration law violators (Pasadena, CA;
Santa Ana, CA; Brownsville, TX); the
decree urges the governor/mayor to rescind
the measure (San Diego, CA; Tacoma, WA),
or urges lawmakers in their own jurisdiction
not to adopt a similar law (San Antonio, TX;
333
El Paso, TX).
City officials pass a resolution calling for a
moratorium on public travel to another
city/state (San Jose, CA; Minneapolis, MN;
St. Paul, MN; New York, NY), or travel
boycott, (Oakland, CA; West Hollywood,
CA; Boulder, CO; El Paso, TX), or full
boycott of companies in that city/state until
its policy on unauthorized immigrants is
repealed (Berkeley, CA; Los Angeles, CA;
San Francisco, CA; Denver, CO; Boston,
MA; Austin, TX; Seattle, WA).

333

City council sends a resolution to the
White House calling on Congress and the
President to sign comprehensive
immigration reform bill to prevent more
city/state laws from cropping up that allow
police to enforce civil immigration laws
(Sacramento, CA; Denver, CO; New York,
NY).

City council proposes a resolution
denouncing a city/state that boycotts
another city/state because it allows police
to enforce civil immigration laws
(Menifee, CA).

City manager sends a letter to
governor/mayor of another city/state
telling her/him that their city/state has lost
all business from their city employees
because of its police policy on
unauthorized foreigners (Gallup, NM).
Public school board or superintendent bans
work-related travel to a city/state that
allows police to enforce civil immigration
laws (Denver Public Schools, Los Angeles
Unified School District board, San
Francisco Unified School District board).

Arizona’s new immigration requires police to detain people they suspected are in the country illegal and to verify their status with federal officials; it also makes
it a state crime to be in Arizona without “immigration papers” and allows people to sue local government or agencies if they believe state or federal law in not
being enforced.

Table 4.5 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (devolution of immigration law enforcement)
ISSUE: DEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Legal-Political
Issue Areas:
Protest
State
Law/
Policing

349

City council passes resolution authorizing
city attorneys to provide support for legal
challenges filed by local lawyers against
another city/state that permits local
enforcement of immigration law (San
Jose, CA; Portland, OR).

A boycott against businesses in another
city/state that allows police to enforce
civil immigration is urged but not
prohibited by City Hall (Chicago,
334
IL).

Elected officials urge voters to reject a
local car impound measure that targets
unauthorized immigrants by requiring
police to impound vehicles operated by
unlicensed drivers, revealing immigration
status (Denver, CO).

Police department, or national group
representing big-city chiefs (e.g., LEEI)
hold a news conference to speak out
against cities that allows police to enforce
civil immigration laws; they voice
opposition to ‘enforcement only’
335
policies.

City council repeals car impound
ordinance passed by popular vote (Denver,
CO).
Police commission approves a plan to ease
car impound rules unfairly burdening
immigrants without driver’s licenses (Los
Angeles, CA).
334
335

Local government does not require police
to enforce a new car impound rule even
though the law requires it (Denver, CO).

Police impound cars of unauthorized
immigrants without driver’s licenses.

The City of Los Angeles amended its boycott to make an exception for an essential Arizona business operating in the city.
A list of police departments represented by the Law Enforcement Engagement Initiative (LEEI) is available at: http://www.leei.us.

Table 5.1 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (government benefits)
ISSUE: GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FOR NONCITIZENS
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive

Unresponsive

Domains: Legal-Political & Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Protest
State
Law/
Social
Services

City officials urge local citizens to vote
“no” on a local ballot measure (e.g.,
California’s Proposition 187) that would
deny benefits to unauthorized immigrants
(Sacramento, CA).

350

A regional alliance of mayors and county
supervisions adopt a resolution calling for
a say in the welfare policy debate and
more federal funding for cities with large
immigrant populations; the decree is sent
to state and federal lawmakers
(Sacramento, CA).
City council adopts a nonbinding
resolution declaring its jurisdiction an
immigrant ‘Safety Net Zone’ to affirm its
commitment to provide immigrants access
to social services and vow city personnel
will not be used for immigration purposes
(Chicago, IL; Santa Fe, NM; Austin, TX;
Dallas, TX); other municipalities pass a
confidentiality law to add “teeth” to their
existing sanctuary resolution restricting
the exchange of immigration status
information (Takoma Park, MD;
Minneapolis, MN; Seattle, WA; NYC).

Mayor and/or city council speaks out
against an initiative proposed in another
state (e.g., Proposition 187) that would
deny benefits to unauthorized immigrants;
he/she vows to reject local proposals for a
copycat measure (Denver, CO).
Mayor lobbies the U.S. president and
Congress to vote against federal
legislation that would deny benefits to
immigrants (Sacramento, CA; Denver,
CO).

Mayor and city council members urge a
“yes” vote on a local ballot measure (e.g.,
California’s Proposition 187) that would
deny benefits to unauthorized immigrants.
City passes an ordinance barring
unauthorized immigrants from public
facilities and services like clinics,
libraries and schools (Prince William
County).

Table 5.2 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (government benefits for noncitizens)
ISSUE: GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FOR NONCITIZENS
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Legal-Political & Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Protest
Federal
Policy/
Social
Services

City administrators file a lawsuit
challenging the legality of federal
legislation prohibiting local government
from restricting the exchange of
information with federal immigration
agents (New York, NY).

351

City leaders form a partnership with
county government to guarantee
immigrants’ uninterrupted access to social
services after federal legislation denies or
restricts welfare benefits to immigrants.
City council approves the use of public
revenues to guarantee immigrants access
to social services denied them by the
federal government; no distinction made
between legal and unauthorized
immigrants (San Francisco, CA; Denver,
CO), the conditioning of city/county
services or benefits upon immigration
status is prohibited by law (San
Francisco, CA).

Local public services agencies do not have
a written confidentiality policy, but their
unofficial practice is “don’t ask” about a
client’s immigration status.
Local public hospitals vow to keep secret
an immigrants’ legal status even after the
municipality’s sanctuary resolution is
rescinded (New York, NY).

City prohibits the use of taxpayer funds to
provide social services to illegal
immigrants.
City officials cut off funding to local
charities/nonprofits that provide services
to unauthorized immigrants.

Table 5.3 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (government benefits for noncitizens)
ISSUE: GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FOR NONCITIZENS
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Social
Services

City officials issue an executive
order/ordinance creating a language access
policy that mandates all local public service
agencies offer bilingual services and
materials to clients (Oakland, CA; San
Francisco, CA; New York, NY).

352

Mayor issues an executive order mandating
that all city departments develop formal
protocol and training on its ‘sanctuary’ law
(San Francisco, CA).
Mayor launches a city-funded outreach
campaign to publicize the city’s immigrant
“sanctuary” policy to ensure unauthorized
residents feel safe when visiting a public
health clinic, enrolling their children in
school, reporting a crime, or seeking other
municipal services; ads available in multiple
languages (San Francisco, CA)
Local officials pass a law that requires
private businesses providing services to
immigrants comply with municipal language
access and privacy laws (New York, NY).

Mayor creates an Office of Immigrant
Affairs to help familiarize immigrants
with the city’s social services and
programs (New York, NY).

Table 5.4 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (government benefits for noncitizens)
ISSUE: GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FOR NONCITIZENS
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Social
Services

City launches a local earned income tax
credit to help mitigate the harmful local
consequences of welfare reform (Denver,
CO; Montgomery County, MD; New York,
NY).

353

City council adopts a living wage policy
designed to help low-wage service sector
workers, most of which are unauthorized
336
immigrants.

336

City adopts a high minimum wage
ordinance for the purpose of ridding the
city of unwanted immigrants; the law
deflects poor, low-skilled workers to
cities that do not enforce labor laws and
have lower wages, because that is where
firms have relocated (Los Angeles, CA).

Baltimore, MD; Berkeley, CA; Hayward, CA; Los Angeles, CA: Oakland, CA; Oxnard, CA; Pasadena, CA; Richmond, CA; San Fernando,
CA; San Francisco, CA; San Jose, CA; Santa Barbara, CA; Santa Clara, CA; Santa Cruz, CA; Sacramento, CA: Watsonville, CA; West
Hollywood, CA.

Table 6.1 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (“locally legal” identification cards)
ISSUE: “LOCALLY LEGAL” IDENTIFICATION CARDS
Policy Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domains: Legal-Political & Socio-Economic
Issue Areas:
Political
Membership/
Policing/
Social
Services

Mayor issues an executive order authorizing
acceptance of foreign government-issued ID
cards as official identification; the law
instructs the local police department and city
agencies to accept it like a state driver’s
license (Denver, CO).

Police department publicly endorses
and/or accepts the foreign governmentissued ID cards, but has no stated
337
policy.

354

City council approves a resolution endorsing
ID cards issued by the foreign consulates
(Durham, NC).

Police chief issues a public statement
advocating for the state issue of a
provisional or non-resident driver’s
license for unauthorized immigrants
(Los Angeles, CA).

Local officials lobby financial institutions
for fair access to banking services via
acceptance of the foreign government-issued
or municipal ID cards.

Local government studys how and why
other cities have implemented a
municipal ID card (Oakland, CA;
Dayton, OH).

City council passes a resolution not to
endorse ID cards issued by foreign
governments (Painesville, OH).
City council adopts a measure that makes
it illegal for local agencies to accept ID
cards issued by foreign consulates to
access municipal facilities, programs or
services.
Local government lobbies for legislation
banning foreign government-issued ID
cards, and opposes efforts to give foreign
in-migrants access to financial services
and credit.

City issues a municipal ID card to residents
regardless of their immigration status; card
allows holder to access city facilities and
services (San Francisco, CA; New Haven
CT).

337

Phoenix, AZ; Glendale, CA; Colorado Springs, CO; Pueblo, CO; Chicago, IL; Durham, NC; Dallas, TX; Huston, TX; San Antonio, TX .

Table 7.1 Typology of municipal unauthorized immigration policy by domain and issue area (amnesty for unauthorized immigrants)
ISSUE: AMNESTY FOR UNAUTHORIZED RESIDENTS
Policy
Types
Responsive
Somewhat Responsive
Unresponsive
Domain: Legal-Political
Issue Areas:
Protest
Federal
Policy

Mayor petitions congressional delegation to
vote against a law that would make illegal
immigration a felony (e.g., HB 4437) and in
favor of a proposed federal amnesty bill.
City council enacts an ordinance urging
Congress to reject immigration reforms that
criminalize individuals because of their
immigration status (Lancaster, PA).

355

Mayor travels to the nation’s capital lobby
for a remedy to the citizenship backlog
problem (Sacramento, CA).

City officials try to sway public opinion
in favor of amnesty through press
releases, or by lending support to
immigrant rights’ advocates by
speaking at pro-amnesty rallies.
Members of big-city police chief
associations stage press conferences to
educate the public about the need for
amnesty legislation or other means of
integrating unauthorized immigrants
into the legal system, possibly with a
driver’s license (Los Angeles, CA).

Local government urges the U.S.
president and their national
representatives in Congress to vote
against a proposed amnesty bill.

